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FOREWORD 
By WAYNE MORSE 
AL OF us who attended the University of Wisconsin and pursued 
any of the courses in economics during the 1920's could not 
help being influenced by John R. Commons. I was not among 
those who took course work from him directly. But among my own 
professors were some of John R.'s most notable students, includ­
ing the late Selig Perlman and Edwin E. Witte. Professor Com­
mons frequently lectured to us in the courses taught by  Perlman 
and Witte, and I attended many informal round-table seminars 
conducted by him, Perlman, and Witte. 
John R. Commons virtually founded a school of thought of 
his own in the area of the economic institutions of the United 
States and their relations to each other. More than that, he saw 
what few academicians ever seehis ideas tested out at state and 
national levels. To me, his greatest contribution was the assumption 
on which he worked and which he fostered that theorizing about 
economics was not enoughthat the academic world must com­
municate with makers of public policy and put their theories to 
the test of practice. 
vii The result was that starting in Wisconsin and spreading to 
other states and eventually to the national government, a series of 
advances in industrial relations was brought about. 
Unemployment and accident insurance, public utility regula­
tion, social security, civil service and administrative law as we 
know them today all may be traced in one degree or another to the 
work of this academic statesman of political economy. These will 
be detailed and described in the following pages. While most were 
fought tooth and nail at the time of their adoption, they have 
largely produced the era of "enlightened capitalism" which  we 
enjoy today. 
A second great contribution of Commons which many of us 
absorbed from him was his insistence on following where the facts 
lead. Commons worked and wrote in direct opposition to the type 
of economics which is based on pure logic. Today, it is perhaps 
hard to understand how remote from practice and practicality 
much of our academic thought in the social sciences really was at 
the turn of the century, and how novel his approach of fact find­
ing was. 
Every student of Selig Perlman has heard him tell how he 
came to the United States as a young man for the purpose of 
showing how American labor  fitted  into and buttressed the 
Marxian concept of class warfare and revolution. He told Com­
mons this was his objective, and he wanted to study under Com­
mons to prove that the American labor movement fitted into 
Marx's dialectic. 
Commons' reply was that he would hold Perlman to only 
one requirement, and that was that his conclusions must be based 
upon carefully researched facts, no matter where they led. Dis­
torting the findings to fit a preconceived theory would not be al­
lowed. Perlman accepted the requirement and held to it. Out of 
his study, Perlman showed American labor history as disproving 
Marx, rather than supporting him. Instead of seeking control of 
viii production by wresting it from capitalists, American labor sought 
rather a fair share in the fruits of capitalist productivity. 
This kind of direct investigation into corporation functioning 
and the day-to-day operation of a labor organization was not the 
general practice at that time. Commons was a great intellectual 
pioneer in bridging the considerable gap between social theories 
and social practice. He not only did it himself, but he trained a 
generation of scholars in the same technique. 
The interest in political economy which he aroused in his 
students and the intellectual demands he instilled in them have 
flowed out to thousands of others. 
Commons' anniversary fully deserves this observance. He 
changed much of our academic procedure and he contributed 
enormously to the betterment of our economic life. 
Senate Office Building 
Washington, D. C. 
June 13, 1962 
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xi INTRODUCTION
 
JOHN R. COMMONS' books collect dust on library  shelves. Except 
for brief mentions in histories of economic and social thought, 
few books mention his name. Each year the ranks of his former 
students thin. Although they continue to honor him, he is almost 
forgotten by others. Few laymen ever have heard of him; even the 
younger economists are a little hazy as to what he represented. 
Why should anyone take the trouble to write a book about 
such a man, and why would anyone wish to read it? The answer 
lies in Commons' extraordinary career and its influence. Nominally 
he was an economistbut of the institutional school. Like others 
of this school, he rebelled against the prevailing doctrines of his 
day. But more important than his economic protestantism was the 
fact that he was a reformer. His impact as a theoretical economist 
has remained small, but the reforms in which he participated have 
become important institutions. They, more than his or any other 
economist's theories, have contributed to a radical change in Amer­
ican thought. Because the reforms were incompatible with the pre­
vailing conceptions of the social order, they slowly undermined it. 
At the turn of the century, economists, lawyers, and political 
scientists as well as the general public were behind the times. Ne­
glecting the changes brought on by industrialization and urbani­2  JOHN R. COMMONS 
zation, they thought in terms of an individualism more appropriate 
to America's rural past. In their eyes each individual had complete 
responsibility for making his own decisions and for accepting the 
consequences. Although local governments did provide care for 
the destitute, such aid was held to a minimum, because it was in­
consistent with the doctrine of individual responsibility. The state 
and federal governments were supposed to refrain from such 
activity. 
The role of government, in the eyes of the turn-of-the-century 
thinkers, should be limited to that necessary for maintaining law 
and order. It was held that regulation of economic activity not only 
was wrong, but also was unnecessary. Competition regulated the 
economy more effectively and justly than could any government. 
Without any need for governments to interfere, the competitive 
system operated to gauge the community's needs in type and quan­
tity of goods. It provided protection for the consumer, an efficient 
allocation of resources in production, and a just distribution of in­
come. Governments could afford to follow a laissez-faire policy. 
Although this conception still was widely held at the turn of 
the century, it overstated the amount of competition that actually 
existed. Growth of trusts and large corporations threatened to 
stifle competition in many industries. In some, such as in railroads 
and public utilities, attempts to provide competition produced seri­
ous problems without protecting consumers effectively. 
Unequal bargaining power between employers and their em­
ployees also cast doubt that distribution was as just as was sup­
posed. Even when workers combined in unions they were unable 
to bargain effectively. 
The greatest shortcoming of thinkers at the turn of the cen­
tury was that most of them gave insufficient attention to instability 
in our economy. Periodically, large numbers of workers were 
thrown out of work long enough to exhaust their savings. Such 
savings provided, at best, only a postponement of destitution. Those 
who had no savings were not much worse off. Not even superior 
workmen were immune from this suffering. During depressions 
that periodically plagued the U. S. economy employers were forced 
to dismiss even their best workers. Clearly, through no fault of his 
own, a man could be reduced to destitution. Although he worked 
hard and well, lived prudently, and saved part of his income he had 
no assurance that he would escape the effects of unemployment. 3  Introduction 
Commons believed that the concept of society prevailing at 
the turn of the century was outmoded as well as unjust. Even at 
that time he felt an urge to create a new concept to fit existing 
conditions. More important to him, however, was the need to solve 
some of the problems caused by changing economic conditions. 
Most of his life he worked on these problems ; and finally, late in 
his life, he published his version of the economy and social order. 
It did not change America's conception of its society, because re­
forms on which he had worked already had done that. Further­
more, his theoretical formulations were not well received by other 
economists. Ignored more than rejected, his theories have had lim­
ited influence. But his reforms profoundly affected American 
thought. 
His career was allied with the progressive movement in Wis­
consin. Because Wisconsin was a pioneer state in social legislation, 
he had unusual opportunities to participate in reforms. This state's 
university, where he was a professor of economics for many years, 
was, in a very real sense, part of the state government. Governors, 
legislators, and other officials turned to the professors for expert 
aid in many fields. Being an intimate friend of Governor Robert 
M. LaFollette, Sr. (later Senator), Commons played a frequent 
and an important role in drafting legislation for state officials. 
Commons went to the University of Wisconsin in 1904 after 
serving for two years as a labor conciliator for the National Civic 
Federation. The acceptance of this organization by respected indi­
viduals was the first nationwide recognition of the legitimacy pf 
labor unions. As such, it was an admission that individual bargain­
ing no longer was adequate. Commons continued, through his teach­
ing at the University of Wisconsin and through his writing, to 
spread the word that labor unions were both respectable and neces­
sary. However, they were not the entire answer to the workers' 
problems. Some of these problems required governmental action. 
Commons sponsored so many important proposals for social 
legislation that he has been called "the intellectual origin of the 
movement toward the welfare state."' In the movement to perfect 
safety laws and to introduce compensation for injured workmen, 
he was the outstanding leader. Not only did he draft the safety law 
adopted in Wisconsin, but also he traveled widely to explain the 
program to officials of other states. To aid in the spreading of this 
and other proposals he was instrumental in organizing the Ameri­
1 Boulding, p. 7. See BIBLIOGRAPHY. 4  JOHN R. COMMONS 
can Association for Labor Legislation. This organization brought 
together economists, social workers, and officials charged with ad­
ministering labor laws. After serving as its secretary for several 
years, he installed his student, John B. Andrews, in his place. 
Through this organization he was able to extend Wisconsin's ex­
perience in labor legislation to many other states. 
Among other labor laws for which Commons was responsible 
were Wisconsin's minimum wage law for women, its improved 
child labor law, and its unemployment compensation law. He also 
strongly backed health insurance, but the campaign for it failed. 
Of the labor laws, his unemployment compensation law was the 
most significant. After Wisconsin adopted the bill he and his stu­
dents drafted, his students carried on the campaign until the fed­
eral government made unemployment compensation nationwide. 
He took an interest early in the organization and administra­
tion of governments because his reforms were dependent on them 
for implementation. Soon after he went to Wisconsin he drafted 
its civil service law. Like Robert M. La Follette, Sr., for whom he 
drafted the bill, he was concerned with the power of machine poli­
ticians to frustrate the enactment and administration of progres­
sive laws. 
His greatest contribution to government was his share in the 
development of the administrative commission. Although today 
such commissions are ubiquitous, they were radical innovations at 
the turn of the century. Because their powers included those usu­
ally  distributed among the legislative,  judicial, and executive 
branches of government, it was claimed that their use violated 
our traditional form of government. Conservatives insisted that 
such commissions were unconstitutional and that the regulation 
they attempted was unnecessary and harmful. But because none of 
the three older branches of government could regulate economic 
activity effectively, the administrative commission was developed 
and introduced into one field after another. Commons played a 
significant role in this process. 
In 1907 he drafted the Wisconsin law that later was used as a 
model in numerous states to create commissions to regulate public 
utility companies. Yet his contribution in the development and use 
of administrative commissions would have been comparatively 
slight if it had been limited to the public utility field. Far more im­
portant was his extension of their use to the administration of 
labor laws. When Commons drafted the law creating Wisconsin's 5  Introduction 
Industrial Commission in 1911, he revolutionized the administra­
tion of safety laws. By transferring the function of making safety 
regulations from the state legislatures to a commission equipped 
with experts, he made it possible for such laws to be kept up to 
date. 
The commissions also served as comprehensive agencies to 
administer other labor laws such as those concerning child labor, 
women workers, minimum wages, maximum hours, and accident 
and unemployment compensation. They also could provide such 
services as those offered by employment offices, mediators, and 
conciliators. 
From the first, Wisconsin's Industrial Commission has been a 
success. So well did Commons draft the law creating it that it has 
been copied by numerous other states. The widespread success of 
these commissions has made them the principal means of admin­
istering labor laws. 
Commons did more than create administrative agencies to reg­
ulate economic activity; he helped to staff them. As a university 
professor he trained numerous economists skilled in research tech­
niques. While other economists were skilled at developing and ex­
plaining theories, these Commons-trained people were skilled in 
the digging up of facts crucial to the success of any economic regu­
lation. Because persons who could do this work were in demand, 
many of his students found jobs in government. A surprisingly 
large number of them gained prominence as administrators. Their 
knowledge and influence contributed in large measure to the suc­
cess of the reforms Commons sponsored. 
Troubled by a belief that the U. S. economic system worked 
injustices on the consumer and the worker, Commons worked on 
many reforms. He offered regulation of public utilities for the 
consumer, greater bargaining power, and a system of social secur­
ity for the worker. Yet such protection meant the abandoning of 
the old concept of each individual being responsible for his own 
welfare. It meant replacing laissez-faire with many of the admin­
istrative features of the welfare state. 
The lack of appreciation for John R. Commons' contribu­
tions should be remedied. Until his influence is placed in its proper 
perspective the history of reform in America is incomplete. Al­
though nearly 17 years have elapsed since his death in 1945, as yet 
no one has written a book about his influence. Perhaps one out of 6  JOHN R. COMMONS 
the rapidly thinning ranks of Commons' students will honor him 
yet with such a book. Such a student would be familiar not only 
with institutional economics, but also could give firsthand informa­
tion about Commons' life and personality. 
Commons' many writings reveal traits of his personality, but 
its main force can be felt only by reading and listening to what his 
students have said about him. From their descriptions he can be 
pictured as a small, thin man with a furrowed face and unruly hair. 
Apparently, he gave the appearance of being reserved and shy, 
but there must have been sufficient warmth in his personality to 
make even a stranger comfortable in his presence. His speech was 
slowsometimes painfully so to the impatientbut those who 
knew him did not mind. His intelligent questions revealed a genu­
ine interest in whomever he interviewed, no matter how humble 
that person might be. Commons' interviewing technique has been 
described as Socratic, but with gentleness and warmth. Everything 
his students say about him adds to the image of a kind, generous, 
and sympathetic person. Besides admiring him as a great scholar, 
they worshipped him as a man. 
David Saposs declared : 
Closest to us of course was Commons, or "John R." as we wor­
shipfully referred to him. In his bearing, appearance, manner, and 
casual relations he was the extreme opposite of the exuberant, ex­
trovert type. His shabby and ascetic appearance and his obviously 
reserved air would be likely to discourage and even unintentionally 
repel those not aware that this forbidding exterior sheltered a sensi­
tive genius who warmheartedly overflowed with inspiring ideas and 
sympathetic appreciation of the trials and tribulations of novitiates. 
His happy technique of launching his assistants and students on 
a project by outlining some general ideas and permitting them the 
joyful experience of working on their own, with only occasional 
guidance, was a remarkable procedure in developing initiative and 
firing scholarly imagination.2 
Perhaps the reason why no student of Commons has written 
a book about him is that they loved him too well. Perhaps they 
fear no book will give him full justice. Furthermore, they find it 
painful to accept anything but the highest praise of him. So far 
their inhibitions have prevented them from putting an end to the 
serious neglect of Commons' part in social and institutional reforms. 
With full consciousness of my own limitations, I offer this 
book as an introduction to Commons. May I be among the first, but 
not the last, to make such an offering. 
2 David Saposs, "The Wisconsin Heritage and the Study of Labor Works and Deeds
of John R. Commons," an address at the Selig Perlman Memorial Dinner at the Univer­
sity of Wisconsin on November 20, 1959. PART I  BACKGROUND
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PERSONAL BACKGROUND 
AND EARLY YEARS 
JOHN R. COMMONS was born October 13, 1862, in the little 
town of Hollandsburg, Ohio, on the western border of the 
state. Soon his parents, John Commons and Clara Rogers Com­
mons, made him into a Hoosier by moving a few miles to Union 
City, Indiana. Although a few miles to the north of Hollandsburg, 
Union City is just over the line in Indiana. In Indiana, Commons 
was raised in a small-town atmosphere, where the center of social 
activity for the male inhabitants was the general store. There the 
men sprawled in their chairs and drawled their witticisms between 
squirts of tobacco. They loved to expound on politics and science; 
and the boy, John R. Commons, loved to listen to them.1 
Commons' home influences 
Originally, Commons' father operated a harness shop in Union 
City, but when his friends asked him to edit a local political paper, 
he freely gave of his time. Finally, after working for a while with­
out compensation, he decided to make editing a paper his business. 
By swapping his harness shop he acquired the Union City Times. 
Afterwards he made several more such trades so that at various 
times he had in his possession three hundred acres in the unsettled 
Red River Valley of Minnesota, thirty acres in the pine forests of 
1 Commons, Myself, p. 8. 
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Florida, and another newspaper, the Winchester Herald. Unfor­
tunately, he never could operate any of these enterprises profitably. 
John R. Commons declared that his father had never made the 
transition between the barter economy and the modern one of 
money and credit.2 He tended to spend too much time writing arti­
cles, poetry, and making pictures. 
In spite of his literary bent, the elder Commons failed to 
achieve the same success of that Hoosier journalist of fiction, John 
Harkless.3 Like Booth Tarkington's hero, Commons' father de­
voted much space in his newspaper to local politics; however, he 
never could collect from his customers or manage the business end 
of his paper. At one point, John R. Commons and his brother of­
fered to relieve him of the financial and mechanical responsibilities 
if he would concentrate on editorial writing and newsgathering. 
He refused to make this admission of failure, even though the 
business continued to worsen. 
Although John R. Commons' father was not a successful man, 
apparently he was intelligent. With only a country school educa­
tion, he managed to be a "studious reader of Milton, Shakespeare, 
other poets, and of history."4 His particular enthusiasm was Her­
bert Spencer, who at the time was popularizing Darwin's theories 
on evolution. How much the elder Commons understood of Spen­
cer's extensive philosophy only can be conjectured, but even his in­
terest in the subject displayed an interest in intellectual currents of 
his day. 
Charles Darwin had upset many men's thinking when he pub­
lished his Origin of Species.° Particularly hard hit were the theo­
logians who had contended previously that they could see a Divine 
design for the universe. Evolution with its changing forms seemed 
to deny there was any such design. In fact, it seemed even to de­
prive God of his role of Creator. If man had evolved from lower 
animals how could it be said that he was created in God's image, if 
created by God at all? Later most theologians were able to accept 
the concept of evolution but not without some reluctance and 
changes in their thinking. 
Even scientists found Darwin's theory startling.° Such an out­
standing naturalist as Louis Agassiz rejected it to his death in 
2 Ibid., p. 11. 
3 Tarkington. 
4 Commons, Myself, p. 12. 
5 Darwin. 
Hofstadter, Social Darwinism In American Thought, p. 5. 11  Personal Background and Early Years 
1873. Even President Barnard of Columbia, a distinguished sci­
entist, wrote in 1873 that "the existence of God and the immortal­
ity of the soul could not be maintained if organic evolution were 
true."7 Yet most scientists did accept Darwin's work. Evidence by 
other men in geology, biology, and paleontology had been casting 
doubt on the concept that species had been fixed at the time of the 
world's creation. Darwin's Origin of Species provided a theory 
that could explain previously puzzling facts. 
If scientists found the concept of evolution a controversial 
matter at first, laymen did even more so. Many of them viewed 
with horror the idea of having an ancestor who was "  .  .  . a hairy 
quadruped, furnished with a tail and pointed ears, probably ar­
boreal in habits." They preferred to keep Adam in the role of an­
cestor and to believe in the Biblical version of creation. Only some­
one willing to defy public sentiment would defend the theory of 
evolution in those first years after its publication. Commons' father 
was that sort of man. 
Although Darwinism certainly symbolized an unconventional 
outlook, the extensions of it into the social field were conservative 
in their implications. When Herbert Spencer coined the phrase, 
"The survival of the fittest," he was describing the rugged indi­
vidualism of a highly competitive economic order. He and his fol­
lowers, who were called Social Darwinists, believed that competi­
tion weeded out the unfit and permitted the fit to rise to the top as 
economic rulers. To permit such competition to function, they in­
sisted governments should adopt completely laissez-faire policies. 
There is no indication as to whether the elder Commons was aware 
of the conservatism of Spencer's doctrine. 
Conservative though Spencer's beliefs might be in their social 
implications, the idea of evolution certainly was very radical for a 
little Indiana town. People there tended to be highly religious. Any­
one entertaining such thoughts about evolution was thought to be 
flirting with eternal damnation. The four leading churches of the re­
gion, Presbyterian, Methodist, Baptist, and Christian, were ultra 
conservative.8 A fifth church, with its numerous Quaker Friends, 
added to the soberness of the community. John R. Commons' mother 
was a devout Presbyterian. His father was of Quaker origin. 
John R. Commons described his home as one with a rift.° He 
did not mean that it was marred by quarreling or lack of harmony. 
7 Quoted in Curti, p. 549.
 
8 Carmony, p. 22.
 
9 Commons, Myself, p. 8.
 12  JOHN R. COMMONS 
Rather he referred to the strong contrast between his father and 
his mother. His father, 2n impractical man with a speculative 
mind, was quite different from his sober-minded, ambitious, and 
responsible mother. Commons thought these differences were sig­
nificant in his development, and he probably was right. 
The elder Commons and his tobacco-chewing cronies might 
enjoy the titillating experience of discussing dangerous subjects, 
but his wife, Clara, held tenaciously to her Presbyterian faith. Al­
though she taught her children tolerance of others' views, including 
those of their father, she strove to impress upon them the necessity 
for maintaining religious orthodoxy. For a long time she clung to 
the ambitious hopes that John R. Commons would become a minis­
ter. She failed to realize these hopes, but she did succeed in making 
him into a reformer. 
The Calvinistic religion his mother planted in John R. Com­
mons did not guarantee salvation if a person performed good works 
and tried to live a good life. Only God could predestine man with 
Grace that would bring salvation. Furthermore, no man could be 
sure of having been given Grace. If he had, he undoubtedly would 
perform good works, lead a good life, and be strong in resisting 
temptation. Yet even the best man must have felt some shadow of 
doubt ; in the privacy of his mind he must have admitted the exis­
tence of at least some evil in his life. The obviously damned could 
go about their ways, but the good never could be complaisant. Each 
man felt he should work hard to prove to himself that he was of 
God's elect. 
This early religious training, along with the sober example of 
his mother, seems to have left an imprint on Commons' character. 
In his autobiography he describes himself as a product of Puri­
tanism.1° He demonstrated his fervor by abstaining from use of 
liquor and tobacco for twenty years after he entered college. Per­
haps his greatest demonstration of Puritanism was in his adoption 
of his mother's industrious habits. 
Not only was Commons' mother industrious ;  she also was 
educated. She had attended Oberlin College when it was the only 
coeducational college in the country, graduating in the class of 
1853. 
Those who had known Commons' mother at Oberlin had ex­
pected her to go far ; however, marriage ended her career as a 
10 Ibid., p. 15. 13  Personal Background and Early Years 
school teacher. Eventually she became the breadwinner for the 
family, but not by teaching. When her children reached college age
she moved to Oberlin to operate a rooming and boarding house 
for students. The father remained for a while in Indiana continu­
ing to publish his newspaper, but finally he gave  up this losing
effort so that he could rejoin her. 
Because Clara Commons had to forego a career of her own, 
she was determined that her children would receive college educa­
tions. In this desire she was only partially successful. She suffered 
from poor health before she could help all three of them get educa­
tions. Only the eldest, John R. Commons, managed to finish col­
lege. The other two, Samuel (Alvin) and Clara had to withdraw 
in the middle of their college careers. Thus, John R. Commons, 
chief beneficiary of his mother's sacrifices, became the principal 
carrier for her ambitions. No matter how subtly applied, the pres­
sure was on him to succeed. 
Commons' educational difficulties 
Commons did not attend college immediately after graduating 
from high school at Winchester, Indiana. Instead he spent three 
miserable months trying to teach in a country school. When he lost 
disciplinary control over his pupils he resigned, vowing never to 
teach ag-ain.11 He then tried selling subscriptions to Henry Ward 
Beecher's Christian Union, but was unsuccessful. After these two 
failures, he worked for his father on the Winchester Herald. 
Since his mother saw no future for him on his father's paper, 
she scraped up her savings and sent Commons to Oberlin College 
in 1882. Because of the limitations of his small-town high school 
education, he was required to spend the first year in the college's 
preparatory department. 
Finally in 1883 he entered Oberlin as a freshman. He had a 
choice of two curricula, literature or the classical studies of the 
department of philosophy and arts. Commons, like all but  one of 
his fellow male freshmen classmates, chose classical studies. (They 
left the literary course to the women.) Hence, instead of taking 
a seemingly watered-down version of a classical education, Com­
mons struggled with the more orthodox version. 
At the time Commons entered Oberlin most colleges in the 
U. S. emphasized training for the ministry. The majority of col­
11  p. 28. 14  JOHN R. COMMONS 
lege presidents, including President Fairchild of  Oberlin, and 
many college faculty members were  clergymen.12 Consequently, 
they stressed Latin, Greek, logic, rhetoric, and  mathematics. At 
Oberlin the curriculum included only as much science as might be 
taken today by a typical liberal arts major. Elsewhere  offerings 
were even more meager. Although a certain amount of choice was 
permitted, the number of elective courses was not extensive. Ex­
cept for Harvard, which had' adopted the elective system soon after 
Charles Eliot became president in 1869, college courses tended to 
be standardized. 
The distinguishing feature of the older type of college, how­
ever, was not its curriculum,  but the attitude of its professors. 
They believed in dispensing knowledge, not extending  it. Com­
mons' description of his education does not include  information 
about the attitude at Oberlin, but other accounts show the  general 
attitude elsewhere. Commons' colleague, E. A. Ross,  devoted a 
chapter in his autobiography to his own undergraduate days at 
Coe College. Although Ross tended to praise his  undergraduate 
training, his description does disclose some of its limitations: 
In college days we were by no means ill-taught. As freshmen
there were fourteen of us, as seniors only six. We followed one 
. course of study and each was called on in every class session . 
Coe's professors at $1,200 a year (say $2,700 today), were not mas­
ters of their subjects, still less builders, but they were men of parts 
who put a good text into our hands and saw that we mastered it.13 
G. Stanley Hall, who was a few years older than either Com­
mons or Ross, was even more complete in his account of his edu­
cation at Williams. After describing the  limitations of Williams 
College in the field of the sciences, he went on to generalize as to 
the professors' methods. He maintained: 
Most, if not all, of the professors covered nearly the same 
ground, with the same authors, year after year, and but  few of them 
aspired to authorship of any kind or were known to  the outside 
world; yet the institution was by no means "mono-hipic." The excep­
tions were Professor A. L. Perry, who was one of the pioneer apos­
tles of free trade; Professor Bascom, who had  published several 
books of a philosophical character and afterwards  printed more; 
and of course, chief of all, the president, Mark  Hopkins, who was 
also "professor of moral and intellectual philosophy."14 
12 Thirteen of 49 faculty members at Oberlin were  clergymen. See Catalogue of 
Officers and Students of Oberlin College, 1883-4.
 
13 Ross, p. 13.
 
14 Hall, p. 156.
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Commons' teacher, Richard T. Ely, received his undergrad­
uate education at Dartmouth during its period when it was also 
under religious influence. Ely described its president in these 
words : 
The Reverend Asa Smith had been head of a Presbyterian 
church in New York and his method of discipline was decidedly of 
the old school. When he became President of Dartmouth, he imme­
diately restored the marking system, prescribed rules of conduct
which were signed by faculty and students, distributed prizes for 
composition and history and put back into the curriculum the full 
quota of dead languages of his day.15 
When Reverend Smith became president of the college, he 
found its financial condition distressing. Although he wished to 
effect a number of reforms, he was unable to raise sufficient money. 
Consequently, many of the college's facilities remained inadequate. 
Ely's description of the library displays this condition and the gen­
eral caliber of the college in that day. He said : 
The college library, for example, was a sad reflection of the
poverty of Dartmouth at this time. The few volumes were poorly 
catalogued and contained a good deal of duplication. The library was 
unheated in spite of the severity of the winters, but this made little 
difference, since it was open only one hour twice a week.16 
Ely's description of Dartmouth's library corresponds closely to 
John William Burgess' remembrances of Columbia's in the late 
1870's: 
The library of the college, as I first saw it, was a very great 
disappointment to me. The college was already more than a hundred 
years old, and its library did not consist of more than twenty-five 
thousand volumes, few of which were rare and none of which were 
modern .  .  .  It was housed in an old tinder-box building with no 
conveniences for studying or reading. It had nothing but a very in­
adequate author-catalog ; and it was administered by a single person 
as librarian, the Rev. Beverly R. Betts, who crept up to the building 
about eleven o'clock in the morning and kept the library open for 
drawing of books about one hour and a half daily.17 
Oberlin combined an atmosphere of religious orthodoxy with 
radicalism in politics and social relationships. Before the Civil War, 
in the days when Commons' mother was a student, abolitionists 
made it a headquarters. Not only was it the first to admit women, 
but it also was the first to admit Negroes. Later it became a prom­
inent center for temperance activities. 
15 Ely, Ground Under Our Feet, p. 28.

16 Ibid., p. 29.
 
17 Burgess, pp. 174-175.
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Commons' career at Oberlin was not particularly successful. 
His difficulty seemed to stem from the fact that he could not study 
in the conventional manner, as would be expected from someone 
studying the classics. For example, in even a subject of a different 
nature, biology, he spent all of his time trying to find the heart 
beat of a little waterbug that came to life in the roadside ditches 
before the ice melted.18 Instead of tentatively accepting what he 
was taught, at least long enough to gain a general view, he stub­
bornly plodded along, refusing to accept each step until it was 
proved to his satisfaction. In the meantime, the other students 
completed the study of all specimens included in the course. Com­
mons confessed he believed that his stubborn curiosity earned him 
a passing grade, although he had otherwise  failed his biology exam­
ination. He complained that he could never verify any of the pic­
tures he saw in scientific publications which his professor hunted 
up for him. Such a failure, he claimed, caused him to be skeptical 
of all scientists. 
Commons' first great crisis came in connection with his study 
of Greek.19 As with biology, he refused to follow the prescribed 
program. Instead, he insisted on hunting up  everything he could 
find on the letter Omega. Consequently, he fell so far behind that 
he was not prepared for his examination. 
Some of Commons' scholastic difficulties at Oberlin might be 
traced to the very formal nature of the courses he took. Because 
of his practical nature, some of what he was taught might have 
seemed to be remote from experience in the world he knew. His 
dissatisfaction with the lack of correspondence between his biology 
textbook pictures and the actual specimens tends to illustrate this 
feeling. If he had been willing to accept what he had been taught, 
without stubbornly following his own course, he would have been 
far more successful as a student. 
Commons' scholastic failures resulted in what he described as 
a nervous breakdown which came in the spring of 1885. He ex­
plained : 
Coming out from a Greek examination, a fierce blow from out­
side seemed to hit inside my head. I could hardly walk home. Then 
I spent three months wandering through the woods about Oberlin, 
until the end of the school year.20 
18 Commons, Myself, p. 27.
 
19 Ibid., p. 26.
 
20 Ibid., p. 26.
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When the semester ended he started on a hike to join his 
brother, Alvin, at Au Sable, a small town in northern Michigan. 
His brother got him a typesetting job, but he could not settle down 
to work. Consequently, he decided to go back to Winchester to 
stay with his older (half) sister, Anna, and her husband. There he 
raised chickens until his nerves and his digestion were restored. 
Meanwhile, Commons' father and brother Alvin had gone to 
the thirty acres they owned in Florida. For part of the following 
winter, after Commons had joined them, the brothers worked at 
printing, and in their spare time, they planted orange trees on 
their farm. By spring Commons' health was fully restored, and in 
April he left Florida to go back to Oberlin. 
In the course of a baseball game played shortly after he ar­
rived, Commons was "beaned" and he suffered another spell of 
indigestion. As a result, he was unable to finish his senior year ; 
however, in 1888, he was allowed to take oral makeup examina­
tions. Although his professors said his responses were poor, no 
one wanted to stand in the way of his graduation. 
Whatever may have been true of his other courses, it is clear 
that Commons found his course in economics satisfying.21 It was 
taught by a Professor Monroe, who had come to Oberlin after 
spending thirty years in public life as a Republican Congressman, 
and later as a Consul in Rio de Janeiro. His rich store of experi­
ences enlivened his courses in political science, economics, and 
modern history, which proved particularly interesting to Commons. 
On the basis of this experience, he decided to go to graduate school 
at Johns Hopkins University. 
Monroe did more than encourage Commons to go on with his 
education. He induced two of the trustees at Oberlin College to 
lend Commons money for his first two years. On one of the loans 
Commons was required to pay 10% interest, but on the other his 
benefactor declined to accept interest. (It was not until fourteen 
years later that Commons was able to pay off these two loans.) 
Commons at Graduate School 
John R. Commons chose Johns Hopkins University largely 
because of his admiration for Richard T. Ely.22 Originally, the 
idea of going to graduate school came from Commons' friend, 
Toyokichi Iyenaga, an Oberlin classmate, who planned to go (and 
21 /bid., pp. 38-41.
 
22 mid., p. 40.
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went) to Johns Hopkins. Commons had learned of Ely from an 
editorial by Simon Newcomb in the Nation, attacking Ely's newly 
published book, The Labor Movement in America." Newcomb 
found the book objectionable because of its sympathy to labor. He 
declared Ely's work to be similar to the ravings of an anarchist or 
a socialist, and asserted that Ely was seriously out  of place in a 
university chair. This attack, instead of dissuading Commons, only 
increased his desire to study at Johns Hopkins. From his own ex­
perience in working in a unionized print shop during his Oberlin 
days, Commons knew that Newcomb's charges against Ely's labor 
sympathies were groundless. 
The founding of Johns Hopkins University in 1876 marked 
the emergence of the modern university in America. Before this 
time, a number of institutions used the name university, but their 
only claim to such usage was the possession of special departments 
for medical, legal, divine, and other professional training. But 
Hopkins was primarily a graduate school, although it did include 
some undergraduate education. It brought together on  its faculty 
a group of eminent scholars whose primary function was to ad­
vance knowledge in their respective fields. 
When Commons arrived in Baltimore in 1888 to begin his 
graduate studies, he found that Ely was teaching economics in a 
manner quite different from that to which he,  Commons, was 
accustomed. At Oberlin, Monroe had made occasional digressions 
from academic material to recount his experiences, but adhered 
largely to the conventional subject matter. Ely, however, set his 
students to field work, without much attention to formal training. 
(Commons' first assignment was to visit building and loan associa­
tions in Baltimore ; and later he became a "case worker" for a 
charitable organization.) 
As Ely taught it, political economy at Hopkins included soci­
ology and political science, in addition to what we now generally 
consider economics. Commons readily accepted this combination of 
fields and later confessed that he could never reconcile himself to 
their separation. Another of Ely's beliefs that Commons adopted 
concerned the value of firsthand research experience. Just as Ely 
had set Commons to study charitable organizations and building 
and loan associations, Commons later urged his students to take 
jobs in industry, where they could learn labor problems from the 
worker's point of view. 
23 Ely, The Labor Movement in America. 19  Personal Background and Early Years 
Commons did very well as a student with Ely. As a result, 
when Ely was writing his Outlines of Economics,24 he hired Com­
mons to work as an assistant at ten cents per hour.25 Although Ely 
used only a few pages from the many kinds of material Commons 
wrote for him, he generously acknowledged Commons in the pref­
ace. This taught Commons the value of giving credit to one's stu­
dents; he knew from experience what an important encouragement 
it could be.26 
Ely also let Commons substitute for him as a lecturer in his 
course on John Stuart Mill. Commons confessed that the boys 
"floored" him in discussion and so he considered himself a "dis­
aster."27 However, this did not greatly lower Ely's opinion of him. 
A few years later, in 1894, when he wrote an introduction for one 
of Commons' books, he said, "It is a time when we need vigorous 
thinking, clear thinking, and a right spirit; and all these are found 
in the works of Professor Commons."28 
Despite Ely's good opinion, Commons' scholastic shortcom­
ings once more arose to plague him in his second year of graduate 
work. He failed a history examination, destroying his hopes for a 
fellowship for his third year. 
Although they would not award him a fellowship, his teachers 
at Johns Hopkins recommended Commons in the summer of 1890 
for an instructorship in economics at Wesleyan University in Mid­
dleton, Connecticut. On the strength of this position, which paid 
$1,000, he married an Oberlin classmate, Ella (Nel) Downey. 
Commons' early teaching experience 
At Wesleyan Commons tried to lecture in the orthodox tradi­
tions of economics, but without success. Three months before the 
end of the school year the president notified him that he would not 
be rehired for the following year because he had failed to interest 
his students. The news came during his wife's first confinement. 
He soon received another blow when he discovered that he could 
not complete his third year at Johns Hopkins without spending 
another year in residence. He had been under the impression that 
he needed only two years of residence there, and could spend the 
24 Ely, Outlines of Economics.
 
25 Commons, Myself, p. 44.
 
26 Ibid., p. 44.
 
27 Ibid.
 
28 Ely, "Introduction," in Commons, Social Reform and the Church, p. viii.
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third year elsewhere. What he now learned was that he was re­
quired to spend the last year in residence in Baltimore. Conse­
quently, his dream of a Ph.D. "  .  .  . was  given a final bang."2° 
Upon learning of his dismissal from Wesleyan, Commons 
sought the assistance of his old teacher, Monroe, who helped him 
get an associate professorship at Oberlin. By this time  (1891) it 
had become necessary for Commons to share with his brother, 
Alvin, the burden of taking care of their parents. (His brother was 
then a printer in the iron regions of northern Michigan.) 
In addition to his courses in economics, Commons' courses at 
Oberlin included one in sociology and one in the history of Ameri­
can institutions for the history  department.3° His economics 
courses included one on the history of economic theories, a public 
finance course, and the beginning economics course. Professor 
Monroe continued to teach the advanced economics courses. If 
Commons had remained at Oberlin for another year an even 
greater part of his teaching would have been devoted to sociology. 
After remaining at Oberlin only one year, Commons reluc­
tantly resigned to go to the University of Indiana.31 Although he 
felt ashamed to leave after all that had been done for him at Ober­
lin, the $2,000 offered by Indiana was $800 more than he had been 
getting at Oberlin. The extra money made it possible for him to 
support his father and mother in a little house nearby for the last 
years of their lives. 
When Commons went to Bloomington in  1892 he found the 
University of Indiana had a remarkable young faculty. It had been 
recruited by its former president, David Starr Jordan, who had 
left to take over the presidency of Stanford University. Commons 
declared that his and his wife's life among the young faculty mem­
bers and their wives was like getting back to his graduate days at 
Johns Hopkins, 
The University of Indiana listed Commons as professor of 
economics until the year 1894 and  1895, when his title was changed 
to professor of public finance. At that time he was joined by Frank 
Fetter, who was given Commons' former title. At Indiana Com­
mons' trend toward sociology became even more pronounced. Not 
29 Commons, Myself, p. 48.
30 Catalogue of Oberlin College, 1891-1892, issued May 21, 1892.
 
31 Commons, Myself, p. 49.
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only did he offer more courses in sociology, but even the descrip­
tion of his elementary economics course showed its influence.32 
When Fetter joined the faculty Commons turned over to him most 
of the economics courses except those in public finance and the 
history of thought. Thus, for his last year at Indiana, Commons 
taught chiefly sociology. 
He resigned voluntarily from the University of Indiana, but 
evidence exists that the authorities were glad to see him go. After 
critics had labeled his book, Distribution of Wealth, as disguised 
socialism, the university officials began to question his fitness." 
As a result, when he informed the president that he had an offer 
from Syracuse University for the fall of 1895, he was told to 
"accept it at once."" 
However, before accepting a position at Syracuse, he warned 
the chancellor that he was a "socialist, a single-taxer, a f ree­
silverite, a greenbacker, a municipal-ownerist, a member of the 
Congregational Church."35 To this facetious warning, the chancel­
lor, who was a three-hundred-pound Methodist minister, replied 
that he did not care as long as Commons was not an "obnoxious 
socialist." Commons, believing that he was not one of the obnox­
ious kind, took the position only to discover later on that he had 
been mistaken in supposing his "socialism" was not obnoxious. 
At Syracuse (where he taught ethnology, anthropology, char­
ity organization, taxation, political economy, municipal govern­
ment, and other courses described as sociology), he ran into more 
serious trouble than he had at Indiana. The nature of his courses 
provided him with a vehicle for expressing his dissenting views, 
which no doubt disturbed the university officials. But it was his 
extra-curricular radical activities that finally induced the Board of 
Trustees to abolish his chair in the spring of 1899. By organizing 
a co-operative, he antagonized local business men. When he de­
fended Sunday baseball, religious people demanded his dismissal. 
Finally, when he startled the members of the American Economic 
32 "Economics and Statistics. A general introduction to the science of political econ­
omy, in which writers of various schools are studied and compared, and the history and
present conditions of industry and social questions are developed. The main living social 
problems are touched upon, and their place assigned in the systematic study of sociology
(Annual Catalogue of Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind., 1893-1894. Also 
1894-1895.) 
33 Dorfman, 1865-1918, Vol. III, p. 285. 
34 Commons, Myself, p. 52. 
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Association with seemingly radical statements, his reputation was 
made.36 Upon firing him, the chancellor explained that his presence 
deterred would-be donors from making gifts. Furthermore, the 
chancellor declared that at a meeting of college presidents, "  .  .  . 
all had agreed that no person with radical tendencies should be 
appointed to their faculties."37 
Commons had little time to speculate over his prospective un­
employment. Two weeks after he had received news of his dis­
charge and while he still was on the university payroll, he received 
an unexpected job offer. The offer was from George H.  Shibley, 
who had heard a speech by Commons on proportional representa­
tion.38 Being an advocate of bimetallism, Shibley believed that the 
gold policy of the government continually had been depressing 
prices. To test this hypothesis, he offered Commons a two-year 
contract, at a salary of $2,500, to construct what was then unavail­
able, a weekly index of the movements of wholesale prices. Com­
mons accepted the offer and moved to New York City to do the 
work. 
In about a year Commons had the components of his index 
sufficiently well in hand to begin publishing a weekly index of the
movements of wholesale prices." Each week, after the first re­
lease in July of 1900, the index number showed a fall in prices. 
Commons' backer, George Shibley, who was by then the economic 
adviser of the Democratic National Campaign Committee, was
enthusiastic over this confirmation of his opinions on the gold 
standard. With Shibley the Democratic Party, which was warm­
ing up to another campaign for Bryan and bimetallism, was search­
ing for a campaign argument. But unfortunately for Commons 
and the Democrats, the series stopped falling about the middle of 
August. By September it began to rise in reflection of the Mc­
Kinley prosperity. The propaganda value of Commons' index dis­
solved, and with it went his job. Although willing to pay Commons 
until he found another job, Shibley asked that he begin looking for 
other employment. 
36 "Today it is Henry George and Karl Marx that have the large influence, because 
they represent the radical classes that are acquiring political power .  .  . Economists have 
not lost influence as a wholeonly those who stand for a class which has passed the day
of its political power." From "Discussion on the President's Address," Report of the
Eleventh Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, New Haven, Conn., 
Dec. 27-29, 1898, pp. 111-112. 
37 Commons, Myself, p. 53. 
38 Ibid., p. 63. 
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Within two weeks Commons received an offer, which he ac­
cepted, from a former student he had taught at Oberlin." This 
former student, E. Dana Durant, was secretary of the United 
States Industrial Commission which had been appointed by Presi­
dent McKinley. For a salary of $3,000 per year Commons was to 
finish a report on immigration. 
This position marked a turning point in Commons' career. 
Until then his interests were too broad for him to be considered 
any sort of specialist. Among his interests had been the study of 
labor problems, about which he had written an extensive series of 
articles for the American Federation of Labor publication, the 
American Federationist.4' However, his knowledge of the labor 
movement was very limited. Through Commons' position with the 
Industrial Commission, he was able to broaden his knowledge of 
the labor movement and its leaders. For, although his share of the 
work involved studying the effects of unlimited immigration upon 
American labor, it gave Commons an excellent opportunity to ob­
serve many phases of unionism. 
Commons wound up his work with the commission with in­
tensive report writing. As a result of this pressure he had another 
neuro-intestinal breakdown that compelled him to take an exten­
sive vacation in Manassas, Virginia. Financed by his friend, Wil­
liam English Walling (a millionaire radical), Commons went to 
live with his cousin's family until he felt able to work again. 
Ralph M. Easley, secretary of the National Civic Federation, 
at one time had told Commons to see him if he ever needed a job. 
Consequently, when he recovered from his illness, Commons went 
to Washington to see Easley. True to his word, Easley gave Com­
mons a position, paying $3,000 per year, as his general assistant 
(in 1902).42 At first Easley set Commons to work on taxation 
problems, but soon changed his work to labor relations. 
Although the National Civic Federation did concern itself 
with other civic problems, its primary function was that of labor 
conciliation. In a day before governments were active in the field 
it endeavored to bring together employers and union leaders to 
preserve industrial peace. 
40 Commons, Myself, p. 67.
41 Commons, "A Comparison of Day Labor and Contract System on Municipal 
Works," American Federationist. 
42 Commons, Myself, p. 82. 24  JOHN R. COMMONS 
When Commons joined the Federation in 1902 it was in its 
most effective period. Although only two years old, the organiza­
tion's services had been used during some extremely crucial strikes. 
In 1901 its services had been used in an unsuccessful attempt to 
settle the United States Steel Corporation strike. During the next 
year its officers tried to settle the historic strike in the anthracite 
coal fields. In the negotiations for settling these and other strikes, 
Commons' role involved contact with the union leaders while Eas­
ley worked with the employers.43 
Much of the effectiveness of the Federation came from the 
cooperation of eminent business and labor leaders. Within the 
organization were such industrialists as its president, Marcus A. 
Hanna, and such labor leaders as Samuel Gompers, its vice presi­
dent. These men were able to exert pressure on their respective 
colleagues to bargain collectively. They had some initial success 
in their peace-making efforts.44 Hanna's death (in 1904) and the 
National Association of Manufacturers' open shop drive de­
stroyed the Federation's effectiveness. Consequently, after 1907 
the Federation turned to campaigning for social legislation. Dur­
ing and after World War I, the organization became hopelessly 
distracted by its efforts to combat radicalism, and it disappeared in 
the 1920's. However, between 1902 and 1904 while Commons was 
Easley's assistant, it was at the peak of its effectiveness. 
On the basis of his experiences as a labor conciliator for the 
Federation and his work with the Industrial Commission, Com­
mons received in 1904 an offer to teach the labor economics courses 
at the University of Wisconsin. The offer came through his old 
teacher, Richard T. Ely, who by this time was head of the eco­
nomics department there.45 For a number of years, Ely had been 
nursing along a project of writing a history of the labor move­
ment. Having written one book on the subject in 1886, he wished 
to bring his work up to date and to add considerably more material. 
By 1904, he had collected much material, but the book was yet un­
written. Rather than go on with it, he brought Commons to Wis­
consin to finish it. So began Commons' career as a labor economist. 
43 Commons dates his participation in the negotiations for the steel strike as of 1902.
See Myself, p. 86. Yet presumably the strike was over by then. See Perlman and Taft,
History of Labor, p. 107. Gompers dates the strike as of 1904. See  Gompers, Seventy 
Years of Life Labor, Vol. II, p. 128. Memories of old men are sometimes faulty. 
44 Green, p. 69. 
45 Commons, Myself, p. 92. COMMONS' OUTLOOK
 
JOHN R. COMMONS always sought answers to every problem he 
studied. Economics to him was not an intellectual exercise, but 
a study that had very practical results. Although he conceded the 
value of the pure theorist, Commons preferred working on imme­
diate problems requiring solutions. This was one of the attractions 
social reforms had for him. 
Commons' practical nature was reinforced by the intellectual 
currents swirling around him. America's anti-intellectualism, its 
pragmatism, and its empiricism, as expressed by Ely and others, 
suited his temperament and capabilities. His one attempt at theo­
retical economic analysis during his earlier years turned out to be 
a failure.' Not being a systematic thinker or a skillful writer, he 
was most successful when he concentrated on practical problems. 
Thus, a variety of factors operated to give Commons a "practical" 
outlook. 
Pragmatism and anti-intellectualism 
Commons was a pragmatist in several senses of the term. 
First of all, his conception of philosophy was an adaptation of the 
Commons, The Distribution of Wealth. 
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pragmatism of Charles S. Peirce and John Dewey.' In his Institu­
tional Economics Commons acknowledges his use of their philos­
ophies.' 
Yet long before Commons knew of such philosophers, he was 
a pragmatist in the sense that he believed that practical experience 
often is a better source of knowledge than words of authority. 
Furthermore, through his thinking ran a strong anti-intellectual 
strain. Although the pragmatic philosophers were not all anti-
intellectual, many of them clearly exhibited this tendency. 
In using the word anti-intellectual, it is necessary to point out 
that it does not suggest repudiation of rational thought or the pur­
suit of knowledge.4 Nor does it connote the nonintellectual's con­
tempt for the more educated. It is not a derisive term ; rather the 
word anti-intellectual indicates doubt in the ability of anyone to 
construct a line of analysis sufficiently comprehensive to cover all 
possible variables. Especially in the social science field, the anti-
intellectual stresses the multiplicity of factors that may render 
prediction impossible. Furthermore, he adds that prejudices and 
desires of a thinker arc likely to influence this reasoning, especially 
when no laboratory confirmations are possible. 
The anti-intellectual is suspicious of theories, although he may 
employ them as a working hypothesis. He prefers drawing con­
clusions from a large number of cases rather than reasoning de­
ductively from generally accepted premises. Often he repudiates 
such premises or declares that reasoning often is dependent on im­
plicit assumptions that may not be true. 
Because truth often is highly complicated, the best way to 
find it may not always be by formal reasoning. A man working with 
practical problems in a field may, through experience, acquire in­
sights that are more fruitful than the theories of an expert who 
lacks practical experience. The practical man's thinking may be 
muddy, but it of ten approaches the truth, while the theorist's de­
ductions, unless checked by observations, may lead him astray. 
An anti-intellectual may be a sophisticated thinker or he may 
be a romantic revolting against systematic thought. The former 
may reach his position by attempting to reason so rigorously that 
he becomes dissatisfied with his efforts, while the latter may be 
2 See Chapter 8, "Commons' Approach To Economics."
 
3 Commons, Institutional Economics, pp. 150-157.

4 Brinton, p. 223. Morton 'White prefers the term "anti-formalism," White, p. 12.
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either intellectually or tempermentally unfit for developing a sys­
tematic line of thought. 
Among the less sophisticated, the anti-intellectual's method of 
thought may be a defense against the glib claims of the unscrup­
ulous. The shrewd but uneducated man very sensibly may con­
clude that although the salesman's patter may sound plausible, it 
may not contain the whole truth. In the same way, the claims  of 
politicians may be accepted only with considerable reservations. 
Such skepticism may extend not only to the truthfulness of the 
persuader, but even to his ability to know the whole truth. Even 
though he may not be able to refute an intellectual's argument, a 
"practical" man may insist that truth is more complicated than his 
opponent can understand. 
America's traditional anti-intellectualism stems in part from 
the existence of a frontier. In pioneer days the practical man ex­
perienced in the ways of the frontier held a distinct advantage over 
the newcomer. Although the newcomer might be highly educated, 
his ability to survive depended on his ability to make a living under 
primitive conditions. 
In a limited way, what was true of the frontier continued to 
be true of farm communities, for some time. Practical knowledge 
and skills continued to be more important than any provided by 
formal education. Particularly in the days before the widespread 
extension of scientific methods to agriculture, farmers followed 
traditional methods taught them by their fathers. Academic knowl­
edge, even of matters concerning agriculture, was less important 
than sound work habits and useful skills.' Furthermore, the long 
hours required for the successful operation of farms left little time 
for intellectual pursuits.' 
Their contacts with those more intellectually sophisticated 
than themselves left farmers distrustful of the fruits of education. 
The man of learning was forever telling him what he wanted was 
"unsound." For example, when a farmer advocated increasing 
the nation's money supply, the economic experts frowned on such 
a proposal as the ideas of a crank. When the farmer saw regula­
tion of railroads as the only possible relief from high freight rates, 
the economists warned against interfering with free enterprise. To 
the farmer the ideas of the experts did not seem in accord with 
am:cultural needs. If he could not find the logical arguments to 
5 Hofstadter, Richard, The Development of Higher Education in America, p. 38. 
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refute the theories of the experts, he would reject all theorizing as 
impractical. By clinging to his own practical reasons in the face of 
authority he displayed (at least some of) the characteristics of the 
anti-intellectuals. 
Even when rural communities developed into towns and cities, 
a formal education did not greatly aid many of the inhabitants in 
making a living. In the growing communities the successful tended 
to be the shrewd, resourceful, practical, and hard working. For­
tunes were made without their owners possessing the advantages 
of superior education. 
Those who made fortunes set the standards for the others. 
It was true that the successful often gave lip service to culture by 
providing opportunities for their wives and children. Yet educa­
tion and culture were only ornaments with secondary values, forms 
of conspicuous consumption. The standard advice was to acquire 
the practical skills necessary for financial success. Then, and only 
then, would intellectual pursuits be worthwhile. 
If the community valued the practical man more highly than 
the intellectual, it is not surprising that it also preferred his judg­
ments. To rationalize such a preference, the community had to
adopt at least some of the arguments of the more sophisticated 
anti-intellectuals. 
Thus, the intellectual became associated in the popular mind 
with an "ivory tower," which insulated him from the experience 
of the men of practical affairs. His glib theories became over­
simplifications that could not be trusted. The college professor per­
sonified the absent-minded dreamer who expounds theories with­
out practical value. Even the scientist with proved practical dis­
coveries appeared in the eyes of the public as a quaint character 
pathetically out of place a few feet from his laboratory. 
To some extent the attitude of Americans toward intellectuals 
may be the result of emphasis on the equality of men. Refusing 
to admit inferiority, Americans decide that the expert does not 
know the truth after al1.7 Any disputes among intellectuals can be 
used as proof that their knowledge is a matter of opinion. When 
pushed into an intellectual corner, many persons may resort to the 
anti-intellectual argument that hidden complications,  if known, 
would vindicate them. Since often no easy way exists to bring out 
7 Commager, p.  12. 29  Commons' Outlook 
such complications immediately, disputes must end as stalemates 
without conversion from either side. 
At the time Commons was growing up the anti-intellectual 
influence in Indiana was strong, although perhaps the small towns 
in which Commons lived were not so hostile to culture as Edward 
Eggleston painted in his Hoosier School Master.8 Undoubtedly, 
Union City and Winchester in Commons' day were culturally su­
perior to Eggleston's Flat Creek. Yet they were a part of rural 
Indiana where the Hoosier dialect defied the English language. 
Although such writers as James Whitcomb Riley, Kim Hubbard, 
and George Ade certainly were expressions of culture, their use of 
homely expressions and situations displayed interests other than 
intellectual. Even in modern times their cracker-barrel Hoosier 
tradition has been carried on by humorist Herb Shriner. Such 
Hoosiers often strike a pose. As John Martin declared, "Perhaps 
at some time or another everybody from Indiana has protested that 
he is a rustic unused to city ways, but probably he never met a 
city slicker he did not secretly believe he could outdo."9 Exagger­
ated as such claims may be, they do suggest a tradition with anti-
intellectual influences. 
As did most Americans, the Hoosiers of Commons' youth 
placed the value of the successful practical man above that of an 
intellectual. Commons recalled with pride that two of his high-
school debating rivals, James E. Watson and James P. Goodrich, 
became U. S. senator and millionaire governor, respectively." 
Perhaps his memory of their good times at the swimming hole and 
at other outings was made a little pleasanter by their success. At 
least he thought his readers would be interested in his successful 
boyhood friends, and throughout his biography he described with 
pride his relations with influential and wealthy friends he met 
later. 
In spite of the emphasis on nonintellectual values, Commons 
did become an intellectual. Although such a course would not have 
been chosen by most of his contemporaries, it would be respected 
if he succeeded. If the intellectual could use his brains and educa­
tion to achieve financial success, he too would gain prestige. Yet 
without some outward sign of success he would earn only tolera­
tion and perhaps even contempt. 
8 Eggleston.
9 Martin, p. 109.
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As was explained earlier, Commons' father was something of 
an intellectual who failed to achieve any tangible success. Instead 
of attending to his business he spent his energies reading literature 
and philosophy. Consequently, his family was supported much of 
the time by Commons' mother. 
A faintly apologetic attitude towards his father is evident in 
Commons' autobiography. At the same time, Commons shows con­
siderable admiration for his mother. He pictures her as a woman 
whose considerable promise had to be sacrificed for her family. 
This little family drama might well illustrate the futility of the im­
practical intellectual. 
Although Commons did not explicitly criticize his father, he 
did express contempt for certain intellectuals in the labor field.11 
On the other hand, he had high praise for the labor leaders who 
had been schooled by the practical experiences of being workers, 
contrasting them favorably with their more intellectual opponents 
within the labor movement. Commons ascribed the errors of the 
latter to their lack of experience. Because intellectuals had not 
shared the worker's experiences they did not actually know how he 
felt. Consequently, they would misjudge his attitude at critical 
times. Such mistakes could prove disastrous to unions. 
In line with this general attitude, Commons also maintained 
that economists should never take the leadership of a union.12 The 
academic man might be a valuable aid to a union when he served 
it as a hired expert. Yet his contribution should not include the 
taking of responsibility for the affairs of a union. Such responsi­
bilities should be left with labor leaders who had grown up in the 
service of their unions. 
Commons' attitude toward the role of intellectuals in the labor 
movement followed closely the attitudes of the labor leaders them­
selves. Even today Wilensky reports the prevalence of this atti­
tude among union leaders.13 Although Commons acquired this at­
titude from his contacts with union officials, it fitted in very well 
with his generally anti-intellectual orientation. 
Despite Commons' admiration for practical men, he certainly 
did not deny the value of learning. He aspired to be a first-rate 
scholar, both in and out of his field of economics. But he believed 
that the scholar should do more than learn economic theories. Al­
11 See chapter on "Commons, Student of the Labor Movement."

12 Ibid.
 
13 Wilensky, p. 265.
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ways he urged his students to acquire practical experience in indus­
try as an aid to the understanding of economic reasoning. Such 
experiences were to serve as a basis for their own theorizing, and 
as a check upon their own theories and those of others. 
Commons' temperament 
Commons' anti-intellectualism and pragmatism not only tied 
in with his background, but they also suited his capabilities and 
temperament. Being a hard worker, he could dig out vast quanti­
ties of material, but his organization of it tended to be unsyste­
matic. He frankly confessed that his lectures were not systematic. 
In describing his lectures, he said, "Every class meeting or lecture 
was something unexpected, and they [the students] didn't  know 
what was coming next."14 Further evidence of his difficulties in 
organizing material can be found in his writings, particularly the 
long, theoretical works. Whenever his subject matter was limited 
or had a natural organization, he managed to  write very clearly, 
but when he was expounding a theory, he had difficulty in mak­
ing himself comprehensible to his students. Although he had other 
intellectual difficulties, his ineptitude at exposition was outstanding 
and aggravated the others. 
Commons, with his inability to be completely systematic, 
found pragmatism more suitable to his nature than any other phil­
osophy. Yet he was not completely comfortable with it. At times 
he seemed to be searching for its opposite, a secure absolutism. 
He looked for such a truth to be found through experience, rather 
than by faith or logic. In college he tenaciously studied a single 
water bug instead of working with all the specimens scheduled for 
the class.15 While studying Greek, he concentrated on the single 
letter, Omega, trying to learn all he could about it. Always he 
seemed to think he could find the real truth if he could gather 
enough facts, make enough observations, or have enough ex­
periences. 
The German Historical School and empiricism 
Commons' natural inclination to emphasize the practical as­
pects of learning was reinforced by his experiences with his teach­
ers. At Oberlin Professor Monroe intrigued Commons with many 
stories of his life as a congressman and a diplomat. Such "prac­
tical" experiences provided Monroe with unusual qualifications as 
14 Commons, Myself, p. 47.

15 See Chapter 1, "Personal Background and Early Years," p. 16.
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a teacher of political science and economics. Furthermore, he en­
couraged Commons to study aspects of economics not usually in­
cluded in college curricula. He even permitted Commons and a 
friend to lecture on Henry George to his class.16 
At Johns Hopkins University the influence of Richard T. Ely 
on Commons was antitheoretical. Not only did Ely send Com­
mons on extensive projects as a caseworker for charitable organi­
zations, but he also encouraged him to study problems from an 
historical approach. Thus, finding "facts," whether historical or 
in the immediate situation, became the focus of any study. Sup­
posedly, the analysis would come automatically later. 
Richard T. Ely had studied economics under Karl Knies in 
Germany. From him he brought back some of the ideas of the 
German Historical School. Ely became an exponent of the induc­
tive method of studying economics, as contrasted with the deduc­
tive method which had been used by the English and American 
economists of his time. Explaining these methods, he said : 
.  .  .  deductive is applied to that political economy which, taking its 
ultimate facts, its premises, from other sciences, from common and 
familiar experiences or from the declarations of consciousness, pro­
ceeds from these and from definitions to evolve an economic system 
without any recourse to the external world, save perhaps as furnish­
ing tests of the validity of the reasoning. 
.  . The term inductive, on the contrary, is to be applied to those
writers who do not start out with all their premises ready made, 
but who include the induction of premises within the scope of their 
science and proceed to use these premises deductively. The inductive 
political economist, for example, gathers together particular facts 
relating to the division of labor upon production, or facts respecting 
government and private banks; and observing particulars in which 
these facts agree with themselves, separates out these similars and 
forms what we call a generalization. This serves him in the future 
for a major premise in economic reasoning. The inductive political 
economist compares his conclusions with external facts, not simply 
for the sake of testing the accuracy of his reasoning, but also in 
order to ascertain whether the generalization itself was made on 
sufficient grounds.17 
Ely actively battled the economists of his day to get them to 
adopt the inductive approach. He declared that he and a number 
of younger economists "felt the urgent necessity for uniting into 
a solid group in an effort to break the 'crust' which had formed 
over economists." As a part of their efforts they organized in 
16 Commons characteristically chose to present the statistical side of the subject.
17 Ely, Johns Hopkins Studies In Historical and Political Science, p. 8. 33  Commons' Outlook 
1886 the American Economic Association.18 Although many others 
embracing other views joined the association, it did serve as a 
forum for those who complained that "economics" until then had 
been too "deductive" or "unrealistic." They insisted that histori­
cal, statistical, and other studies accumulating "facts" should be 
given more attention. Then, armed with facts, the economists 
could reason more realistically and more scientifically. 
Richard T. Ely and his contemporaries carried on their con­
troversy as to the relative merits of the "inductive" versus the 
"deductive" methods just before and for some time after Com­
mons was a graduate student. They were the "progressives" chal­
lenging the hide-bound conservative economists whose "unrealistic 
deductions" merely defended the status quo. In contrast to the 
stern laissez-faire policies which forbid government from inter­
fering with the harsh consequences of individual action, Ely and 
his friends argued for a more humanitarian approach. They be­
lieved that government does have responsibility for the welfare 
of all of its citizens. 
Although economic theory had been making progress during 
the early and middle parts of the nineteenth century, many of the 
older American economists of Ely's day taught a brand of eco­
nomics not significantly different from Ricardo's. They did not 
bother to adapt their thinking from the English to the American 
scene. Although economic institutions were changing before  their 
eyes, they reasoned as though their economics would be valid in 
any nation, in any age, and under any conceivable conditions. Not 
even the rapid technological changes of their time could alter their 
reasoning. 
Arthur L. Perry, the author of a popular text on economics, 
declared: 
The natural laws of Production are inexorable in their opera­
tion. It is best for men to find out what these are, and then to con­
form to them their own economic action. If custom or legislation 
thwart these laws, they will take their revenge without pity, and 
lapse of time will only exhibit transgressors more clearly as firmly 
held in the grip of violated law." 
Perry as well as the other prominent American writers, such 
as William Graham Sumner, Charles Dunbar, and Simon New-
comb, insisted that the only economically sound policy for govern­
18 Ely, Richard T., Ground Under Our Feet, p. 121.
 
19 Perry, p. 196.
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ments to follow is that of laissez-faire. Even the serious depres­
sion of 1873 did not shake their beliefs. 
Neither did ideas introduced from other sciences greatly 
influence them. To some the new idea of evolution was an influ­
ence, but a minor one. The concept of "the survival of the fittest" 
was merely another way of describing the beneficient workings 
of competition under laissez-faire. It reinforced their own stern 
conservatism by relegating progress to an automatic process with 
which men should not tamper. Those unfit to survive were to be 
denied merciful aid or even sympathy. In Sumner's words, ".  .  . 
if we do not like survival of the fittest, we have only one possible 
alternative, and that is the survival of the unfittest."2° Such an 
alternative, he said, was the law of anticivilization. 
Simon Newcomb warned against giving in to generous im­
pulses out of pity for the poor. He recommended: 
What we really ought to do is to train, persuade, or compel every 
person to earn his living under penalty of starvation. The funda­
mental idea of current charity is the wholly incompatible one of 
enabling the favored few who chance to excite our sympathies to get 
a living without earning it. Just so far as we can free ourselves 
from this benevolent impulse and turn our efforts in a rational di­
rection, so far may we hope that charitable effort may yet be bene­
ficial to the race.21 
This doctrine of the nonsurvival of the unfit was not any 
harsher than the "Iron Law of Wages," or the Malthusian positive 
checks to population increases. In effect, the evolutionary doctrine 
did not significantly change the recommendations of the conserva­
tive economists. 
Yet the economists who were willing to use ideas borrowed 
from biology to support their previously established view failed 
to take into consideration the possible effects of these ideas on 
their static theories. They neglected to consider that if plants, 
animals, and men slowly change, then perhaps theorizing based 
on assumptions of an unchanging world is not justified. 
John R. Commons adopted both Ely's inductive approach and 
his humanitarian attitudes. His training under Ely reinforced his 
tendency to stress the practical aspects of economics. He could 
dig up material, collect facts, and trace historical relationships 
better than he could reason deductively. When he worked on prob­
20 Sumner, William Graham, p. 225.
 
21 Newcomb, p. 533.
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lems involving reform, he found a use for this type of empirical 
research. At the same time he was following Ely's humanitarian 
approach. But Ely did not change Commons : he merely reinforced 
Commons' "natural" bent. 
Reaction to a failure 
Commons agreed with Ely that economics should be rewritten 
with a more "realistic" approach. Yet for his first book, The 
Distribution of Wealth, he tried to combine this approach with the 
abstract theories newly imported from Austria.22 
In the introduction to this book Commons began by attempting 
to explain the theory of value in terms of marginal utility. He then 
went on to explain distribution in terms of a marginal productivity 
theory. However, his main emphasis was upon the failure of dis­
tribution to follow marginal productivity norms. Although he 
agreed that the wages of labor and interest on capital tend to 
equal their marginal products, certain owners of monopolies ap­
parently get more. These monopoly owners are able to limit the 
supply of what they own, while workers and the owners of in­
vestment funds find it difficult to raise their prices by limiting 
what they offer. 
Rather than attempt to restore perfect competition, Commons 
advocated safeguarding the interests of nonmonopolists in other 
ways. The workers could be protected by increasing their bargain­
ing power. Commons even went so far as to insist that every per­
son should have the right to be employed. To enforce such a right, 
he advocated creation of courts of arbitration. In his words : 
The new courts that shall enforce the right to employment are 
courts of arbitration, created by the government, and empowered to 
compel employers to submit to investigation and to suffer punish­
ment for violating the right of employees to work. No man is to be 
discharged for any cause except inefficiency and dishonesty. Wages,
hours of labor, conditions of labor, are to be adjudicated by the 
courts.23 
Apparently, Commons would allow for discharge for reasons 
other than inefficiency and dishonesty, because a few paragraphs 
later, he advocated: 
This displacement of labourers by machinery and by trusts can 
be remedied by government through employment bureaus and public 
works.24 
22 Commons, Distribution of Wealth. See chapter on "Commons' Approach to Eco­
nomics," p. 274. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., p. 84. Later on, in other writings, Commons' method of guaranteeing em­
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These passages set the tone of the book, and determined its 
reception. Other passages, whose meanings are less clear, height­
ened the radical tone by seeming to challenge the institution of 
private property.25 In others, human rights were made to appear in 
conflict with the rights of property.26 
Professional critics were unkind to this maiden effort. F. W. 
Taussig refused to review it because he considered it an "unbaked" 
performance.27 A. T. Hadley, in the Yale Review, complained that 
Commons ".  .  .  based his whole theory on the fallacy that men, 
as a rule, make money by hurting society."28 Hadley was more 
gentle than the other two reviewers, Richard Mayo-Smith of Co­
lumbia and A. C. Miller of the University of Chicago. Both of 
these reviewers mistakenly implied that Commons was less than 
completely candid. Miller declared, "  .  .  .  the whole essay might 
not be improperly regarded as a disguised attempt to found a scien­
tific basis for a theory of socialism."29 In the same vein, Mayo-
Smith insisted that ".  .  .  the elaboration of the theory of distribu­
tion demands perfect impartiality  .  .  .  with no hidden purpose 
underlying the argument, if the author wishes to command the best 
attention of his readers."3° Commons' bias, he went on to say, 
was observable throughout the book. Furthermore, he said : 
This Tendenz, as the Germans would call it, whether conscious or 
unconscious, is unfortunate, because the mere agitator will believe
that  his  practical  conclusions  have  scientific  support,  without 
troubling to understand the argument ;  while the scientific reader 
will hesitate about accepting many statements which need elabora­
tion.31 
In any case, Mayo-Smith maintained, Commons should have 
been frank with his readers. 
Commons' reviewers, preoccupied with the radicalism of his 
proposals, completely overlooked his analysis. What he had was 
a theory of profit maximation for monopolists.32 Cournot pre­
viously had done the same thing mathematically, but most Ameri­
can economists, including Commons, had overlooked this work. 
25 Ibid., p. 110. 
26 Ibid., p. 80. However, in the end, we find that he would tax in such a way as to
" .  .  .  leave capital and labour and business ability free and untrammelled, but endeavor
to widen and enlarge the opportunities for their employment." (Ibid., p. 258). Yet even
this reassurance for free enterprise was part of a radical proposal of the day, the single-
tax. 
27 Dorfman, p. 284. 
28 Hadley, A. T., The Yale Review, pp. 439-440. 
29 Miller, pp. 462-464. 
30 Mayo-Smith, pp. 568.572. 
31 Ibid. 
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If Commons' work (or for that matter, Cournot's) had been 
understood by his contemporaries, monopoly theory might have 
taken a prominent place in economic literature much earlier than 
it did. 
This book contained a number of flaws, both of organization 
and analysis. Consequently, even if the reviewers had tolerated 
his radicalism, they still might have picked the book to pieces. 
The mistakes in analysis were minor,33 but the book's style was 
so clumsy that no one recognized the contribution it might have 
made. As a result, the bad reviews buried it. A few authors of 
books on distribution listed it in their bibliographies, but other­
wise it exercised no influence in the field. 
After this failure Commons never again wrote anything in 
which he attempted to use this type of formal analysis. According 
to his student, Professor Selig Perlman of the University of 
Wisconsin, Commons' disappointment with his first book provoked 
him to try to rewrite economics from a broader base.34 Eventually, 
this effort resulted in his Institutional Economics, which he finally 
published in 1934, after years of continual rewriting. 
In the meantime, Commons turned to the practical side of 
his nature, as suggested by Ely. Here Commons found a milieu 
within which he could work successfully. Most of the time these 
problems involved reform. 
Commons and reform 
Throughout Commons' life, he was engaged in one reform 
movement after another. Although he did not fulfill his mother's 
wish that he enter the ministry, he did share her enthusiasm for 
reforms. At Oberlin he and his mother were instrumental in the 
founding of the Anti-Saloon League. They began an antisaloon 
publication and agitated for "local option" prohibition. This was 
the first in a long sequence of reform efforts that absorbed Com­
mons' energies. 
Reform activity gave Commons an outlet for his energy with­
out requiring that he be systematic. If he clung tenaciously to one 
problem until he  felt  satisfied with his  efforts, such single­
mindedness was all to the good. Above all, reform movements gave 
him practical problems on which to work. To become a reformer 
33 Commons, Distribution of Wealth, pp. 148, 154.
 
34 Personal interview, July, 1952.
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one merely needs to join with others of similar intentions. Re­
formers usually welcome anyone inclined to join them, and Com­
mons was a prodigious joiner.35 He joined numerous important 
reform movements in America from the time of his college days 
until the early days of the New Deal. 
Commons' outlook made reform activity congenial to him. 
As a result of his graduate work under Ely, his thinking was a 
combination of sociology and economics rather than economics 
alone. During the eighties and early nineties, the subject of soci­
ology, although new, was offered by an increasing number of 
colleges and universities. Even a number of theological seminaries 
began to offer such courses as Christian sociology, ecclesiastical 
sociology, or social ethics. 
The spread of these courses was due in part to the recogni­
tion of social changes stemming from rapid growth of industries 
and cities. With a change from an essentially rural nation into 
an industrial urban one, such problems as unemployment, poverty, 
slum conditions, crime, and social unrest intruded into the public 
consciousness. But the interest in sociology was also due to the 
rise of a liberal religious movement, which began to attract con­
verts in the 1880's. Shortly after the Civil War, a number of 
liberal ministers began directing the attention of their churches 
to social problems. By the eighties, the efforts of these religious 
leaders congealed into a movement described as the Social Gospel." 
Those following the Social Gospel movement declared that 
the Kingdom of God is to be on earth. Christians' efforts should 
be directed towards perfecting society rather than concentrated 
on securing individual salvation. Recognizing the concept of evolu­
35 Commons helped found a local Anti-Saloon League, The American Institute of
Christian Sociology (Christian Socialism), The American Association for Labor Legisla­
tion, The American Safety Council. He held the following offices: Assistant to the Secre­
tary of National Civic Federation; Secretary, The American Association for Labor Legis­
lation; President, The National Consumers' League; President, The National Monetary 
Association; director,  National Bureau of Economic Research; President, American 
Economic Association; Grand Master of the Order of Artus, Omicron Delta Gamma (an
honorary economic fraternity). He flirted with Populism, but decided its subtreasury
plan was unsound. At times he backed single-tax proposals, civil service reform, propor­
tional representation, workmen's compensation, national health insurance, unemployment 
insurance, minimum wage laws, monetary control by the Federal Reserve System, limita­
tion of immigration, worker's education, and encouragement of unionism. Politically he
voted as a Prohibitionist, a LaFollette-Republican, a LaFollette-Progressive, and as a
New Deal Democrat. His public offices included: expert, for United States Industrial
Commission of 1901; commissioner, Wisconsin Industrial Commission; commissioner of 
United States Commission on Industrial Relations, 1913-1915; member, Wisconsin Mini­
mum Wage Board; staff expert for Congressional Committee investigating the Federal
Reserve System; and expert for the Associated States Opposing Pittsburg-Plus.
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tion, the followers of Social Gospel believed that social order is 
gradually improving. In time it will evolve into the Kingdom of 
God on earth. But this evolution should not be left to automatic 
forces. Each change for the better in working conditions or labor 
legislation was cited as a step towards the Kingdom. Men could 
and should work to bring it into existence. 
The Social Gospel movement rejected the orthodox Christian 
position that man is innately sinful. It maintained that human 
nature is essentially good. Evil results from a corruption of that 
nature under external pressure from a corrupt society. Hence, to 
improve society one should attempt to reorganize and reform the 
social order in a way that will permit the better side of human 
nature to emerge. Such a process would not require a revolution 
or sudden change; rather, it would require the efforts of Christians 
in the spreading of good will among all people. 
Richard T. Ely was prominent in the Social Gospel move­
ment and wrote a number of works on social problems for minis 
ters.37 Following his teacher's example, Commons joined one of 
the subgroups of this movement, the Christian Socialists." During 
his teaching year at Oberlin Commons taught sociology to theo­
logical students. In the same year he compiled and published A 
Popular Syllabus of Sociology, intended for ministers and gen­
eral readers." 
When Commons taught at Indiana he and Ely helped found 
the American Institute of Christian Sociology. He served this 
organization both as its secretary and as an associate editor of its 
publication, The Kingdom. In addition to attending a number of 
other conferences for the organization, he directed its summer 
conference at Oberlin College in 1894. To study "Causes and 
Proposed Remedies for Poverty," Commons took the exceptional 
liberty of inviting socialists and labor leaders as well as economists 
and ministers as speakers. Among the speakers were: Thomas J. 
Morgan, socialist leader from Chicago; Samuel Gompers of the 
American Federation of Labor; Professor J. B. Clark, an eminent 
economist; and Washington Gladden, a prominent minister. 
37 Ely, Richard T., Social Aspects of Christianity, (New York, N. Y.: T. Y. Crowell,
1889); The Law of Social Service, (New York, N. Y.: Eaton & Mains, 1896); The Uni­
versity and The Churches, (reprint of address delivered at Thirty-first Convocation, Sen­
ate Chamber, Albany, 1893); Religion as Social Force, (reprint of address delivered be­
fore Education Congress at World's Fair, St. Louis, Mo., 1897); "Amana: A Study of 
Religious Communism," Harper's Monthly.
38 Dombrowski, p. 72. 
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At about this time, Commons wrote a book entitled Social 
Reform and The Church." In it he declared that ministers and 
other educated persons have definite responsibilities for promoting 
reform. Crime and rejection of religion both result from poverty 
and miserable living conditions. He argued it was the duty of 
ministers to learn about conditions in such places as slums, alms­
houses, workhouses, and jails, and to work toward their improve­
ment. 
These activities  increased Commons' reputation for radi­
calism. He was accused of favoring socialism, the single-tax, free 
trade, and Populism. When Ely warned him that he should be 
more prudent, he replied: 
.  .  .  I believe fully in what you say regarding the timeliness of ex­
pressions of advanced views, and I recognize than on some occasions 
I may have seemed needlessly to have aroused antagonism. It is diffi­
cult to combine opportuneness with exposures of injustice, but I 
believe that I am getting more cautious.41 
Despite this statement (made in 1895 while at the University 
of Indiana), he persisted in the same type of writing and activities. 
As a result, he endangered his university positions. As explained 
in the previous chapter, he was encouraged to resign from the Uni­
versity of Indiana and was dismissed from the University of 
Syracuse. 
Commons and the doctrine of Meliorism 
Despite his lurid reputation (circa 1895-1900) Commons was 
always a gradualist and not a revolutionary. In this he was typi­
cally American. With the exception of the issues which led to the 
Civil War, Americans generally have been able to resolve their 
problems by negotiation and persuasion. The lack of class barriers 
also has prevented the development of the European-type intel­
lectual, who, without a real stake in the social order, would have 
been willing to risk all in a revolution. Americans of ability and 
education tended to find too many favorable opportunities for 
personal advancement within the social order for them to take 
much interest in trying to destroy it. 
The reform movements in which Americans have been in­
terested have aimed at preserving or extending the opportunity for 
individual advancement.42 From the very early days of our nation 
40 Commons, John R., Social Reform and The Church.
 
41 Dorfman, Vol. III, p. 285.

42 Parrington, Vol. III, p. xxiv.
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most of the demands for reform have centered on attacks on 
monopoly, demand for public education, and for a fair distribu­
tion of public lands. The reforms did not object to the existence 
of the wealthy. Many of them aimed to become rich themselves 
some day, but they did insist that the doors of opportunity remain 
open.43 
Even labor leaders tended to remain within the American 
tradition of reform. In the early history of the labor movement 
labor leaders also emphasized programs purporting to maintain 
equality of opportunity. They campaigned for public schools free 
to all children, cheap or free land for settlers, equality of citizen­
ship, as well as for higher wages and shorter hours. Many of their 
efforts were directed against what they considered monopoly. They 
wished to keep open the possibility for workmen to enter self-
employment by making credit available to them.44 Later, when 
the dream of large numbers of workers becoming self-employed 
faded, many in the labor movement turned toward producer co­
operatives. Even when labor leaders finally came to realize that 
the wage system could not be eliminated without a revolution, 
they continued to advocate working within the social order rather 
than advocating drastic changes. 
Although Samuel Gompers, himself, had been a socialist origi­
nally, he early decided that labor should work for immediate im­
provements instead of wasting resources in futile efforts to create 
a revolution. Commons knew Gompers very well and counted him­
self as his follower. In the obituary which he wrote for Gompers 
Commons might well have been describing his own views: 
No one understood better than Gompers the limits beyond which 
the organization of labor could not go. It could not lift itself as a
body out of manual labor and become a body of business men or
professional men. For this reason Gompers was always against 
"theorizers" and "intellectuals" in the organization of labor. They 
were "industrially impossible." Amid all the differences in America 
of religion, of race, of languages, of politics, there was only one 
direction toward which labor could unitemore wages, more leisure, 
more liberty. To go further than this was to be misled by theorists, 
idealists and well-meaning but "fool" friends of labor. Labor could 
have "moral power" only when it struggled for better homes, better 
living conditions, better citizenship, by its collective action.45 
Commons like Gompers believed that the "intellectual" with 
theories of social revolution had no place within the labor move­
43 Curti, p. 611. Also see Goldman, p. vii.
 
44 Perlman, Selig, p. 280.
 
43 Commons, John R., Current History, Vol. XXI, p. 674.
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ment. Revolutionary activity on the part of labor leaders led only 
to trouble and was not effective in changing the social order. In­
stead, labor should direct its efforts toward immediate gains and 
be content with slow but orderly progress. 
The view Commons shared with Gompers grew out of both 
a skeptical view of intellectual systems and a belief in gradualism 
in reform. The latter view was reinforced not only by American 
traditions, but also by the trend of the times. During the nine­
teenth century technological changes, economic expansion, growth 
of communities, and other changes, held to be improvements, had 
been developing at an accelerated pace. In the intellectual field the 
frontiers of knowledge had been expanded. Even in the social 
field reforms such as the end of the slave trade, and then finally 
the end of slavery in this country and abroad, finally were ac­
complished. Debtors' prisons were abolished; mechanics' liens 
protected the workers' wages; manhood suffrage had extended 
democracy; and free popular education promised an ever more 
enlightened citizenry. To most observers it appeared that the world 
was getting better, and progress seemed to be the natural course of 
events. When the concept of evolution of man from lower forms 
to his present state was expounded, this belief in progress appeared 
even to have scientific verification. 
To Social-Darwinists like Herbert Spencer and William Graham 
Sumner, progress was an automatic process that men could not 
purposely assist. Men who thought they could make the world 
over were absurd.46 Progress could come only by a process of 
natural selection of individuals most fit to survive. Any reforms 
that would ameliorate the conditions of the unfit merely would re­
tard progress. 
In contrast to this view that dominated academic sociology 
during the 1880's and 1890's, Commons and other reformers 
believed that man, himself, was the instrument for social change. 
He agreed that the change should be slow, but not as slow as the 
operation of hereditary selection. Revolutions might unloose serious 
and unforeseen complications, but step-by-step steady improve­
ment could proceed safely and surely toward an equitable and 
stable social order. 
Commons had a strategy for social reform. It consisted of 
adaptations of economic institutions in our capitalistic system in 
46 Sumner, William Graham, "The Absurd Effort To Make The World Over," War 
and Other Essays, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1911), pp. 195-210. 43  Commons' Outlook 
such a way that the businessmen and others would have economic 
incentives to improve the conditions of the working class. Further­
more, he believed that reforms could be organized in such a man­
ner that they would benefit even the employers. 
As an example of his method of campaigning for reforms, 
consider his efforts to sell "workmen's compensation" coupled 
with a safety program.47 The first step consisted of finding a few 
enlightened employers who were convinced of the wisdom of safety 
programs. These were publicized as examples for others to follow, 
thereby demonstrating that compensation to injured workmen, 
regardless of legal obligations, paid dividends in improved morale 
of the workers. Commons then persuaded the enlightened em­
ployers to help him sell similar measures to other firms. As soon 
as he had political support, he persuaded employers to join with 
labor leaders on committees to help him draft a state law to require 
all employers to accept his principles. By giving both sides the 
impression that some type of law on the subject was inevitable, 
he induced them to compromise their differences. This joint prod­
uct he perfected for submission to the legislature. At the legis­
lative hearings on the proposed law he had both the "enlightened 
employers" and labor leaders testify on behalf of his proposals. 
Their testimony created the impression that a large group of em­
ployers and labor leaders were in favor of the bill. 
Finally, after the legislature enacted his proposals into law, 
he used representatives of both employers and union leaders on 
advisory boards to aid in its administration. In doing this he recog­
nized that the selling of the program was not over when it became 
a part of the law. He continued to educate both employers and 
workers as to the fairness of the program and the need for suc­
cessful administration. Then with a record of success in one state 
(Wisconsin), he began a campaign to extend the program into 
other states. 
In the case of workmen's compensation, the program not only 
provided the injured workmen with compensation, but it also re­
lieved the employer of liability from potentially expensive law­
suits. The employer continued to pay insurance premiums, but 
the money went to take care of his employees instead of protecting 
himself from unpredictable liabilities. Along with the compensa­
tion program went an intensive safety program aimed at cutting 
the premiums for those employers who were successful in limiting 
47 See chapter on "Commons and Social Legislation." 44  JOHN R. COMMONS 
injuries to their employees. Consequently, the new workmen's 
compensation insurance could be provided at lower rates than 
the insurance against liability, benefiting both sides. The injured 
employee received predictable and certain payments without the 
necessity of suing his employer. At the same time the employer 
could benefit from the improved morale and from advantages 
accruing from reduced accident rates. 
In all reforms Commons pushed, negotiations and persua­
sion played crucial roles. To him reform without the acceptance 
of  all  interested parties was unsatisfactory. Consequently, he 
stressed education of employers, workers, and the general public 
during all stages of his campaign. By giving the interested parties 
responsibility for the formulation and administration of the pro­
gram, he sought to make it theirs. His role was to stand in the 
background prodding them, but giving them full credit for the 
actions. 
When Commons finally evolved this method his troubles from 
reform activities were over. Instead of being branded as an agi­
tator, he gained prestige from the success of his reforms. Further­
more, he found the method of operating which suited his capa­
bilities, temperament, and outlook. cU II V I 
I t 
COMMONS' WORKING ENVIRONMENT 
WHEN COMMONS joined the University of Wisconsin's eco­
nomics department in 1904 he arrived at a particularly fa­
vorable time, when the state government and the administration of 
the university were controlled by LaFollette's Progressives. In 
Wisconsin Commons found himself an insider whose talents 
were useful to those in power, where elsewhere he had been con­
sidered a dangerous radical. He could continue to engage in reform 
activities in Wisconsin, but he did so for the authorities instead of 
in spite of them. 
Almost immediately he and Robert M. LaFollette formed an 
intimate friendship that profited both careers. It was LaFollette's 
habit to call on university professors to serve as experts to advise 
him on his program. During his governorship a close relationship 
developed between the state government and its university. The 
officials of the university, by providing time off for them, encour­
aged the professors to work for the state. Commons, as one of 
them, found numerous opportunities to serve the state during La­
Follette's administration and for years afterwards. In the draft­
ing of laws for social legislation he made his most significant con­
tributions. 
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La Follette 
Without Robert M. La Follette's leadership it is doubtful that 
the Progressive movement would have come to power in Wiscon­
sin. He was a master politician who, in the face of extreme odds, 
organized a powerful machine.' At first he was a lone voice crying 
for reforms against corrupt politicians. By sheer persistence he 
fought his way into the governor's chair. Twice he was defeated, 
but on the third time circumstances favored him. When he sought 
the Republican nomination for governor in 1900 the party coun­
cils were divided by dissident elements. He chose his support 
wisely, and then quickly organized a bandwagon movement before 
other candidates gained enough strength to oppose him. Because 
the party had no other strong candidate he was accepted by politi­
cal factions that had been hostile before and would be hostile again. 
But La Follette quickly seized the opportunity to gain power, even 
if it meant making peace with his natural enemies. 
Soon after his election to the governorship his determination 
to carry out his program antagonized many of his temporary 
friends.2 When they discovered that his campaign promises were 
more than oratory they quickly deserted him. Once in power, how­
ever, La Follette was able to build his own  political machine. Al­
though his party had a majority in both houses of the legislature 
during his first term, he could count on the support of only the 
Assembly. Consequently, he failed to obtain much of his program. 
During his second term he gained a slight majority in the Senate 
and retained control of the Assembly. Some of his program he 
then was able to push through, but most of it had to wait until his 
third term when he had solid support from both houses. 
The Progressive movement was created largely through La­
Follette's efforts. He was an indefatigable campaigner who visited 
every significant community in the state.  Although by today's 
standards, his three-hour speeches were long, they were not dull. 
They were sufficiently interesting to attract people for miles.' Using 
emotional appeals blended with his logical arguments, he could 
make even a railroad timetable interesting. 
La Follette would have been a better politician if he had not 
been a zealot. Although he used some of the methods of his op­
1 Robert S. Maxwell, Wisconsin, p. 56.
2 Joseph W. Babcock, the leader of Wisconsin's congressional delegation, and Eman­
uel Phillip, who later became governor of Wisconsin, supported La Follette during the
1900 election, but led the opposition soon afterwards. These Republicans who opposed 
La Follette were called "Stalwarts."
 
3 Maxwell, p. 57.
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ponents to gain power, he was fundamentally the foe of all politi­
cal machines, including his own. During the early years of his gov­
ernorship, he appointed numerous party workers to be oil inspec­
tors, game wardens, etc. However, he later made them take civil 
service examinations, and a few lost their jobs when they re­
ceived failing grades. 
His strong feeling against political machines was developed 
early in his life. When he was a farm youth, he sympathized with 
the Grangers' struggles against entrenched interests.4 These agrar­
ian prejudices deepened into convictions when the machine politi­
cians placed barriers in the way of his ambitions.5 As a young man 
he ran for the office of district attorney of Dane County. Although 
the political boss of the county, Elisha W. Keys, opposed him, he 
won by the vigor of his campaign. Later, when he ran for Con­
gress in 1884 he again won in spite of the opposition of profes­
sional politicians. Then in his victory, when he might have made 
his peace with them, he continued to fight his political battles 
fiercely and independently. By the time he sought the governorship 
he was committed to a crusade against machine corruption. 
All politicians must deviate to some extent from their ideals, 
but that extent was not very far for La Follette. Stubbornly he 
clung to a position, even though doing so grievously affected him. 
Furthermore, he expected his followers to share loyally the con­
sequences of his righteous stands. In time, the list of his ex-
supporters grew to be almost as extensive as that of the ones who 
continued to follow him.8 
His inflexibility was not entirely a handicap.' His fierce hon­
esty and devotion to his cause earned him loyalty no mere politician 
could command from his followers. Furthermore, the time was 
ripe for a crusade that required such a man as leader. For over a 
quarter of a century farmers had been frustrated in demands to 
regulate railroads. In the cities citizens were frustrated in their 
efforts to control public utility companies. Blocking both efforts 
were the machine politicians, whose behavior earned them the repu­
tation for being corrupt.8 
4 Robert M. LaFollette, p. 24. 
5 Belle and Fola LaFollette, p. 119.
6 The trail of 'Fighting Bob' LaFollette, in his climb to national fame and prestige, 
was strewn not only with his political opponents but also with many of the colleagues who
helped him win his earlier political battles. Davidson, Stephenson, and McGovern, and 
later Irvine Lenroot, loyal supporters of the Progressive cause though they had been, were 
all read out of the party by the implacable senior senator." Maxwell, p. 194. 
7 Frederic C. Howe, p. 7. 
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La Follette meant to snatch power from the machines and give 
it back to the people. High on his list of reforms was the introduc­
tion of the direct primary for the state of Wisconsin.9 After his 
experience with the convention system in which he was deprived 
of the nomination for governorship twice by what he considered 
fraudulent means, he was determined to change the system.10 He 
reasoned that the direct primary could be used as a means of pre­
venting political machines from frustrating the popular will.11 In 
this reasoning he probably was overoptimistic, but the change 
could be used to weaken the machine existing at that time. At least 
the opposing politicians feared that La Follette was right. Conse­
quently, they fought the proposal and prevented its adoption dur­
ing his first two terms. Pressure from the people stirred up by 
La Follette's constant urging, finally forced the legislature during 
the second term to submit the proposal to a referendum vote. The 
measure then was adopted by the voters of Wisconsin at the same 
time they voted a third term for La Follette. 
In creating the direct primary system the state of Wisconsin 
made an innovation copied by the majority of the states in the 
union. Although it is not without its faults, the direct primary is 
at least an improvement over the convention and caucus system 
where candidates  emerged mysteriously from discussions  in 
"smoke-filled" rooms. Political organizations, or machines, as La-
Follette would have called them, remain important mechanisms. 
However, they must operate more in the open than under the 
former system. To La Follette must go the credit, or blame, for 
this important change in our political system. 
To bring political influences out into the open, La Follette in 
his third term pushed an antilobbying act through the legislature. 
He had urged its passage in messages to three legislatures. Finally, 
in 1905, the law was enacted." It required that all lobbyists or 
representatives should register with the secretary of state. They 
were to state the character of their employment and the names of 
their employers. Although they were to be given the widest oppor­
tunity to present publicly their messages to legislative committees 
or other officials, they were prohibited from conducting any private 
Howe, p. 51.
10 La Follette claimed that he had enough delegates to nominate him for governor in
both the 1896 and the 1898 conventions, but last minute changes defeated him. Some of
his supporters reported that they had been offered bribes to change to other candidates.
La Follette asserted that $8,300 was used "to handle delegates before the balloting began," 
for the 1898 convention. Robert M. La Follette, pp. 192, 220. 
at Edward N. Doan, p. 29. 
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communications with members of the legislature on any subject of 
legislation. 
To prevent any future political machine from using the spoils 
system to gain political power, La Follette created a civil service 
system for the state of Wisconsin. In this undertaking he turned to 
John R. Commons to draft the legislation. He asked Commons to 
study all similar laws in the country and then draw up a proposed 
law that would be the best in the nation. All employees of the 
state, except department heads and elected officials, were to take 
civil service examinations to determine whether they were compe­
tent. This included his own appointees as well as those who would 
be hired in the future. When Commons explained that all other 
civil service reforms had "blanketed in" existing employees, La-
Follette replied firmly that no exception would be made." 
Besides attempting to trim the power of political machines, 
La Follette also aimed at making tax burdens more equitable in 
Wisconsin.14 In 1903 the legislature created an inheritance tax law 
with rates from one and one-half to fifteen percent, depending on 
the closeness of the relationship of the heirs and the size of the 
estate. Because the personal property tax had not been successful, 
it was partially replaced by an income tax. The rates varied from 
one percent on the first $1,000 of taxable income up to six percent 
on taxable incomes over $12,000. Of the revenue from this tax, 
ninety percent was remitted to the county, cities, and villages in 
which it was collected. Because it was collected by state rather than 
local officials, its administration was an improvement over that of 
the personal property tax. 
To complete his revision of the tax system, La Follette then 
proposed to change the method by which railroads were taxed. Up 
to this time railroads had been paying a percentage of their gross 
income in taxes instead of paying property taxes as did other busi­
ness firms. According to the tax commission, which had been set up 
under a previous governor, railroad property yielded half as much 
in taxes as did the property of similar value belonging to private 
persons." These estimates proved to be exaggerated, but after 
adoption of the new type of tax, the revenues increased sharply.16 
13 Commons, Myself, p. 103. 
14 Howe, p. 139. 
15 Robert M. LaFollette, p. 243. 
16 Howe, p. 135. Revenues rose from $1,948,340 under the system for 1903 to $2,494,­
282 for 1904, the first year under the new system. The increases for the first three years
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After the legislature, in 1903, voted the new tax on railroads, 
La Follette turned his attention to getting railroad regulation. Ever 
since the repeal of the Granger-inspired Potter Law, some agita­
tion had kept the idea of regulation alive. Not only did the railroads 
fail to satisfy the farmers' demands, but they used strong political 
influence to prevent any re-enactment of a similar law. In doing so 
they aligned themselves with those opposing La Follette. Conse­
quently, when La Follette's political power grew to sufficient pro­
portions, their day of reckoning arrived. Finally in his third term, 
he managed to push through the legislature a bill regulating rail­
way companies. 
The Wisconsin Railroad Regulation Law of 1905 was so care­
fully drafted that it became a model for those in other states.17 By 
creating the first truly modern administrative commission it pro­
vided effective means of regulation. More about this commission 
and others will be given in later chapters. 
Although La Follette was a zealot, his program was not un­
reasonable. Nor was he a true radical, in spite of his reputation 
among his contemporaries. None of his proposals were aimed at 
destroying legitimate business interests. They were aimed at pro­
viding protection for consumers, investors, voters, and workers. 
Although he at times could be vindictive towards his political op­
ponents, his reforms were moderate. Like his friend, Commons, he 
believed that conflicting interests could be resolved. His method en­
tailed the use of the best available experts who could devise reas­
onable compromises. All of his proposals were framed carefully 
and the legislation for them was drafted carefully. As a conse­
quence, his enlightened reforms became models for numerous other 
states to follow. What was even more important, they were suc­
cessful. 
The key to La Follette's success in formulating his program 
was in finding a sufficient supply of experts. At a time when gov­
ernments and businesses used few such persons, not many were 
available. La Follette found his supply among the professors of the 
University of Wisconsin. He created what during the New Deal 
days would have been called a "brain trust." It enabled him to 
frame his program along reasonable and workable lines, and it had 
the important byproduct of providing rich experiences for profes­
sors such as Commons. 
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The University of Wisconsin 
La Follette was fortunate to have among his resources the 
many scholars of the University of Wisconsin. At the time he took 
office as governor, the university had an excellent reputation. When 
the distinguished Mose ly Education Commission came from Eng­
land to study education in America, it ranked the University of 
Wisconsin high among the best universities of the nation." In 
addition to its prestige, the university had very practical assets 
which the state could use. Its faculty contained a corps of experts 
who were to play leading roles in formulating the program of the 
Progressive movement. 
La Follette was the first Wisconsin governor to graduate from 
the state university ; he entered in 1875 and graduated in 1879.19 
During his student days the university was an intimate institution 
with an enrollment of only 400 students.2° The influence of its 
president, John Bascom, pervaded the entire university.21 The stu­
dents, including LaFollette, respected and honored him. LaFollette, 
at least, adopted some of his high moral purpose and his views on 
the obligations of citizens. 
Bascom was the last of the old style presidents at the univer­
sity.22 Being an extremely broad scholar, he held the concept that a 
cultured man should be at home in all fields of learning. His own 
writings included contributions in philosophy, psychology, religion, 
economics, art, literature, and social reform. Although he desired to 
strengthen its scholarship, he believed the primary function of the 
university was to educate and cultivate undergraduates. Conse­
quently, any graduate study existing there was incidental. 
In 1887 Bascom was succeeded by an entirely different type of 
educator, Thomas Crowder Chamberlin.23 Instead of neglecting 
graduate studies, Chamberlin worked to make such a program pos­
sible. To attract high caliber graduate students, he established a 
number of fellowships. To strengthen the faculty, he recruited a 
number of men eminent in their various fields. He insisted that 
promotion for the younger faculty members be made conditional 
upon their acquiring Ph.D.'s. To allow time for supervision of 
graduate students he reduced the teaching load of his professors. 
18 Curti and Carstensen, Vol. II, p. 107. 
19 Belle and Fola LaFollette, p. 27. 
20 Ibid.,  p. 37. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Curti and Carstensen, Vol. I, pp. 246-295. 
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He planned a new library to make research possible for both fac­
ulty members and graduate students. Above all, he encouraged fac­
ulty members to engage in research. In short, he aimed at the crea­
tion of a modern university. 
Although Chamberlin was a geologist, he did not favor the sci­
ences over other studies. He attempted to strengthen all depart­
ments, but he was most successful in the social sciences. A key 
figure in this development was the distinguished historian, Freder­
ick Jackson Turner. Chamberlin made it clear that Turner must 
earn a Ph.D. if he expected a career at the University of Wiscon­
sin. Consequently, Turner took a leave of absence in 1888 to study 
at Johns Hopkins University. There he met Richard T. Ely, who 
already had gained an outstanding reputation as an economist. 
When Turner learned that Ely was not happy at Hopkins, he per­
suaded Chamberlin to hire him.24 
Wisconsin got Ely in 1892 but only after offering him consid­
erable inducements, including a salary higher than it had paid any 
other professor. Ely wanted more than money; he wanted to es­
tablish a new School of Economics, Political Science, and History, 
which would "do for civil life what West Point did for military 
life."25 Not only would it advance knowledge in the social sciences, 
but it also would offer training for public careers. The regents of 
the university agreed to the establishment of the school, provided 
some fellowships, added to the faculty, and provided $5,000 for 
books. 
Ely was a difficult man to satisfy, and so was his colleague, 
Turner. After returning to Wisconsin with his Ph.D., Turner at­
tracted nationwide attention for his work on the significance of 
the frontier in America. When various other presidents continually 
urged him to accept calls to their respective universities, Wiscon­
sin had the serious problem of holding him. Although it could not 
match some of the offers financially, it did offer him other induce­
ments. Because Turner's demands coincided with what would en­
hance the study of American history, the university profited by 
acceding to his demands. 
The unusually rapid growth of scholarships in the social sci­
ences at Wisconsin resulted primarily from the demands of Turner 
and Ely. They demanded that distinguished colleagues be added to 
24 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 618.

25 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 632.
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the staff. To strengthen their fields further, they insisted on in­
creased funds for books, fellowships, and facilities for publishing 
research findings. Because they got what they wanted, Wisconsin 
became a leading center for scholarship in the social sciences. 
Although he created a modern university out of a small col­
lege, President Chamberlin remained in office for only a short time. 
After five years he resigned to become a professor at the new Uni­
versity of Chicago. But the foundation he laid was so solid that his 
successor, Charles Kendall Adams, could complete the job." 
President Adams possessed both the desire and the ability to 
complete the program of transforming Wisconsin into a leading 
modern university. His natural abilities and his experience as the 
president of Cornell University fitted him for his job. Being some­
thing of a politician as well as an able administrator, he persuaded 
the legislature to provide funds for the ambitious building program 
begun under his predecessor. He continued the process of strength­
ening the faculty and encouraging research. By the time of his re­
tirement because of ill health in 1902, the University of Wisconsin 
was approaching the goal sought by Chamberlin and Adams. 
During Adams' administration an event involving Ely demon­
strated some of the growing pains of a university. In 1894 Oliver 
E. Wells, the state superintendent of public administration and a 
member of the Board of Regents of the university, wrote a letter 
to the editor of The Nation.27 He charged Ely with believing in 
strikes, boycotts, and in radical doctrines. As a consequence, Ely 
had to defend himself in a public hearing before a committee of 
the Board of Regents.' After hearing the evidence, the committee 
decided that Ely was actually conservative." Although academic 
freedom was not an issue in the investigation, the committee de­
cided to issue a statement on the subject. A portion of their state­
ment became Wisconsin's "Magna Carta"3° and was inscribed af­
terwards on a prominently displayed bronze plaque. 
26 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 561-579 .
27 Wells, p. 27. 
28 Ely, Ground Under Our Feet, pp. 218-233. 
29 Curti and Carstensen, Vol. II, p. 526.
30 Ibid., Vol. II, p. 525. ".  .  . We cannot, however, be unmindful of the fact that 
many of the universally accepted principles of today were but a short time ago denounced
as visionary, impracticable, and pernicious. As Regents of a University with over one 
hundred instructors supported by nearly two millions of people who hold a vast diversity
of views regarding the great questions which at present agitate the human mind, we could 
not for a moment think of recommending the dismissal or even criticism of a teacher even
if some of his opinions should, in some quarters, be regarded as visionary. Such a course
would be equivalent to saying that no professor should teach anything which is not ac­
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Although the Ely "trial" did not decide the issue of academic 
freedom for all time, it did create a presumption that Wisconsin 
was a university where such matters were important. From then 
on, any interference with a scholar's freedom would be in viola­
tion of the supposed policy. The incident dramatized the fact that 
the university had taken an important step in the transition from a 
small college to a modern university. Unlike the universities that 
dismissed Commons, it became known for its ideal of academic 
freedom. 
The development of the university that took place before La-
Follette became governor did not cease. Its development was fur­
ther aided by the regent's choice in 1903 of a successor to Presi­
dent Adams. After considerable search for a suitable candidate, the 
board finally selected one of its own professors, Charles Van 
Hise.31 He became the first graduate of Wisconsin to become its 
president. 
Van Hise and LaFollette were close friends and classmates. 
While their relationship might have been expected to increase the 
unity between the university and the state, the closeness was re­
markable. Van Hise could depend on the support of the state gov­
ernment during all of the years the Progressives were in power, 
and the government could depend on the university for a supply 
of experts to formulate its program. 
Although the university vigorously continued to emphasize 
research, Van Hise encouraged professors also to contribute their 
services to the state. He gave them liberal amounts of time and 
leaves of absence to do such work. By 1908 forty-one members of 
the university's faculty were serving on one or more commis­
sions.32 Setting an example for the members of his faculty, Van 
Hise served on five different commissions. Although such service 
was not unknown in other states, the extent to which it was offered 
the present condition of society is perfect. We must therefore welcome from our teachers 
such discussions as shall suggest the means and prepare the way by which knowledge may 
be extended, present evils .  .  . removed and others prevented.
We feel that we would be unworthy [of] the position we hold if we did not believe
in progress in all departments of knowledge. In all lines of academic investigation it is of
the utmost importance that the investigator should be absolutely free to follow the indica­
tions of truth wherever they may lead.
Whatever may be the limitations which trammel inquiry elsewhere we believe the
great state University of Wisconsin should ever encourage that continual and fearless
sifting and winnowing by which alone the truth can be found." 
31 Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 3-122. 
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during Van Hise's administration was unprecedented. The Van 
Hise-LaFollette friendship created a state and university part­
nership. 
Wisconsin and the use of the expert 
Although the use of the expert in framing legislation did not 
originate there, the state of Wisconsin certainly was an important 
leader in this field.33 But this leadership did not arise until LaFol­
lette became governor. Being a man with a program, he did not 
wait for the legislature to submit bills for his approval. Instead he 
made detailed proposals to the legislature and backed them as fully 
as he could. 
Before he submitted any proposal he had detailed studies made 
by experts on the subject. Such studies provided him with informa­
tion as to whether such proposals had been tried elsewhere, and 
whether they were successful. Based on the best knowledge avail­
able, they were a safeguard against mistakes that might lead to 
costly failures. To avoid legal difficulties and the possibility that 
the legislation might be declared unconstitutional, experts care­
fully drafted each bill. As a result, the Progressive's program was 
so successful that very little of it was discarded when the opposi­
tion gained power. 
LaFollette explained that many of his experts were from the 
university: 
.  .  . While I was governor, I sought the constant advice and service 
of the trained men of the institution in meeting the difficult problems 
which confronted the state. Many times when harassed by condi­
tions which confronted me, I have called in for conference President 
Van Hise, Dr. Ely, Professor Commons, Dr. Reinsch and others.34 
.  . During the last session of the legislature a Saturday lunch club 
was organized, at which the governor, and some of the state officers 
and legislators  regularly meet with the university professors 
Van Hise, Ross, Reinsch, Commons, Scott, Meyer, McCarthy and 
othersto discuss the problems of the state.35 
This Saturday Club of which he spoke was formed when La-
Follette no longer was governor. Yet it does symbolize the close 
relationship between the state and the university. LaFollette initi­
ated the relationship while some of his successors continued to 
foster it. 
33 Howe, p. 38.
 
34 La Follette, Robert M., p. 30.
 
35 Mid., p. 32.
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Frederic C. Howe in his Wisconsin, An Experiment in De­
mocracy, described the relationship: 
The close union of the university with politics prevented any 
serious reaction during the years which followed the election of 
La Follette to the Senate. University graduates occupied many of 
the important state offices, whether elective or appointive. In 1901 
there were thirty-five professors and instructors giving part of their 
time to the public service. President Van Hise and Dean E. A.
Birge are members of the conservation commission, state park 
board, the forestry and fish commissions. John R. Commons, pro­
fessor of political economy, and now a member of the newly created 
industrial commission has promoted much of the industrial, labor, and 
railway legislation of recent years. Thomas S. Adams, former pro­
fessor of political economy, is now a member of the tax commis­
sion, while Dr. B. M. Rastall is director of the state board of 
public affairs. Dr. B. H. Meyer, now of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission at Washington, was a member of the railway commis­
sion and at the same time professor of transportation. Charles 
McCarthy, head of the legislative reference library, is lecturer in 
political science, and E. M. Griffith, the state forester, is instructor 
in forestry. C. F. Burgess, professor of mechanical engineering, is 
on the engineering staff of the railroad and tax commissions, while 
Richard Fischer,  professor of  chemistry,  is  the  state  chemist. 
Chauncey Juday, state biologist,  is lecturer on zoology. J. G. I). 
Mack, W. D. Pence, C. G. Burritt, N. P. Curtis, Otto L. Kowa lke, 
H. H. Thorkelson, and H. H. Voskuehler are all members of the 
engineering faculty and connected with the railway and tax com­
missions in the appraisal of property, the investigation of equip­
ment, meters, and conditions of service of the local public utility 
corporations, and the working out of technical problems connected 
with the regulation of these industries. Professors in agriculture, in 
chemistry, in law, and in medicine are identified with other state 
activities and give a considerable part of their time to public affairs. 
Groups of students spend their vacations in all kinds of state work 
and are the most efficient of employees.36 
The professors used their graduate students in studying state 
government problems. Some of them secured positions for their 
students to aid them in such work. Fellowships were set up for 
other students who worked on such problems. Many students par­
ticipated in seminars devoted to the state's problems. Before Pro­
fessor T. S. Adams and D. 0. Kinsmen drafted the state income 
tax bill of 1911 students spent several years on the subject. Before 
the state considered initiative, referendum, and recall, graduate 
student seminars worked over the proposals. Commons' students 
aided him in most of his proposals. 
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To a considerable extent this type of study was an extension 
of Ely's idea of creating a school to train persons for public serv­
ice. Under this study the state became a laboratory where students 
could gain practical experience. As a result, Wisconsin became an 
early leader in the training of students for service in public ad­
ministration.37 
Perhaps Wisconsin's greatest contribution to the use of ex­
perts was the introduction of specialists in the drafting of legisla­
tion." Although the use of such specialists was an innovation in 
America, it long had been a part of British practice. Because the 
powers of government are not divided in Britain as they are in 
America, there never were inhibitions against using experts from 
the executive branch in drafting bills to be presented to Parlia­
ment, and the Cabinet frequently would consult a specialist before 
submitting bills. Finally, in 1871, British law formalized the pro­
cedure by creating parliamentary counsels to insure proper and 
legal wording for all government bills.39 
Specialists in bill drafting may prevent the inclusion of loose 
wording that might lead to confusion and much litigation. So-called 
"jokers," or loopholes, in laws may not be apparent even to a well-
trained attorney. The history of legislation is filled with instances 
of laws that have been unenforceable or enforceable in ways quite 
unforeseen by their originators. Much of the invalidation of legis­
lation on constitutional grounds has  resulted from improper
wording. 
Slow though America was in turning to bill-drafting special­
ists, the need has been more acute in the U. S. than in Britain. 
The U. S. Constitution, subject to complex interpretations, has 
made the drafting of legislation hazardous. Battalions of corpora­
tion lawyers have been quick to find legal flaws that could be ex­
ploited for their own purposes. 
Before the time when Congress or various state legislatures 
hired official bill draftsmen, individual members of these organiza­
tions had to depend on their own or unofficial aid. Many such mem­
bers were lawyers, but their abilities to draft laws were limited. 
37 Leonard White, p. 326.
38 Dr. Witte explained that there are two types of bill drafting. One, such as that
done by Commons, is the developing the general concepts for a bill. The second involves 
the technical job of phrasing the provisions in legal language. This second type is done to
ensure that the law will operate as intended and is not vulnerable to attack on constitu­
tional grounds. E. E. Witte, Letter of February 9, 1960.
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Some copied, without making adequate changes, laws of other 
states. Those who wished to further lighten the task submitted 
bills drafted by lobbyists of special interest groups. The honest 
but simple souls who labored over their own submissions often 
proposed what they never intended. In his Legislative Reference 
Work: A Comparative Study, J. H. Leek told of numerous exam­
ples of poorly drafted laws, some humorous and others merely 
expensive." He cited both state and federal laws which led to 
troubles. In some cases, the legislation remained nugatory, and in 
some extreme cases governors had to call special sessions of their 
legislatures to correct the mistakes. 
La Follette preferred to use university professors as his drafts­
men, among whom Commons was his favorite.41 Yet Commons and 
his associates used an agency La Follette might have used, had he 
so desired. This was the drafting service of the Legislative Refer­
ence Library of Wisconsin, under the direction of Charles Mc-
Carthy. Commons found the facilities of the library speeded him in 
his work. 
While Commons and other professors developed the general 
concepts in proposed legislation, McCarthy and his experts phrased 
the provisions into legal language. Because this latter group was 
equipped to do more than this technical work, La Follette's pro­
posals usually were considered by two sets of experts before being 
submitted to the legislature. 
At least part of the reason La Follette did not use the service 
directly was that his habit of consulting professors antedated its 
establishment. Furthermore, the drafting service developed gradu­
ally and reached operating efficiency late in La Follette's adminis­
tration. 
The year 1901 usually is given as the date of the founding of 
Wisconsin's Legislative Reference Library.42 It was then Mc-
Carthy was hired as a document cataloger for a branch of the Wis­
consin Free Library. He did this work in such a manner that ma­
terials could be assembled easily to provide background material 
for anyone interested in drafting legislation. Such materials in­
cluded comparable laws and proposals in other states, the national 
government, and other nations. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Fitzpatrick, p. 112. 
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In the course of his work McCarthy began to aid individual 
legislators more and more. He invited them, individually and col­
lectively, to use the library's facilities. In 1903 the legislature rec­
ognized the library by providing regular appropriations and suit­
able quarters. By 1905 McCarthy requested that the legislature au­
thorize employment of a lawyer for drafting bills. Accepting his 
recommendation, the legislature in 1907 authorized him to add a 
bill-drafting service to his library. 
Any member of the state legislature could go to the library 
for aid both in compiling materials for studying proposals and in 
the drafting of bills.43 Furthermore, he could be sure the bill em­
bodied his ideas and was free from defects. In one extreme case 
the library staff drafted a bill to abolish its own services. Although 
the bill did not pass (partly because of the humor it caused), it 
was indicative of how the service remained nonpartisan. Because 
members of the Democratic Party and both branches of the Repub­
lican Party used its services, the library even withstood the attacks 
of a later governor who opposed the Progressive movement." 
Members did not want to return to the alternatives of paying high 
fees out of their own pockets to private lawyers or accepting the 
work of lobbyists. With the library staff even the most insignifi­
cant legislator could submit technically correct bills. 
The success of the Wisconsin drafting service led to prompt 
imitation elsewhere.45 During 1907 seven other states followed 
Wisconsin's example. During the next decade the majority of the 
states followed both with drafting services and legislative libraries. 
Many states kept the two institutions separate, but provided both 
functions. 
Within a few years the national government also followed 
Wisconsin's example. La Follette, as a senator, fought for extend­
ing the Wisconsin principles to the federal government. In 1915 
his efforts were rewarded by the establishment of the Legislative 
Reference Service. Finally, in 1918, Congress established the Of­
fice of Legislative Counsel, which provided a bill-drafting service. 
Both services have grown over the years, indicating that the mem­
bers of Congress have found them useful. 
Wisconsin thus led in the introduction of experts in govern­
ment. Because the Progressives were introducing extremely con­
43 McCarthy, p. 197.
 
44 Fitzpatrick, pp. 72-89.
 
45 Leek, p. 58.
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troversial proposals, success couldnot come by the mere passing of 
laws. Those laws were challenged with all the means at the disposal 
of the opposition. If any defects could be found in the wording or 
in the constitutionality of them, the bills might be defeated. La Fol­
lette and his Progressives faced these possibilities by taking ex= 
treme care in framing their proposals. They used the best minds 
available to search for reasonable solutions to the problems. They 
tried to be fair to all interests involved, without compromising 
their main objectives. Then when their proposals were well thought 
out and sold to the people, they introduoed carefully worded legis­
lation to implement their programs. In doing so, Wisconsin became 
a leader in both its progressive legislation and in its reasonable 
method of attaining it. 
The LaFollette- Commons friendship 
In contrast to those at other universitits, the situation at Wis­
consin favored Commons' reform activities. The administration of 
the university and that of the state combined in the encouragement 
of professors to participate in the formulation of reform pro­
grams. Both institutions were in the hands of liberals who were 
congenial to the ideas of Commons. Instead of condemning him 
for meddlesome reform activities, the authorities put him to work 
on important reforms. 
Many of Commons' opportunities resulted from his friend­
ship with La Follette. The two men had met when Commons made 
a trip to Madison on a study for the National Civic Federation in 
1902.46 At that time, La Follette, as governor, consulted Commons 
on a matter pertaining to the taxation of railroads. Previously, 
Commons had written a few articles on, the subject and was then 
currently the secretary of the taxation department of the National 
Civic Federation. Apparently, LaFollette was pleased With Com­
mons' help because for many years tIlereafter he turned to him for 
aid in drafting legislation. They became close friends and intimates 
of each others' households. 
While LaFollette was governor Commons drafted the Civil 
Service Law of 1905. Shortly afterwards, although hd had left 
Wisconsin to become a United States senator, he requested that 
Commons draft the 1907 law regulating public utilities. Common 
did so and continued to draft laws in Wisconsin for many years. 
46 Belle and Fola La Follette, p. 157. 61  Commons' Working Environment 
At times he even aided LaFollette with bills to be submitted before 
the United States Senate. 
Although Commons was not a politician, he did aid LaFol­
lette politically. During'both the 1910 and 1912 campaigns he took 
time away from his numerous other activities to help LaFollette.47 
He spoke op his friend's behalf and helped with the raising of 
money for the 1910 senatorial campaign." During the 1912 cam­
paign he lived as a guest at the LaFollette home while preparing 
campaign 'materials and performing other duties at campaign 
headquarters." 
Early in 1912 it appeared that LaFollette was a serious con­
tender for the' Republican presidential nomination. For several 
years he had been pining leadership of a growing number of his 
party's senators who were defying the Taft administration's lead­
ership. Although Taft forces were in control of the party, the 
growing oppositionsiseriously challenged that leadership. 
Meanwhile, former President Theodore Roosevelt gave in­
creasing encouragement to the revolt. Because he was either reluc­
tant to run again for the presidency or because he wished to appear 
reluctant for strategic reasons, Roosevelt remained in the back­
ground. Although he refused to state that he definitely would not 
run, he fostered the impression that he was not a candidate. With­
out him, the obvious candidate to oppose Taft was LaFollette. 
Yet LaFollette did not wish to run only to find that the more 
popular Roosevelt would dramatically step in at the last minute and 
take over all' of his supporters.5° He did not regard Roosevelt as a 
true 'Progressive he could support, but without the support of 
Roosevelt's friends, the Progressive movement would be a lost 
cause. Yet Roosevelt would. not openly give him active support. 
Instead, he sent numerous emissaries to assure LaFollette that he 
would back him at the appropriate time and that he, himself, did 
not mean to run. Although,LaFollette was not quite sure he could 
trust Roosevelt, who avoided making any v,,ritten promises, he did 
have to act on the assumption that Roosevelt's relayed promises 
were in good faith. After being assured of support from most of 
47'1-bid., p.-299. 
48 Although the Seventeenth Amendment to the United States Constitution did not
come until 1913, Wisconsin in 1906 had enacted a law providing for direct primary elec­
tions for the office of United States Senator. Although such a choice was not binding, it 
was expected that the state legislature would choose the winning candidate. 
49 Belle and Fola LaFollette, p. 381. 
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the Progressives and sufficient financial support, La Follette an­
nounced his candidacy. 
Even after he had begun his campaign, he was not completely 
convinced of Roosevelt's sincerity. Consequently, he sent Commons 
to visit him.51 Commons had lunch with Roosevelt at the Alpine 
Club in New York. There, in response to his direct question, 
"Would he support LaFollette ?" Roosevelt replied, "Yes, tell him 
to go ahead."52 LaFollette did go ahead, and the Roosevelt sup­
porters did back him, until at the strategic moment when they 
switched to Roosevelt. 
Commons also helped in LaFollette's campaign by writing 
press releases, campaign material, and by working on his platform. 
During January, 1912, he spent two weeks in the LaFollette house­
hold preparing some biographical material on LaFollette. When 
finished, he sent it to the campaign headquarters where it even­
tually reached the hands of Medill McCormick, who was directing 
publicity. At this point, McCormick, who was a Roosevelt sup­
porter, substituted a manuscript he had written himself. The sub­
stitute was so worded that it could be construed as committing La-
Follette to support Roosevelt in case Roosevelt later chose to run. 
McCormick then directed a clerk to send it to the printers to 
have 10,000 copies printed. To assure speed in the printing he 
offered the printer $200. If the substitute had been printed not 
enough funds would have been left to pay for printing the original 
manuscript. 
Fortunately, the clerk took the manuscript to Congressman 
John M. Nelson, who was temporarily in charge of the headquar­
ters, and explained the offer McCormick was making the printer. 
Immediately Nelson submitted the substitute manuscript to Mrs. 
LaFollette and Commons. They decided it should not be printed 
and that the original manuscript should be printed at once.53 
By this time Roosevelt forces were beginning to equivocate, 
many of them looking for an excuse to desert LaFollette. Although 
Roosevelt had not yet announced his candidacy, some of his sup­
porters began to campaign openly for him. Finally, LaFollette, 
himself, gave them the break for which they were waiting. 
51 /bid., p. 345.
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At the Periodical Publishers' Association dinner at Philadel­
phia La Follette made a disastrously poor speech.54 Exhausted from 
his strenuous campaign and worried over the illness of his daugh­
ter, he was hardly at his best. Before he had departed for Philadel­
phia he had promised Commons he would not speak for more than 
thirty minutes.55 However, under the strain of speaking before 
what soon was a hostile audience, he lost all sense of timing. For 
two hours he rambled on and on. His voice became strident and 
his words were inappropriate. When he was done, he was sick and 
exhausted. 
At once reports were circulated that he had been drunk, had a 
mental collapse, or at least was broken in health. Seizing on the 
incident as an excuse, many of his former friends deserted him. 
By the end of the month, Roosevelt had "thrown his hat in the 
ring." Although La Follette continued his campaign to the bitter 
end, his chances were killed that night in Philadelphia. 
After the campaign, during which La Follette limited himself 
to some attacks on Roosevelt and to support for some local Pro­
gressives, he managed to regain some of his leadership over the 
Progressive senators. At last, after many years, he had enough 
support to push through a law requiring "physical valuation" of 
the railways of the nation. At the time of the passage of the Hep­
burn Act, he had argued without success for an amendment for 
this purpose. He had declared that railroad rates could not be reg­
ulated effectively unless there were some objective criteria to de­
termine what would be reasonable rates. In La Follette's opinion 
the best method would be to relate the rates to a reasonable return 
on the value of capital invested. Yet he did not want to accept the 
figures of the companies involved regarding how much they had 
invested. Instead, he believed their properties should be appraised 
by engineers, accountants, and other experts to determine what 
would have been a reasonable investment. 
In December of 1912 Representative Adamson introduced a 
bill in the House for "physical valuation" in virtually the same 
form that La Follette had introduced seven years before as an 
amendment to the Hepburn Act. Early in 1913 the bill went to the 
Senate and was referred to the Interstate Commerce Committee, 
whose chairman appointed La Follette as a chairman of a subcom­
mittee to consider it. 
54 Ibid., pp. 398-414.
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To improve the bill, La Follette worked "night after night" 
with John R. Commons until one o'clock in the morning." With 
them Professor Edward W. Bemis, a leading utility expert, also 
worked on the bill. Finally, shortly before March 4, when Congress 
was to adjourn automatically, the bill was reported out of commit­
tee and was passed unanimously by the Senate. Taft signed the 
law as one of the last acts of his administration. 
Thus, this Physical Valuation Act, which Commons helped 
write, brought the Interstate Commerce Commission's  power al­
most up to par with that which Wisconsin's commission had in its 
own state. However, this valuation on a national scale proved more 
difficult than in the state of Wisconsin. It was not completed until
the 1930's. 
In June of 1913 La Follette's friendship brought Commons an­
other opportunity for public service. La Follette sent him  a tele­
gram stating that President Wilson offered him the position of 
chairman of the new Industrial Relations Commission.57 Unfor­
tunately, Commons felt compelled to decline because to accept 
would have necessitated a three-year leave of absence from the 
University of Wisconsin. He had just completed a two-year leave 
while serving as a commissioner on Wisconsin's Industrial Com­
mission. 
Yet Commons did become a member of the President's  com­
mission. Although he could not accept the chairmanship, he did 
agree to serve as a public member on condition that he would be 
available only during vacations from the university. The story of 
his service will be told in a later chapter. 
Commons' friendship with La Follette faced a crisis during 
World War I. After his son had enlisted, Commons caught the war 
spirit and began to see Germany as a threat to national existence 
of the U. S.58 He feared that if the French and British lost the 
war, Germany, after gaining the world's largest navy, might 
threaten this continent. 
Some time after America had entered the war, Commons 
made a business trip to Washington. While there he called on his 
friend, Senator La Follette, in his office. The two men became in­
volved in a heated discussion on the declaration of war." Finally, 
56 Belle and Fola La Follette, p. 455. 
57 Commons, Myself, p. 165. 
58 Ibid., p. 183 . 
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when nothing more could be said, they parted. Commons described 
their parting: 
On our walk from his office toward the Union Station, neither 
of us could say a word. I saw then his unconquerable will with his
jaw shut tight. Never before had I come against it in my own 
person. I determined that, when I should get back to Wisconsin, I 
would do what I could to elect opponents of LaFollette.60 
Their friendship was at an end. With both of them passionately 
believing the other wrong, there could be no reconciliation. Com­
mons, in the height of the war patriotic fever, turned against his 
friend. To LaFollette this was desertion and disloyalty during his 
own critical time. 
LaFollette had been for strict neutrality from the time Europe 
first was plunged into war. Fearing war would set back the prog­
ress of democracy a generation, he was determined that the United 
States should remain out of the war. Such a war, he reasoned, 
would provide the reactionaries with the chance to undo all of the 
hard-won reforms. 
When Congress voted for war, he accepted the majority deci­
sion, but with no enthusiasm. His opposition to the majority then 
changed to an attempt to retain as much democracy during wartime 
as possible. At times his proposals were interpreted as obstructing 
the war effort. Such condemnation reached climactic proportions 
when his speech in St. Paul was misquoted by a national news 
service. The account of the speech quoted him as saying that, "We 
had no grievances against Germany."61 Actually he had said that we 
did have serious grievances. He had even added that although he 
had not been in favor of the war, it was necessary to fight it once 
we were in. 
When the people of the nation thought that LaFollette be­
lieved we had no grievances they were ready to call him a traitor. 
In the Senate an attempt was made to expel him. At home he was 
fired from the Madison Club. The Wisconsin legislature passed a 
resolution condemning him. President Van Hise conducted a meet­
ing of professors who circulated a petition asking for his expulsion 
from the Senate. Even John R. Commons signed this petition. 
In time the truth of the St. Paul speech became known. Even­
tually, with the end of the war, the storm raging around LaFollette 
60 Ibid.
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subsided. Many who had turned against him were ashamed of 
their action. In 1922 voters in Wisconsin vindicated him by re­
electing him, by an unprecedented majority, to the Senate. 
Commons lost a good friend when he condemned La Follette. 
Yet he never lost his respect for him. In his autobiography, Myself, 
he described La Follette with almost hero-worship. As to losing 
his friendship, Commons wrote : 
.  .  . It was grief to me that, during the years following 1917, when I 
was often in Washington, I could not get up the courage to visit 
him at his home. I was afraid of his family. I received no invitation. 
I met him and his son Robert on public affairs at his office in the 
Senate Building. They were the same to me as ever.62 
Fola LaFollette described her father's reaction at the first 
meeting of the two men after their parting: 
.  That same day, after an Interstate Commerce Committee hearing 
on the railroad issue, he saw John R. Commons for the first time 
since Commons signed a petition calling for Bob's expulsion from 
the Senate. The two men, who had been so intimate for many years, 
talked briefly of family matters. Bob wrote his family that Com­
mons "shook hands with me" and said he would call and see me, 
but he has not been around. He looked old and thinner than ever." 
The two men never did have a reconciliation. Commons sup­
ported LaFollette in his third-party presidential campaign in 1924. 
Furthermore, he wrote articles supporting his candidacy. Yet the 
contact between these two men remained "official." The old inti­
macy never could be restored. 
The LaFollette-Commons friendship combined two forces that 
were trying to cope with the problems arising from the growth of 
big business in America. LaFollette represented the agrarian inter­
ests, resenting the shift of power from rural to metropolitan in­
terests. These rural interests watched with fear the growth of huge 
economic enterprises. If they could have done so they would have 
prevented such a growth. Faute de mieux, they fought a defensive 
battle to prevent the more flagrant abuses of power by corpora­
tions. They pushed through antitrust laws only to find them inef­
fective. In only a few cases, where the public interest was clearly 
apparent, were they successful. Such cases included the need to 
regulate railroads and public utility firms. 
Because of the strong political opposition from business, much 
of the battle by the agrarians centered on measures to suppress 
62 Commons, Myself, pp. 187-188.
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corruption. They fought for direct primaries; civil service sys­
tems; corrupt practice laws; direct election of United States sena­
tors; and initiative, recall, and referendum elections. Their theory 
was that business interests might corrupt the caucuses, legislatures, 
and the Congress, but that the electorate itself is relatively in­
corruptible. 
Perhaps their reforms were not adequate insurance against 
corruption, but these changes were good tactical moves in achieving 
their objectives. Selling the people on the need to safeguard against 
corruption aided the reformers in pushing old interests out of 
office. In many states the reforms, and for a time the reformers, 
were successful. Although the reforms did not completely succeed 
in ending corruption, they have remained as a legacy from a brief 
period of reform. COMMONS' CAREER AT THE 
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN 
WHEN COMMONS joined the staff of the economics depart­
ment of the University of Wisconsin in 1904 his career 
reached its turning point. His conflict with university authorities 
concerning his radicalism was over, as was his succession of short-
term positions. In the congenial atmosphere of Wisconsin he was 
destined to remain. 
As explained in the previous chapter, conditions were particu­
larly favorable for him when he arrived at Wisconsin. The admin­
istration both of the university and of the state encouraged profes­
sors to engage in the very sort of activities that attracted him. Like 
those of any modern university, authorities urged faculty members 
to undertake research projects. What was unique about Wisconsin 
was that work for the state in the formulation of its legislative pro­
gram counted as research. Hence, Commons was provided with 
the opportunity of combining the career of a reformer with that 
of a scholar. 
The third element in his career was that of a teacher. At the 
time he was hired by Wisconsin his record showed little promise 
as a teacher. When he had attempted to substitute for Professor 
Ely at Johns Hopkins during his graduate days he could not cope 
with his students.' On his first teaching job, at Wesleyan Uni­
1 Commons, Myself, op. cit., p. 44. 
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versity, he was fired after one year because he was a poor teacher.2 
Although his difficulty in holding positions supposedly was caused 
by his radicalism, his deficiencies in the formal techniques of teach­
ing may have had some influence on the authorities. He never did 
become a good or systematic lecturer, but he became a great teacher 
in spite of superficial difficulties. But to anyone hiring him in 1904 
his teaching ability was not an attraction. Fortunately for him, 
Wisconsin had evolved sufficiently toward becoming a modern 
university that its  officials tended to value research more than 
teaching. 
He was hired by Ely, who knew exactly what to expect of 
him. By this time he had acquired considerable experience of the 
kind respected by Ely. His study and work involving labor unions 
provided him with qualification for what Ely had in mind. Ever 
since publishing the book, The Labor Movement in America, Ely 
had been nursing the idea of writing an extensive and complete 
history of labor in the United States.3 This project he turned 
over to Commons, who with the help of his students, finally pub­
lished two long works on the subject. The first, A Documentary 
History of American Industrial Society,4 contained a compilation 
of source material in labor history, while The History of Labor in 
the United States' became the classic work on the labor move­
ment. The first he published in 1910 and the second, to the extent 
of its first two volumes, in 1918. Finally, in 1935, Commons' stu­
dents finished the last two volumes of the labor history. More on 
this history will be included in a later chapter. 
Ely contributed more than materials for Commons' work on 
labor history. He solicited $30,000 for the expenses involved.6 
Among the contributors were V. Everit Macy, whom Commons 
knew from his National Civic Federation days; William English 
Walling, who previously had employed Commons on research 
projects;  Stanley McCormick, a friend of Walling; F. Fulton 
Cutting, a New York lawyer; State Senator W. H. Hatton of 
Wisconsin, with whom Commons later worked on labor legisla­
tion;  Captain Ellison A. Smyth, a textile manufacturer about 
whose labor relations Ely had written; and Charles R. Crane, who 
was a backer of La Follette and later of Woodrow Wilson. Later, 
2 Ibid., p. 45.
3 Ely, The Labor Movement in America.
4 Commons and Associates, A Documentary History of American Industrial So­
ciety.
5 Commons and Associates, The History of Labor in the United States. 
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Professor H. W. Farnham of Yale University furnished another 
$25,000, in addition to creating the Board of Research Associates 
in American History, an organization which furnished further 
funds. Even the University of Wisconsin provided money for the 
projects. 
Because of his own contacts, Commons, before long, solicited 
funds for his projects. The history project provided him with 
a method of operating, beneficial to both him and his students. 
Operating before the days when the great foundations provided 
numerous large grants of money, Commons turned to his  wealthy 
friends when he needed to raise funds. From them he obtained 
money for travel expenses for himself and his students.  Always 
he used clerical and research assistants, paid with the money he 
raised. 
Rather than try to do all of the writing, he parceled out work 
to his students, to whom he gave generous credit. He reserved 
the role of editor and co-ordinator for himself. Such a technique 
had disadvantages, but it did permit him to accomplish far more 
than he could have done alone. When the Documentary History 
was published, and later when the first two volumes of the History 
were completed, the critics heaped praise upon  them.? In sharp 
contrast to his failure with The Distribution of Wealth, this suc­
cess in the labor field established him as a leading labor economist. 
However, he became involved in many more activities than 
writing a labor history and teaching at the University of Wis­
consin. As was explained in the previous chapter, his friendship 
with La Follette started him on a series of projects for government. 
In addition, La Follette helped him make useful contacts for his 
other work. Some of La Follette's friends, because they tended to be 
liberal, were interested in Commons' activities. Those with money, 
like Charles Crane, helped finance a number of his projects. Many 
of them aided him in securing contacts necessary to get govern­
ment financing for some of his projects. With this money, plus 
what was available from the comparatively new foundations, he 
was able to carry on projects requiring the aid of a number of 
researchers. 
Commons' outside activities 
While at the University of Wisconsin Commons engaged in 
so many activities in addition to his teaching that it is almost im­
7 See the chapter, "Commons, Student of the Labor Movement." 72  JOHN R. COMMONS 
possible to account for all of them. Individual chapters will be 
devoted to some of the more important ones, but many others can 
be mentioned only briefly. 
Soon after he arrived in Wisconsin he drafted the Civil Serv­
ice Law of 1905 for Governor La Follette. Shortly afterwards, in 
1906, he participated in the National Civic Federation study of 
some thirty-five municipally and privately owned gas, electric light 
and power, and street railroad companies in the United States and 
England. As part of the study, he made a five-month trip to the 
British Isles. After his return he undertook the supervision of 
the labor portion of the Pittsburgh Survey, which was financed 
by the Russell Sage Foundation. This study was made by a num­
ber of investigators and some social workers who later published 
the magazine Survey. Commons' part of this survey of social 
conditions in Pittsburgh included a study of the problems of the 
wage earners. To aid him in his share of the work he took along 
several of his students. 
His experiences in these two studies, the one on public utilities 
and the second on working conditions, provided him with back­
ground for drafting two important Wisconsin laws. In 1907 he 
drafted the Public Utility Act, which became the model for many 
others throughout the nation. His observance during the Pitts­
burgh Survey of the need for improving safety conditions and 
compensating injured workers contributed to the study he made 
preparatory to drafting the law creating Wisconsin's Industrial 
Commission. This law placed the formulation and enforcement of 
industrial safety regulations under an administrative commission. 
It also provided compensation for workers injured on their jobs. 
Before drafting each of these laws he used a number of his stu­
dents to aid him in compiling information needed both for devising 
proposals and for influencing the legislature to accept him. 
Not only did Commons write bills for submission to Wiscon­
sin's legislature, but he also participated in campaigns to sell the 
public on the need to adopt the reforms he advocated. He enlisted 
the aid of organizations in which he was very active. In 1907 he 
was elected secretary of the newly formed American Association 
for Labor Legislation. This association, composed of state and 
federal officials dealing with labor problems, and of professors and 
social workers, continually developed plans for labor legislation. 
After Commons' plan for labor administration by commissions was 
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merous other states. To make the organization more effective it 
soon elected a full-time executive secretary, John B. Andrews, who 
was a Commons' student. Also, in 1910, it moved its headquarters 
to New York City to be nearer important industrial centers. 
Commons continued to be active in this and in another organi­
zation also interested in labor legislation. This second organization, 
the National Consumers' League, operated on the basis of per­
suading consumers not to buy goods produced by companies whose 
employees worked under unsafe or unsanitary conditions. They 
attempted to shock consumers by showing them exhibits of such 
conditions. Commons' role in the organization in 1911 included 
the drafting of a model bill for a minimum wage law for women. 
Later, in 1923, he became the president of the organization, suc­
ceeding Newton D. Baker. 
After drafting the Industrial Commission Law, he served as 
one of the first members of Wisconsin's Industrial Commission. 
When his two-year term of office ended in 1913 he declined a six-
year reappointment at an annual salary of $5,000. This refusal, 
he said, attracted attention because he went back to the university 
for $3,500.8 However, his friend, Charles Crane, gave him the 
difference each year, until after World War I, when his salary 
was raised to $6,000. 
Just before and after being a commissioner he did other gov­
ernment work. In 1910 he began eighteen months' work for the 
city of Milwaukee. He and his students made an exhaustive study, 
resulting in a number of money-saving suggestions for the Soci­
alist administration then in power. They streamlined city organiza­
tions, devised cost-accounting systems, and installed modern filing 
systems. Afterwards, Commons influenced Governor McGovern to 
create the Wisconsin Board of Public Affairs, which was to do the 
same work for the state. In this undertaking, unlike in the Mil­
waukee survey, he did little beyond starting the project. 
Shortly after the expiration of his term as a member of the 
Industrial Commission, he became a member of the United States 
Commission on Industrial Relations. Again, as in both the Pitts­
burgh and Milwaukee surveys, he confined his participation to 
weekends, holidays, examination and vacation periods. He was 
offered the chairmanship but refused as he did not feel he could 
spend the necessary three years away from the university. 
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At the conclusion of his work with the United States Com­
mission he suffered from a nervous collapse, the first in ten years. 
From shortly before examination time in the spring of 1916 until 
the second semester in the following year he did nothing but rest. 
When he returned to the university in February of 1917 
he limited his activities to those of scholarship and the classroom. 
Many of the reform organizations to which he belonged were 
inactive during the period. He was elected president of the Ameri­
can Economic Association for 1918, at its December, 1917, meet­
ing. This office provided him with his chief nonacademic activity. 
Although many economists worked for the government during the 
war, Commons remained at the university. By then the Progres­
sives were out of power in Wisconsin and the conservatives did 
not request his services. Because he had quarreled with his friend, 
La Follette, over the issue of the war, his other main entree to 
government service was gone. As for military service, he was too 
old. His son, Jack, enlisted shortly after the United States became 
involved. Consequently, Commons' interest in the war was that 
of a father of a soldier. 
Although up to this time he had engaged in numerous other 
activities, he had managed to pile up impressive contributions to 
economic literature, especially on the subject of labor. Many of 
his contributions were short articles, but some were in the form of 
books. The books which he wrote by himself included : The Dis­
tribution of Wealth (1893), Social Reform and the Church 
(1894), and Races and Immigrants in America (1907).9 In addi­
tion to these, he edited Trade Unionism and Labor Problems 
(1905),1° The Documentary History of American Industrial So­
ciety (1910), and The History of American Labor (1918). These 
last two established him as a leading authority on the history of 
labor. In 1916 he and his student, John B. Andrews, published 
the first edition of their Principles of Labor Legislation,n which
was the first of its  field published in the English language.12 
Through four editions, the last in 1936, it maintained its place 
as the standard treatise on the subject. 
During the war Commons continued his study of labor prob­
lems with an investigation of industrial relations. In 1919 he pub­
lished Industrial Goodwill, which summarized his ideas on scientific 
9 John R. Commons, Races and Immigrants in America. 
to John R. Commons, ed., Trade Unionism and Labor Problems. 
11 Commons and Andrews. 
12 Barnett, "Review: Principles of Labor Legislation by John R. Commons and John 
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management, employee morale, and the responsibility of the public 
toward the worker." It explored some of the shortcomings of 
scientific management while at the same time proposing methods 
of obtaining the willing co-operation of workers in increasing 
their productivity. 
During the summer of 1919 he made a study of some thirty 
factories that had reputations for good labor relations. Financed 
by some leading paper manufacturers in Wisconsin, he took a 
number of his students on a tour of factories from Wisconsin 
to Maine. After their return he edited a number of their reports 
into the book, Industrial Government.14 Although there was less 
lasting interest in this book than in his others, the research for 
it and its writing provided excellent experience for his graduate 
students. 
While studying labor conditions for this book he observed 
effects of the 1919 inflation and the subsequent depression on 
workers. His appetite for reform was awakened so much that for 
more than the next decade he concentrated on plans to dampen 
the operations of the business cycle. 
In 1920 he and Wesley Mitchell joined with Malcolm C. 
Rorty15 to found the National Bureau of Economic Research, the 
organization that pioneered in the study of business cycles. The 
staff included Mitchell as research director, two of Mitchell's 
students, Frederick R. Macaulay and Oswald W. Knauth, and 
one of Common's students, Willford I. King.16 Commons served 
as director until 1928. 
Commons saw the solution to cyclical unemployment in terms 
of monetary policy. Serving as president in 1922 of the National 
Monetary Association, he carried on a campaign to spread the 
knowledge of monetary controls among both economists and lay­
men.'' He pursued this interest further in 1927 and 1928 by aid­
ing Congressman Strong of Kansas in the framing of a bill instruc­
ting the Federal Reserve System to stabilize prices. Financed by 
a private donor, he spent five months with the congressman work­
13 Commons, Industrial Goodwill. 
14 Commons, Industrial Government. 
15 Malcolm Rorty was chief statistician for the American Telephone and Telegraph 
Company.
16 Dorfman, Economic Mind in America, Vol. IV, p. 365, also Wesley C. Mitchell,
The National Bureau's First Quarter Century.
17 Members of the Research Council of the organization included: W. F. Foster,
David Friday, E. W. Kemmerer, W. C. Mitchell, W. M. Persons, John E. Rovensky,
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ing on the bill.18 Although members of the House Banking and 
Currency Committee complimented him on his testimony during 
hearing, the bill failed to pass. 
Because he realized that monetary policy cannot cure all unem­
ployment, he drafted in 1920 for submission to the Wisconsin 
legislature a bill providing for unemployment compensation. It 
was rejected by the legislature in 1921 and other versions of the 
proposal were defeated at each subsequent session for the next 
decade. Finally, in 1932, Wisconsin enacted a law drafted by him, 
which created the first unemployment compensation system for any 
American state. From the time Commons began his campaign 
until well after its success in Wisconsin he organized pressure 
groups and wrote and spoke extensively on the subject. In 1924 
he even served as an administrator for a voluntary unemployment 
compensation program of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers in 
Chicago. 
Although the problems of depression and unemployment 
dominated his activities, they did not prevent him from following 
a number of other interests. He, William Z. Ripley, and Frank 
Fetter, in 1923, served as experts for the Associated States Op­
posing  Pittsburgh-Plus  (Illinois,  Wisconsin,  Minnesota, and 
Iowa)." They provided economic arguments that were used in 
hearings before the Federal Trade Commission. When the com­
mission ruled against the Pittsburgh-Plus basing plan, the steel 
companies abandoned it rather than appeal to the courts. 
Commons was also a guiding light for a significant project 
on workers' education, which was under the direction of one of 
his students, Don Lescohier.2° Commons sold the university offi­
cials on the idea, served as an adviser to the project, and later was 
a member of its governing committee. To this day, the University 
of Wisconsin has carried on this educational project by providing 
special classes for workers.21 
During the twenties, despite his many other activities, Com­
mons managed to continue with the usual activities of professors. 
In addition to teaching, he made numerous contributions to eco­
nomic literature. Many of the articles involved proposed reforms, 
18 Norman Lombard of the Stable Money League (the reorganized National Mone­
tary Association) raised $2,500 for the expenses of Commons and his statistical assistant,
Myrtle Starr. Commons was on a leave of absence with pay from the university. Com­
mons, Myself, p. 191. 
19 "Hearings," Congressional Record, 69th Congress, pp. 3834-3848.
20 Commons, American Economic Review, Vol. XIV, pp. 505-519. 
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but not all. He demonstrated his ability to keep up with economic 
literature by writing numerous reviews of other economists' works. 
In 1924 he published his Legal Foundations of Capitalism, the 
first of his mature theoretical works.22 In 1934 he followed with 
his Institutional Economics. Although each of these brought him 
a certain amount of respect from many of his fellow economists, 
they failed to present his ideas in a usable form. Consequently, he 
wrote a third book, The Economics of Collective Action, which 
was to clarify the first two.23 This last book finally was published 
after his death. Like the other two, it has had a limited impact on 
American thinking. Commons' recognized contributions remain 
those of a reformer and a teacher of graduate students. 
Commons as a teacher 
Commons' qualities shaped the direction of his success both as 
a teacher and as a reformer in Wisconsin. Not being a brilliant 
and systematic lecturer, his success came from a more individual 
approach. Using his enthusiasm on individuals and small groups, 
he accomplished more than those who held large audiences spell­
bound. He did lecture and he often gave talks to large groups, but 
his success came from his marshalling of facts and from his en­
thusiasm for what he was advocating. 
His student, Edwin Witte, explained: 
Professor Commons was not a brilliant lecturer. His courses 
never were well organized. But he inspired his students to devote 
their lives to the improvement of our democratic way of life and
our economy of free enterprise, for which he developed in them 
not only profound admiration, but also an appreciation that the Amer­
ican idea is one of continuous progress. 
As is common with young people, many of Commons' students 
were dissatisfied with things as they are But they emerged from 
his classes, indeed, as men who wanted to improve what they thought 
was wrong, but without destroying our political, economic, and 
social structure. Commons taught them to see that they must thor­
oughly know the facts and offer workable proposals for improve­
ments. He told them not only to study all that was written about a 
given subject and to reason logically about it, but to make their 
own observations, and to think in terms of remedies, rather than 
criticisms, and to learn from the people directly interested. 
Beyond this teaching, which was done far more by way of 
example than of preaching, Professor Commons possessed those 
qualities which endeared him to them as "John R." He was gen­
erous in his praise for conscientious effort and credited his stu­
22 Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism.
 
23 Commons, The Economics of Collective Action.
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dents with ideas they got from him, or which he inspired. To many 
of us he was a second father, unselfishly interested in our welfare, 
in and out of the classroom. Nor did his interest cease when they 
left the university. He kept in touch with everything they were 
doing and gave them counsel and assistance whenever they sought 
his help, as they were constantly doing.24 
Commons' warm personality added to his effectiveness with 
graduate students. By frequent demonstrations of his personal 
interest in their work he stimulated their enthusiasm. His encour­
agement nurtured their confidence and kept them at conscientious 
effort. Generously, he gave them credit and recognition for what­
ever they accomplished. 
His method of using students to work on his various projects 
also increased his effectiveness as a teacher of graduate students. 
His reforms appealed to his students, who as youths tended to be 
idealistic. Instead of working on the usual projects, which are 
often destined to dusty shelves, they worked on reforms that in 
many cases became laws. It was easy for them to feel the impor­
tance of what they were doing. Consequently, their work took on 
an urgency that drew from them considerably more effort than 
they otherwise might have given. 
Working with Commons, who moved about with prominent 
persons while working on his projects, heightened the glamour of 
their work. Besides meeting with influential people, they often 
traveled to interesting places. In the meantime they were treated 
by Commons as important colleagues making significant contribu­
tions. Furthermore, those who worked closely with him on his 
projects benefited from the extra attention they derived from 
their intimate relationships with him. 
Especially when the project involved governmental functions 
the work often prepared the students for specific positions. By 
being in on the creation of a new agency, the student often found 
opportunities for further employment when his work at the uni­
versity was completed. By actually participating on a project 
involving such work he gained an advantage over other potential 
applicants. 
Commons was not the only professor at the University of 
Wisconsin who worked on governmental projects. Not only did 
LaFollette and the Progressives call in numerous professors as 
24 Edwin E. Witte, "John R. Commons, Teacher, Economist, and Public Servant" 
(Remarks at the John R. Commons' Birthday Dinner, October 10, 1950). 79  Commons' Career at the University of Wisconsin 
expert consultants, but university  officials encouraged faculty 
members to accept such invitations. Howe, in his Wisconsin, an 
Experiment in Democracy, called the university the fourth depart­
ment of the state, along with judicial, executive, and legislative 
branches.25 He described how state officials turned to professors 
who would use problems in the state as projects to train their 
graduate students. As a result of such training, numerous stu­
dents found their way into governmental service for Wisconsin, 
other states, and the federal government. 
Yet the methods which Commons and his colleagues at Wis­
consin used were not without drawbacks. Although a student might 
gain general knowledge of economics from his other courses while 
at the university, the extent of his training from the projects under 
Commons might be too narrow. Interesting and important as the 
project might be to the student, its training value might be slight. 
If the student concentrated too much of the time studying a 
specific case, he might fail to develop an understanding of broad 
principles. Studying such a case might not develop his ability even 
for general analysis. 
Although Commons did not completely neglect economic theory 
in the training of his students, he certainly did not make sure that 
they gained a command of the conventional tools of economic anal­
ysis. When he was concentrating on his reforms he left the teach­
ing of analytical techniques to others. But even when he was devel­
oping his own economic theory students could not learn from him 
much of the corpus of economic theory. He used his seminars as 
sounding boards for his own ideas ; unfortunately many of his stu­
dents later confessed privately that they did not understand what he 
was trying to do. Even Commons was aware of this fact and con­
fessed that he had difficulties in making his students understand 
his theories.26 Some of his students, especially those who taught 
in universities, did learn modern economic analysis, but not from 
him. 
Although somewhat handicapped by a lack of economic theory, 
a great number of Commons' students rose to prominence. By 
adopting Commons' focus on the solution of practical economic 
problems they found many opportunities for constructive work 
both in and out of government. Many of them found good govern­
ment positions and a large number found their way to the eco­
25 Howe, p. 39.
 
26 Commons, Institutional Economics, p. 1.
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nomic departments of many important colleges and universities. 
Witte said of his fellow students: 
Commons' students went everywhere and many of them made 
great contributions as scholars, public officials, or men of practical 
affairs. Even a listing of the students who carried on the work of
Commonsas all of them always said they were doingis impos­
sible on this occasion. But I may be pardoned in mentioning a few, 
although I omit others of equal merit. I mention among University 
teachers :  Harry Millis, Ira Cross, Theresa McMahon, William 
Haber, Ellison Chalmers, Selig Perlman, Don Lescohier, Elizabeth
Brandeis, Kenneth Parsons, and Harold Grovesmost of whom, 
significantly, have not been merely scholars but men and women 
who have made real contributions of a practical nature to human 
betterment. Among men and women whose careers were mainly in 
the public service, I enumerate: Arthur Altmeyer, William Leiser­
son, Katherine Lenroot, Ewan Clagueand, on the state level, Paul 
Rauschenbush, Maud Swett, and Meredith Givens. Quite a few of 
his students came from abroad and returned to their native lands 
to make distinguished records, among them Mark Somerhausen,
the Chief Justice of Belgium,27 Hilary Marquand, the British 
Minister of Pensions, and Andre Philip, French professor and 
journalist and a Minister in several Cabinets. All these, and many 
others, have said that John R. Commons was the greatest influence 
in their lives. Commons, moreover, had much the same effect upon 
many people who came into close contact with him in his many 
endeavors outside of the classroom.28 
Because Dr. Witte was speaking in Madison, his list naturally 
included more of the students who had remained close by. He 
might have extended his list to include John B. Andrews, who, 
as executive secretary for the American Association for Labor 
Legislation for years, spearheaded many of the reforms in labor 
legislation. Those prominent in university teaching whom he might 
have added are : Alvin Hansen and Sumner Slichter of Harvard, 
Theodore Schultz of the University of Chicago, Francis Bird of 
the University of Cincinnati, Frank T. Carlton of Case Institute, 
Holbrook Working and John Troxell of Stanford University, 
Calvin B. Hoover of Duke University, Harold McCracken of 
Louisiana State University, Bruce Knight of Dartmouth, and 
Martin Glaeser of the University of Wisconsin. Other students 
he might have named include : Emerson Schmidt of the United 
States Chamber of Commerce, Roy Blough, Wilbur Cohen, Paul 
H. Nystrom, Florence Peterson, Willard I. King, and Senator 
Wayne Morse. Then, of course, Dr. Witte neglected to include 
his own name. In addition to heading the University of Wisconsin 
27 Dr. Witte later corrected this to read "justice of the high Administrative Court." 
Letter, February 9, 1960. 
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department of economics, Dr. Witte served as executive director 
for President Roosevelt's Committee on Economic Security, which 
drafted the Social Security Act of 1936. Even if Dr. Witte had 
included the above names, the list would be only illustrative.29 
Of course Commons' students were subject to many other 
influences besides his, but so many of them have been active in 
reforms and social welfare activities that there is no doubt of the 
impact of Commons' personality on them. When talking about 
Commons these  students  reveal an affectionate remembrance 
verging on hero worship. They proudly tell of his accomplish­
ments and are fond of describing his personality. Above all, they 
emphasize his greatness, especially as a teacher. One of them, Selig 
Perlman, said: 
As a teacher and inspirer of graduate and undergraduate students, 
Professor Commons ranks with America's greatest. In Commons' 
presence  the  student was aware of  greatness,  yet never  felt 
dwarfed.3° 
Dr. Witte also called him a great teacher, but added he was 
"the most lovable man I have ever known."31 Undoubtedly, the 
devotion of his students stemmed from his unselfish interest in 
their welfare. Although he had sufficient prestige to command con­
siderable respect, he remained human in his relationships with 
them. Each Friday night a group of his students, seniors, and 
graduates met informally at the Commons' home for a lap supper 
and two hours of talk. They were free to bring their wives, hus­
bands, and friends. Sometimes, according to Perlman, the group 
numbered sixty.32 At some of the meetings prominent economists 
or public men of the world presented their observations. At other 
times these "Friday Niters," as they called themselves, were asked 
to discuss what they were doing in addition to their studies. Intro­
ducing themselves to the group, they recited their own biographies. 
In these informal meetings they became acquainted with Com­
mons and each other. Often they became close friends, and ac­
cording to Commons, would help one another whenever they 
could. 
29 When his students were preparing for a birthday party for him on his seventieth 
birthday, Ernestine Wilke, writing for Meredith Givens, gave W. Ellison Chalmers a par­
tial list of Commons' students. The list containing 140 names with addresses disclosed
a wide distribution of positions in universities, research foundations, governmental or­
ganizations, and welfare organizations. (Letter of September 21, 1932.) 
30 Selig Perlman, "John Rogers Commons," in Commons, The Economics of Collec­
tive Action. 
31 Witte, op. cit. 
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Commons' influence did not cease when his students received 
their degrees. He continued to follow their progress after they 
had left the university. If he knew of any positions for which 
they would be interested or qualified he got in touch with them. At 
times he was almost a one-man employment bureau. At least some 
of the success of his many students can be attributed to his aid 
in getting them suitable positions. 
At one point his students thought they had a job for him. 
When President E. A. Birge announced his plans for retirement 
in 1924, rumors spread that John R. Commons was being con­
sidered along with a few others as the next president of the uni­
versity. Although he was a little old (sixty-two) to be considered 
seriously for such a post, his prestige and the affection of his stu­
dents undoubtedly contributed to the starting of the rumor.33 
Commons continued his teaching at the University of Wiscon­
sin until he retired in 1932. Although the Board of Regents gave 
him special permission to continue even though he reached the age 
of seventy in that year,34 his desire to finish his Institutional Eco­
nomics influenced his decision to retire. Furthermore, by then his 
health was too poor for him to remain very active. He decided in 
favor of his book, which he published in 1934. 
On his seventieth birthday his students prepared a party for 
him. Survey magazine reported on this party in a short tribute: 
Men and women in all parts of the United States who owe
their training and inspiration to John R. Commons of the Uni­
versity of Wisconsin joined with students and friends in Madison 
in celebrating the seventieth birthday of their professor on Novem­
ber 18. From Syracuse University, where Professor Commons' chair 
was abolished because his teachings were not in favor there a 
quarter of a century ago, came a message signed by thirty-three 
students saying that they wished the celebration might have been on 
their campus. Prof. Thomas S. Adams of Yale wrote that he knew 
the guest of honor would not go to heaven because he would be 
happy only where there are problems to solve and evils to fight. 
Dr. E. A. Birge, former president of Wisconsin, rose up as a
biologist to take issue with Adams. He was sure that Commons 
would be in heaven to reform the transportation system there, about
which the biologists, who don't see how wings can be set on 
shoulder-blades, have so long complained. President Frank, who was 
unavoidably out of town sent a message to the teacher who had 
achieved immortality in the affections of his students ;  and this 
33 The thirty-eight year old Glen Frank was given the position.
 
34 Wisconsin State Journal (Madison, Wise.), October 15, 1932.
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seemed to express the feelings of the audience better than any other 
words. An employer and two union leaders testified to the gratitude 
of capital and labor for the services Professor Commons had
rendered them. Governor La Follette spoke of those to the govern­
ment and the people of the state. Students presented a check for 
$1,500 to be used for a trip abroad to afford a much needed rest. 
Students also announced that a John R. Commons Library had been 
presented to the University consisting of a complete set of Com­
mons' works and copies of all the books that his students had 
written. Before the dinner broke up Professor Commons charmed 
his audience with glimpses of the personal side of his life, about 
which he rarely speaks.35 
Commons' later years 
When Commons retired in 1932 at the age of seventy his 
health was too poor for him to take the trip abroad that his stu­
dents wished for him. By then he had had a lifetime filled with an 
unbelievable amount of work. His wife, Nell, who had been a con­
siderable source of strength as well as affection for him, was dead. 
Together they had planned to tour Europe in 1928, but on Janu­
ary 1 of that year she failed to survive a surgical operation. Rather 
than make the trip alone, Commons cancelled it and then worked 
harder than ever. Soon the combination of grief, overwork, and 
his lifetime propensity to break down at intervals, resulted in a 
nervous collapse. 
He recovered only to receive another blow. His son, Jack, 
apparently suffering from his war experiences, developed a perse­
cution mania and suddenly disappeared in 1930. Leaving his wife 
and child, he drove off in the family car. For the next fourteen 
years nothing was heard from him. Heartbroken, Commons made 
every effort to locate him both through friends and through the 
American Legion. From time to time the father received reports 
of his whereabouts, but invariably they turned out to be false. 
Finally, in 1944, Jack was found driving a milk wagon in Hart­
ford, Connecticut. What he did during those fourteen years is 
not clear, but Dr. Witte was under the impression he spent much 
of that time in mental hospitals.36 
Shortly after Jack disappeared Commons suffered yet an­
other blow. His other child, Rachel, died mysteriously shortly 
after her marriage. There were strong reasons to suspect suicide." 
35 The Survey, LXVIII, p. 674.
 
36 E. E. Witte, letter of February 9, 1960.
 
37 Ibid.
 84  JOHN R. COMMONS
 
Despite his personal tragedies and poor health, Commons con­
tinued to work. Although he could write for short periods only, 
he continued to work on his Institutional Economics. At the urging 
of his students he wrote his autobiography, Myself. Although 
somewhat disconnected, it is one of his most interesting books. 
Many of his friends feared he would not have sufficient strength 
to finish either book, but finally in 1934 he published both of them; 
and, as it turned out, he had another decade of life before him. 
In his home overlooking Lake Mendota he had been living 
with his sister Anna. They were comfortable and his incomes 
from his emeritus pay and a Carnegie pension were adequate for 
their expenses. Unfortunately while he was driving down a high­
way his car was struck from the rear. His sister died as a result 
of this accident. After this tragedy in 1934 he sold his home, 
bought a trailer, and set out for Florida with his niece, Bertha 
Best. There he recovered his health and worked on for another 
decade." 
When his niece died in 1941 he was left alone again. For a 
while one of his graduate students, Chester Meske, stayed and 
worked with him on his last work, The Economics of Collective 
Action. Finally, in 1942, when the old man no longer could stand 
the discomforts of life in a trailer, Mr. and Mrs. A. B. Carpenter 
took him into their home and cared for him. He remained under 
their protection until 1945 when he went to North Carolina to 
join his one surviving sister and his son, Jack. After Jack was 
found, Commons, his sister, and Jack decided to live together in 
Chapel Hill. 
In 1943 Commons had written his student, Kenneth Parsons, 
asking him to come to work with him for "a month or two."39 He 
feared that without help, he might not finish his book before his 
strength ebbed away. Because Parsons had published an essay 
explaining Commons' point of view, Commons thought of him 
as the logical one to help. Parsons spent five weeks with him in 
the summer of 1944. After returning to Madison, Parsons checked 
the references, smoothed the wording in a few places, and then 
sent a retyped copy back to Commons. After making a few sug­
gestions for modifications, Commons returned the manuscript late 
in April of 1945. 
38 Kenneth Parsons, "Editor's Preface," in Commons' Economics of Collective Action, 
p. v.
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Although the work was not done, Commons left for North 
Carolina. Parsons described this journey in these words: 
He spent a few delightful days in North Carolina, visiting 
President Frank Graham and Professor Howard Odum of the Uni­
versity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and with Professor C.
Bruce Hoover of nearby Duke University. As he reveled in the 
university atmosphere, he was young again for a few days; and 
then the little canter at the end of the race was over and he died 
rather suddenly in May, 1945, at Raleigh, North Carolina, with 
his son and sister at his side.4° 
Five years after Commons' death, his Economics of Collective 
Action was published by the University of Wisconsin Press, fi­
nanced by funds made available when Commons assigned his right 
to royalties from the Documentary History and The History of 
Labor in the United States to the University of Wisconsin as a 
revolving publishing fund. According to Dr. Witte : 
Economics in Action was contemplated by him as a last publica­
tion and was many years in preparation. He made much of this 
theoretical writing unintelligible to present day economists and so 
invited his student, Kenneth Parsons, to come to Florida to live 
with him to work over the draft of what he had written for this 
book. Parsons did so and revised the first half of Economics of 
Collective Action but did not have time to touch the later chapters. 
When Commons died the manuscript of this, his last book, was in 
the shape indicated. It was clear that no one (not even Kenneth 
Parsons, who probably understood Common's theoretical views better 
than any one else) could probably revise what Commons, himself, 
had written. There was money, however, in the fund the University 
of Wisconsin had for the publication of worthwhile books in eco­
nomics which came from the royalties that John R. Commons had 
assigned on his two greatest books for this purpose. So it came to 
pass that the University of Wisconsin Press published Economics 
of Collective Action as the first book financed from this fund. In 
all, Economics of Collective Action is as Commons wrote it, the 
earlier chapters as revised with Parson's help, the later chapters 
as  written  by Commons, but  not  revised  as  he hoped they 
would be.41 
Also in 1950, former students held a party celebrating the 
anniversary of his birthday. Numerous speakers summed up his 
contributions. Their remarks were recorded in a pamphlet pub­
lished by the State Historical Society of Wisconsin. Among the 
40 Ibid., p. viii. C. Bruce Hoover is Calvin B. Hoover.
 
41 Witte, letter of February 9, 1960.
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remarks in his tribute Edwin Witte revealed the affection typical 
of Commons' students, by stating: 
John R. Commons was a great teacher, if judgment is to be
based upon the students he influenced. His public services rank 
among the most valuable given by any academic man in the history 
of the state and nation. His contributions to the advancement of 
economics, while not appreciated by many of the present day 
economic theorizers, are likely to endure and further enhance his 
fame. But I shall ever remember him as "John R.," the most lovable 
man I have ever known.42 
42 Witte, Commons' Birthday Dinner, op. cit., October 10, 1950. PART II	  WORK 
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JOHN R. COMMONS sponsored three Wisconsin reform programs 
which proved to be unusually significant. The first placed the 
regulation of public utilities in the hands of an administrative com­
mission. The second created the Wisconsin Industrial Commission 
and gave it power to make safety regulations and installed a com­
pensation program for injured workmen. The third provided Wis­
consin with the first unemployment compensation in the country. 
Each of these programs was highly controversial at the time 
of its enactment. Many persons doubted whether such laws were 
consistent with the U. S. economic system, form of government, 
or the federal Constitution. 
At the turn of the century, when Commons drafted the public 
utility law, laissez-faire was not quite an absolute principle of gov­
ernment. Legislatures, the Congress, and the courts had by then 
admitted that some businesses such as railroads might be regulated 
in the interest of the public. Intervention to prevent the growth of 
monopolies was conceded to be a legitimate prerogative of govern­
ment. Even some social legislation, such as laws to limit the hours 
of work in such unhealthy places as mines, had been declared legal 
by the courts. Laws to require safety devices in factories also were 
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accepted. However, these were exceptions. In general, business 
men, lawyers, economists, and even government officials agreed 
that government intervention in business should be limited to a 
bare minimum. 
The prevailing concept of the role of government might be 
compared to that of a referee of a game as contrasted to that of 
director of a play. The government provided a legal system under 
which individuals were free to determine their own roles. They 
could do this by exercising their freedom to make contracts. They 
were free to make contracts to sell their own or to purchase some­
one else's services, and to acquire and dispose of property. The 
government aided in the enforcement of contracts but did little in 
the way of interfering with the making of them. 
Because freedom of contract was held to be a "sacred" tenet 
of the economic and legal system, much in the way of social legis­
lation was blocked during the early years of the twentieth century. 
Laws to regulate hours of work, minimum wages, and conditions 
of work were said to be abridgments of a fundamental freedom. 
A corollary to freedom to contract was the individual's respon­
sibility for his own welfare. The legal system might protect him 
from fraud or robbery, but not from the consequences of his own 
stupidity. Furthermore, each individual was expected to save to 
provide for his own security or suffer the consequences if misfor­
tune should overtake him. Private charity might aid him in case of 
extreme adversity, but he usually could expect no help from the 
government. 
Local governments provided aid for the indigent poor but not 
for the able-bodied unemployed. Those receiving such aid were 
unable to make a living and had no relatives to support them. 
Hence, they were exceptions to the principle of individual respon­
sibility. 
Any legislation providing aid to the able-bodied poor with 
money derived from taxes was held to be class legislation. Tax­
payers whose money went for such purposes were said to have 
been deprived of their property without due process of law. 
Because governments did little regulating of economic activi­
ties at the turn of the century, their structures could be compara­
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remained substantially as it was in the early days of the republic. 
The legislative branch passed laws determining public policy while 
the executive branch carried them out. The legality of the actions 
of both the legislative and executive branches was reviewed by the 
third branch, the judiciary. Each branch had its own powers and 
functions. There was little overlapping. However, as governments 
came to deal with the complex problems involved in economic regu­
lation, the simple division of powers and functions had to go. The 
administrative commission upset the old concept of tri-partite divi­
sion of government. At the turn of the century these commissions 
were new and their fate uncertain, but by the time of the New Deal 
they were numerous and powerful. The successful operation of 
the two commissions created in the laws drafted by John R. Com­
mons aided immeasurably in the spread of this form of govern­
ment machinery. 
Three laws sponsored by Commons were milestones along the 
road from the Progressive era to the New Deal. The public utility 
law plus the slightly earlier legislation regulating railroads in Wis­
consin were the Progressives' important laws to regulate industry. 
To be sure, they were designed to provide regulation only where it 
was not being done adequately by competition, but nevertheless 
they ruptured the principle of laissez-faire. The law creating the 
Industrial Commission went even further. It brought all employ­
ers under the regulations of the Industrial Commission. It also in­
terfered with freedom of contract by eliminating the subjects of 
safety conditions and compensation for accidents from contracts 
between employers and employees. Even more important, it pro­
vided compensation for injured workmen regardless of who was to 
blame for industrial accidents. As such, it was the opening wedge 
by which government regulations would in many areas replace pri­
vate contract. The third law was the one creating unemployment 
compensation. 
The Public Utility Law 
Commons patterned the Public Utility Law of 1907 after the 
Wisconsin Railroad Rate Commission Law of 1905. The earlier 
law was as important in bringing railroads under effective regula­
tions as the new law was in extending the regulation to public 
utility companies. Up to the time of the Wisconsin law of 1905, 
neither the national nor the state governments had been effective in 
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either poorly written or failed to provide the regulatory bodies with 
adequate powers. 
In contrast to the earlier laws, the 1905 Wisconsin law gave 
its commission power considerably beyond that of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission at the time. In Wisconsin's law the legisla­
ture required every railroad to charge reasonable rates for hauling 
passengers and property between points within the state. Anyone 
believing rates to be unreasonable could appeal to the Railroad 
Commission which the act created. If the commission found any 
rates unreasonable it could substitute rates that were reasonable on 
the theory that "reasonable rates" could be ascertained. The com­
mission did not set maximum rates;  it specified actual rates. To 
determine what reasonable rates were, the commission was given 
considerable power of investigation and the help of highly trained 
staff. It could determine with the aid of its staff accountants and 
engineers the value of the properties used by the railroads. To 
assure fairness, it was required to conduct hearings at which the 
railroads could present evidence to be considered by the commis­
sion before it rendered decisions. Railroads disagreeing with the 
commission's decisions could appeal to the courts, but the burden 
of proof that the rulings were unreasonable was on them. Further­
more, all evidence first had to be presented in hearings before the 
commission before being presented in court. Thus, the evidence as 
verified by transcripts of the commission's hearings was to be con­
sidered prima facie. To avoid lengthy litigation, cases involving 
the commission were to be expedited through the state's courts.' 
Thus, Wisconsin created the first truly modern-type regulatory ad­
ministrative commission with power to do the work intended. 
Soon after the creation of the Railroad Commission in the 
state of Wisconsin attention shifted to the need for regulation of 
public utility companies. By this time it was recognized that regu­
lation by competition had not been satisfactory. The nature of pub­
lic utility operations made duplication of plants undesirable. Yet 
potential and sometimes real abuses indicated that some kind of 
public control was necessary. One alternative had been municipal 
ownership of the public utilities. Unfortunately, this controversial 
alternative was not without its serious problems. Mismanagement 
in the municipally owned gas works of Philadelphia attracted con­
siderable attention throughout the country. As a result, an investi­
gation of the situation was made by the National Civic Federation, 
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which also discovered other examples of corruption and misman­
agement of publicly owned utilities. These findings cast doubt on 
the proposition that public ownership was the proper alternative to 
inadequately regulated private companies. 
Up to this time, public utilities had been regulated through the 
granting of charters with all conditions of operations specified in 
advance. Rates, quality of service, and obligations of the company 
had been spelled out in the franchise, as well as its rights and priv­
iledges. Franchises were considered contracts between cities and 
the companies. Some cities bargained carefully for contracts pro­
tecting their residents thoroughly, but others were less exacting. 
Some franchises were for long periods, even into perpetuity, while 
others were for comparatively short periods. 
When franchises were for long periods, changes in condi­
tions often worked hardships on either the companies or their cus­
tomers. In periods of rising prices companies faced rising costs 
without any possibility of raising prices. Unless some adjustments 
were made, companies lost money until they were forced to curtail 
or suspend services. On the other hand, during periods of falling 
costs, the customers were at a disadvantage if  rates remained 
constant. 
When franchises were of short duration, investors had to bear 
great uncertainty. If all capital improvements had to be amortized 
over the remaining life of a short-lived franchise, rates would have 
to be high. If rates were not high enough to cover amortization, im­
provements needed for satisfactory service would not be made. 
Furthermore, as each franchise neared its expiration date, negotia­
tions between the company and the city became urgent. Such ur­
gency provided incentives for the company to employ all the politi­
cal pressure it could. Such pressure often accompanied corruption. 
Consequently, short term franchises were not satisfactory either. 
In 1906 the citizens of Wisconsin knew that the regulation of 
public utilities would be a leading problem before the 1907 legis­
lature.2 Residents of both Madison and Milwaukee were disgrun­
tled with the treatment they were receiving from public utility com­
panies. The city of Madison sued the Madison Gas and Electric 
Company to get it to charge reasonable rates and to provide service 
of good quality. When the city tried to get an injunction to this 
effect the Wisconsin Supreme Court dismissed the case on the 
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grounds that it had no authority to fix rates for the future. Such 
a function, the court declared, belonged to the state legislature. 
The gas company even succeeded in preventing the city from 
seeing its books. Such a refusal to divulge facts created suspicion 
that there was something to hide. A Wisconsin university profes­
sor, Dr. Victor Lenher, in an article in the Wisconsin State Jour­
nal, claimed that the amount of nonburnable gases in gas delivered 
by the Madison company was excessive and that the quality of the 
gas was much below standard.3 
Sentiment in Milwaukee was aroused against the local electric 
company, which had brought legal action against the city when it 
tried to use money from the water fund for the purpose of con­
structing a municipal street lighting system. The company's suit 
increased the antipublic utility agitation throughout the state. 
At the Republican convention at Watertown, Governor David-
son, in his keynote address, attacked the public utility companies.' 
He maintained that the rates for heating and lighting gas in Wis­
consin cities were higher than in sixteen other leading cities in 
America. Other abuses, he claimed, included the watering of stock. 
As a result of both the governor's interest and popular demand, the 
Wisconsin Republican Party included in its state platform a prom­
ise to pass a law regulating public utilities. Senator Robert M. La-
Follette and Herman L. Elkern, speaker of the Assembly of the 
state legislature, asked Commons to draft a law extending the jur­
isdiction of the railroad commission to include all public utilities 
in the state of Wisconsin. 
Immediately prior to this Commons had been part of the 
aforementioned investigation by the National Civic Federation. 
This investigation had covered the operations of public utility com­
panies both in the United States and England. Though Commons' 
part in the investigation centered on labor problems, with other 
members of the staff he had visited many public utility operations 
in this country and Great Britain, and had acquired both interest 
and knowledge in the public utility field. 
Commons worked on the proposed law with Charles McCarthy 
and his staff of the Legislative Reference Library of Wisconsin. 
McCarthy assigned M. S. Dudgeon of the legal staff to work 
closely with him, but Commons also sought help from anyone who 
could give him useful suggestions. He frequently consulted with 
3 Ibid.
 
4 Ibid.
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the public utility companies, and especially with their legal repre­
sentative, C. B. Winslow. He also got the advice of the members 
of the Railroad Commission, who would be called upon to admin­
ister the law. Several members of the legislature, notably Senators 
A. W. Sanborn and W. H. Hatton, aided in establishing contact 
between the various parties interested in the legislation. 
Commons went beyond the state for ideas on a public utility 
law. Francis Staten, in his dissertation for the University of Wis­
consin wrote : 
While several bills were introduced early in the 1907 session, 
the serious business of drafting a public utility law was left to the 
Joint Committee on Transportation. This committee had the aid of 
Professor John R. Commons of the University of Wisconsin, of 
Charles McCarthy of the Legislative Reference Library, and M. S. 
Dudgeon. Months of time were spent in preparing the bill. Type­
written copies were prepared and sent to informed people through­
out the United States to receive their comment and criticism. 
Letters were received by Mr. McCarthy and Dr. Commons from
such men as Newton D. Baker of Cleveland; Frederick B. De-
Berard, statistician of the Merchants' Association of New York; 
M. R. Ingalls, chairman of the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago, and
St. Louis Railways; and Professor Charles Merriam of Chicago 
University. The work was done deliberately, and carefully, and the 
draughtsmen continually invited criticism and suggestion. 
The bill as drafted was introduced simultaneously in the Senate 
and in the Assembly and extended hearings were held before the 
Joint Committee on Transportation of which Senator Hudrall was 
chairman. The utility men were well represented at the hearings, 
and a comparison of the bill as originally introduced and as passed 
indicates clearly their objections and suggestions were of consider­
able influence.' 
With his usual modesty, Commons denied that he introduced 
anything new into the law. He said he adopted as a starting place 
most of the recommendations of the National Civic Federation's 
investigation commission. In fact, he claimed he got everything 
from others and described himself as a "sieve for funneling ideas 
from everywhere into legislative enactment."6 
Here we see an early example of his genius as a reformer. Not 
only did he keep his own personality discreetly in the background, 
but he also constantly endeavored to spread the credit and the re­
sponsibility for whatever was done. By doing so, he won the sup­
port of persons he needed to succeed in his undertaking. But in 
point of fact, he really did serve as a "funnel" for ideas. 
5 Ibid., pp. 12, 13.

6 Commons, Myself, p. 120.
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Commons did not think of reforms as something to be rammed 
down the throats of those needing to be reformed. Rather he 
thought of them as institutional adjustments that could make the 
economic system more workable. He was most enthusiastic when 
he believed problems could be resolved in such a way that all par­
ties concerned could benefit. 
Consequently, when Commons drafted the law to control 
public utility companies he had no intention of injuring them. Such 
regulations as he proposed were intended to be beneficial to them 
as well as to the public. To formulate a law that would be fair to 
them, the utility companies co-operated in the framing of the legis­
lation. In view of the conflicts in Madison and Milwaukee, it is in­
teresting to note that when Commons was the man drafting the 
law he received co-operation. Perhaps the companies were only 
yielding gracefully to the inevitable, but Commons in other situa­
tions displayed the same ability to resolve conflicting interests. 
The public utility law extended the authority of the Railroad 
Commission to the regulation of public utility companies. The 
three-man commission created in 1905 broadened its scope to in­
clude the regulation of any corporation or municipality owning or 
operating any plant or equipment in the state, for the purpose of 
providing telephone, electrical, gas, heat, power, or water services 
for the public. 
The law required that all rates set by public utility companies 
be reasonable. If the members of the Railroad Commission believed 
any company was charging unreasonable rates they could investi­
gate to determine reasonable rates. When any twenty-five persons 
complained that rates were unreasonable the commission was re­
quired to make an investigation. In deciding on reasonable rates 
the commission was to determine the value of the property used 
by a public utility company, so rates could be set to ensure the 
company a fair rate of return on its investment, but no more. No 
order setting rates was to be issued by the commission unless it 
first conducted formal public hearings at which all parties con­
cerned could state their cases and present evidence. 
The law required that public utility companies publish sched­
ules of their rates and all the rules and regulations concerning 
them. These schedules were to be available for inspection by the 
public at places where customers paid their bills, and also were to 
be submitted to the Railroad Commission. Any deviation from 
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customer was prohibited, as was any other form of discrimination. 
Before any company could increase its rates it was required to 
obtain approval from the commission. 
Not only could the commission regulate rates, but it also was 
empowered to set standards of service and determine standards 
on measures of quality. If a company was not providing adequate 
service the commission could order it to bring its services up to 
standard. 
So the commission could have adequate knowledge of each 
public utility it regulated, it was given the power to prescribe a 
uniform system of accounts. Not only was each company required 
to adhere to the commission's system, but it was forbidden to keep 
any other books or records not approved by the commission.  In 
setting rates, the commission was to provide for depreciation of 
each type of property used. At intervals, and in such force as it 
might direct, the commission could require the public utility firms 
to furnish reports covering their operations. This information, in 
addition to providing a basis for the commission's regulatory activ­
ity, was to be made available to the public. Hence, both the public 
utility companies and the commission which regulated them were 
to be operated under the light of public scrutiny. 
The commission was given authority to inspect the books, ac­
counts, papers, and any records of the companies it was to regulate. 
It could require the attendance of witnesses and the display of 
books and records at any of its hearings. No person was to be ex­
cused from testifying on the grounds that to do so would incrimin­
ate him, but if he did testify, he was not subject to any penalty for 
what he disclosed. 
Perhaps the most significant feature of the law was the intro­
duction of the indeterminate permit. This type of franchise had 
been used in a few cities, but Wisconsin was the first to introduce 
it on a statewide basis.' Unlike the usual franchise, which had a 
specific expiration date, the indeterminate permit was revocable 
only upon purchase of the property by a municipality for just com­
pensation. Thus, the problem of whether a franchise should be for 
a long or short period was solved. It was to be for an indefinite per­
iod, during which the company's investment would be protected, 
while the public would be protected from unreasonable rates. If a 
7 "In 1907 the indeterminate form was introduced into state public laws, largely be­
cause disinterested students of the subject like Milo R. Maltbie of New York and Profes­
sor John R. Commons of the University of Wisconsin advocated its adoption." Glaeser, 
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municipality wished to buy its public utility company's property, 
the Railroad Commission determined the compensation. If the 
company was dissatisfied with the commission's decision it could 
appeal its case to the courts. 
The law did not make the indeterminate permit compulsory 
for existing companies, but rather it permitted them to surrender 
their existing franchises to obtain such permits. To provide incen­
tive for them to do this the law provided that when a company had 
an indeterminate permit no permit could be given to a second com­
pany unless it first obtained a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity from the commission. Apparently, it was assumed that 
the commission was not likely to issue such certificates. Conse­
quently, a company with an indeterminate permit was assured it 
would have a monopoly. On the other hand, a company without it 
had no such protection. The municipalities could create competition 
by issuing additional franchises. Furthermore, they could refuse 
to renew expiring franchises. In most cases, companies found it 
advantageous to accept the indeterminate permit. 
After July 11, 1907, all new franchises for public utility com­
panies in Wisconsin were to be indeterminate permits. Following 
Wisconsin's example, a number of other states adopted this inno­
vation. Among them were Indiana, Ohio, Minnesota, New York, 
Illinois, and California. 
Most of the procedures for enforcing the Railroad Commis­
sion's orders under the new law were the same as under the 1905 
law.8 Orders were to take effect twenty days after being issued, 
unless the commission set some other date. If any public utility or 
other interested party were dissatisfied with an order it could bring 
action within ninety days in the Dane County circuit court. By con­
fining jurisdiction to this court, the commission was assured that 
its decisions would be reviewed only by judges who were informed 
on public utility problems. Furthermore, reducing the number of 
reviewing judges provided greater uniformity of decisions. 
As in the railroad law, cases involving the commission were to 
have precedence over other civil actions. Before any new evidence 
could be presented to the circuit court the commission was to be 
given time to enlarge its investigation by further hearings. On the 
basis of all evidence, old or new, the commission could then amend 
or rescind its order. Rates set by the commission were to be con­
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sidered prima facie lawful. Any party opposing the commission's 
order was required to show by clear and satisfactory evidence that 
it was unlawful and unreasonable before the court could set it 
aside. The law placed the burden of proof with the parties oppos­
ing such an order. From a decision of the circuit court, appeal 
could be made to the state Supreme Court within sixty days. Thus, 
all the way along the line, all legal action was to be expedited to 
prevent hindrance by harassing litigation. 
For violation of the act or orders of the commission, penalties 
were specified. Such penalties consisted of fines for departures 
from published schedules, acceptance or giving of rebates, refusal 
to supply the commission with information, or interfering with the 
apparatus or appliances of the commission. To ensure prompt com­
pliance with the act, each day's violation was to be considered a 
separate offense. In all cases where a public utility company was 
guilty of a violation, any injured third party could sue the com­
pany for treble damages. 
Thus, the law created a modern-type administrative commis­
sion with ample power to regulate the companies under its juris­
diction. It became a model for many other states when they enacted 
laws to regulate public utilities. John A. Kurtz of the Missouri 
Public Service Commission, in 1923, wrote : 
Not until the 20th century, however, was the jurisdiction of 
state commissions extended to the regulation of local public utilities. 
The idea was ushered in by the recreation in 1907 of the Wisconsin 
Commission giving it  jurisdiction over railroads, telephones and 
telegraphs, water and electric companies. New York and other states 
followed soon thereafter, until at the present time practically every 
state in the Union has a public service commission, with full power
to regulate not only practices, but also the rates and security 
issues of both statewide and local  utilities. Nine states of the 
Union have established their commissions by constitutional pro­
visions, and thereby placed these quasi-judicial bodies beyond the 
pale of legislative power to destroy. 
We are prone to forget the reasons for the change. It was ap­
parent to those who carried on the affairs of the state at the time, 
that the practices and rates of these recently developed and powerful 
corporations could not be fairly and intelligently regulated by techni­
cally inexperienced bodies like legislatures or city boards of alder­
men; that on principle at least it appeared necessary to create a 
body which would become expert in its knowledge of the subject 
and which would be in continuous session to act at any time that 
it appeared from investigation to be necessary to protect the rights
of the public. These bodies were given wide powers and were 
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perts, and other technical men to make investigations and ferret out 
the true facts. To these commissions, by statute or constitutional 
provisions as the case may be, had been delegated the legislative 
power to regulate.9 
Eliot Jones also picks 1907 as the year that marked the begin­
ning of effective public utility regulation by state commissions. Both 
New York and Wisconsin enacted regulatory laws in that year, 
but he chose the Wisconsin law as an example for his textbook on 
public utility economics. Furthermore, he declared that the law was 
so carefully drawn that very few subsequent changes were neces­
sary. He said: 
.  .  By our description, in some detail, of Wisconsin's Public utility 
acts we have indicated our belief in the importance of wise and com­
prehensive legislation as a fundamental basis for public utility regu­
lation.19 
The law in Wisconsin met his requirements. 
Yet this Wisconsin law Commons drafted was more than just 
a milestone in public utility regulation. It demonstrated a technique 
for regulating private business that was adopted throughout the 
country. Although the administrative commission was slow to de­
velop in the federal government, despite the early creation of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (1887), it was fully developed 
in Wisconsin from the beginning. Both the railroad and public util­
ity laws gave the Railroad Commission the full powers characteris­
tic of the modern administrative commission. This technique of 
government spread to the other states and in time to the federal 
government. 
The Wisconsin Industrial Commission 
The second of the three important Wisconsin laws in which 
Commons had a leading role in formulating and enacting created 
the Industrial Commission. It came as the culmination of a nation­
wide program to install a program for compensating injured work­
men. Prominent as Commons was in this campaign, he shared the 
leadership with many others. What Commons did that was distinc­
tive was to broaden the program into a comprehensive scheme of 
safety regulation combined with compensation. He drafted Wis­
consin's "Safe Employment Statute," which created the Industrial 
Commission that administered all the state's labor laws.11 
9 John A. Kurtz, "State Public Service Commissions," in Freund, pp. 141-142. 
10 Jones and Bigham, p. 187. 
11 Chapter 50 of the Laws of Wisconsin, 1911, created an Industrial Accident Board 
to  administer workmen's compensation. The Industrial Commission created  in  the 
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Industrial accidents had been taking a toll that was compared 
to war casualties.12 The victims and their families, however, in the 
majority of cases, were unable to obtain adequate compensation. 
By 1911 powerful voices demanded that something be done to end 
such obvious injustice. For the previous third of a century various 
states had attempted through legislation to force employers to take 
safety precautions, but the laws had a serious common defect. 
Under the prevailing legal concepts each safety device, safety rule, 
and precaution had to be mentioned specifically in a law. An in­
spector observing a dangerous condition was powerless to force an 
employer to correct it unless the law specifically gave him power to 
do so. Because technology was changing rapidly, safety regula­
tions could become out of date rapidly. While old regulations be­
came obsolete, needed new ones had to wait for legislative action. 
Sometimes the wait was extensive, as the task of getting bills 
passed before a legislature is never speedy. In many cases the 
ability to judge need for specific devices and safety rules necessi­
tated special technical knowledge legislators did not have. In other 
cases, pressure from employers fearing additional costs often de­
layed action. 
If employers continued to violate safety statutes, factory in­
spectors were required to initiate legal proceedings. In court the 
inspectors were the prosecution's witnesses, and as such, had to 
pit their knowledge and credibility against defense attorneys and 
witnesses. Opposing witnesses might outnumber the inspectors 
and outmatch them in technical knowledge of manufacturing con­
ditions. Such knowledge was crucial because the court decided not 
only if the laws were broken, but also if they were reasonable. 
Under such circumstances the enforcement of safety laws was 
both uncertain and clumsy. 
Laws governing employers' liability in case of industrial acci­
dents or illnesses were equally unsatisfactory. An injured work­
man or the family of a killed workman usually were unable to ob­
tain any compensation, even though the injury caused destitution. 
And in the infrequent cases where compensation was obtained, the 
payment was either inadequate or received after considerable delay 
often after a prolonged and uncertain court fight. 
The basis of the liability laws was in the labor contract, under 
common law. In such a contract employers and employees agreed 
to certain explicit conditions, such as wages, hours, and work to be 
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performed. Other conditions were considered to be implied under 
common law. One of these was that the employer would provide a 
reasonably safe place to work. If the employer provided tools they 
were to be reasonably safe. He was also duty-bound to exercise 
reasonable care in hiring agents and employees to work for him. 
So that the work would be relatively safe, the employer was obli­
gated to provide suitable and reasonable rules for the carrying on 
of work in his establishment. He must warn his employees of any 
dangers, and especially warn and instruct any youthful or inex­
perienced workers. 
The word "reasonable" had a very special meaning. It implied 
the usual or general practice of the average prudent individual in 
an industry. If the prevailing safety practices were low, then the 
standard of reasonable practice also was low. For an injured em­
ployee to obtain a legal claim from his employer he had to prove 
that his employer was negligent in the performance of his duties 
and that he himself was not. In any accident the fault had to be 
determined. If the negligence of the employer directly led to the 
accident, the employer was liable. In any other case there was no 
responsibility. 
The difficulty with the liability laws was that the majority of 
industrial accidents legally were not the fault of the employer. 
They were the result of inherent risks of the industry. As such, 
they were to be borne by the employee unless the employer gratui­
tously extended aid. However, the employee seldom was able to 
bear the burdens that accompanied injury. In most cases the pos­
sibility of receiving pay (before the accident) high enough to 
compensate for risks was a lawyer's "legal fiction." Men who could 
get no other jobs took the risky ones at pay seldom higher than for 
safer jobs.13 Disabling injuries or death of a wage earner usually 
made his family destitute or dependent on others. 
When cases were brought to court, juries often sided with the 
injured workman, regardless of the legal liability. Knowing this, a 
group of lawyers sprang up to handle such accident cases on a con­
tingency basis. Although many of the jury awards ultimately were 
13 "It is apparent that the majority of them (workmen engaged in dangerous occupa­
tions) are not earning enough to enable them adequately to insure against accident at high
rates necessitated by the nature of their occupation. That wages are not adjusted 'to
cover risk' in the actual industrial world of to-day is a matter of common knowledge. 
The testimony before the Commission (studying Employers' Liability in New York,
(1909) ) of those familiar with the condition of the working classes also brought out the
fact that the risk of the industry is not considered in determining a man's wages." East-
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set aside when appealed to higher courts, enough were sustained 
to provide substantial fees. 
Although odds were against the winning of a court award by 
a workman, a few did collect comfortable sums. Consequently, 
most employers preferred covering their risks through liability in­
surance, even though it was expensive." Liability insurance had 
other drawbacks in addition to expense. It removed the employer 
from a position in which he might be able to help an injured em­
ployee. Any help on his part might prejudice the case, which the 
insurance company might have to fight. Consequently, the work­
man had to bargain with an impersonal insurance company that 
had no interest in him. If the workman did not settle for a modest 
sum he often found it necessary to conduct a bitter court fight that 
might last for years. In the meantime, he might be almost destitute. 
If such an employee had been a deserving worker, many of the 
other employees felt an injustice had been committed. Although the 
employer might be able to relieve himself of legal liability through 
insurance, he could not always prevent poor morale among his 
workers. 
Industrialization created a discrepancy between the logic of 
the common law rules of employer's liability and the layman's idea 
of justice. At first, those who would reform the law sought to mod­
ify the common law." States began to pass laws modifying the lia­
bility of employers for workers' accidents. While this increased the 
possibility that an injured employee might collect from his em­
ployer, it did not reconcile the two conflicting systems of logic. As 
long as the fault had to be placed on the employer before he was 
liable for damages, any considerable liberalization of the law for 
the benefit of the injured workmen required a torturing of the 
logic of the law. 
What was needed was a new concept of liability. A new con­
cept did developthat the cost of accidents and compensation to 
the injured should be considered a part of the costs of an industry. 
It was advocated that an injured employee should be entitled to 
compensation from his employer regardless of who was to blame. 
Because it was believed that industry costs eventually are passed on 
to the consumers, the employer, except in temporary or isolated 
instances, actually would not be deprived of any property. Hence, 
14 Only 28% of the money paid by employers for insurance actually reached the in­
jured employees, Commons and Andrews, p. 362. 
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the ideas of "due process" and "equal protection under the law" 
again could be reconciled with the laymen's sense of justice. 
While reformers in America attempted to modify the em­
ployers' liability laws, a number of European countries enacted 
laws providing for compensation for injured workmen regardless 
of whose negligence caused the accident. Germany under Bismarck 
led with its law in 1884, Austria followed in 1887, Hungary in 
1891, Norway in 1894, Finland in 1895, and Great Britain in 1897. 
"By 1910 practically every European country including Russia, 
had adopted some system of workmen's compensation."18 
Maryland passed the first workman's compensation law in 
America in 1902, but two years later it was declared unconstitu­
tional. Several states created commissions to study the liability 
laws in the years that followed. However, the first legislation came 
when Congress, under the urgings of President Theodore Roose­
velt, passed a law in 1908 providing for compensation for federal 
employees. 
In 1906 a number of reformers, consisting of academic econo­
mists, law professors, administrators of labor laws, union officials, 
employers, and social workers formed the American Association 
for Labor Legislation. Of this organization, Abraham Epstein 
declared : 
Of all the organizations active in this movement the American 
Association for Labor Legislation deserves special credit. This As­
sociation did the most to procure adequate compensation legislation
and, in innumerable ways, has valiently fought for these laws for 
a quarter of a century.17 
John R. Commons was one of the important leaders of the 
association and was described by E. E. Witte as, "  .  .  .  in a very 
real sense also its founder."18 At the first annual meeting in 1907 the 
association elected him its secretary. For several years thereafter 
It Harry Weiss, "Employers' Liability and Workmen's Compensation," Lescohier 
and Brandeis, p. 570.
17 Epstein, p. 593. 
18 Witte, John B. Andrews Memorial Symposium, p. 8. 
Richard Martin Lyon writing on the Association disagrees with this position. "While it
appears inaccurate to regard Professor Commons in a very real sense .  .  .  its founder, 
as asserted by Dr. E. E. Witte at the Wisconsin Symposium, there is no question as to
the goodwill which Commons' name created for the American Association. This is docu­
mented best in a letter from President Farnam to the Wisconsin scholar, dated February
18, 1909: 'Your idea of resigning and letting Mr. Andrews take your place does not
strike me at all favorably. It would, I think, only create confusion in the public mind to
have you disappear from the secretaryship, and we need your name very much. I am
quite willing to give him the title executive secretary and think it would he much better
to let him try what he can do under you for the rest of the year and then if you insist
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he maintained the association's office in a corner of his own at the 
University of Wisconsin and installed his student, John B. An­
drews, as executive secretary. In 1910 the association moved its 
headquarters to New York City so that its influence could be 
brought to bear more directly in the more industrial areas. How­
ever, Commons maintained close ties with the organization. 
During its early years the association spent a considerable part 
of its efforts on workmen's compensation.' At the first two annual 
meetings a number of papers on the subject were presented. It 
devoted the third annual meeting to constitutional problems of 
labor law. Until such problems could be solved, no legislation could 
be sustained. 
By 1909 the campaign for workmen's compensation reached 
the point where three important states appointed commissions to 
study the problem. The officers of the association then worked with 
the members of commissions. John B. Andrews, the executive sec­
retary, reported : 
Three states, Minnesota, New York, and Wisconsin, had special 
legislative committees at work on the subject. Secretary Commons 
made a trip to Minnesota where he discussed plans in detail with 
members of that Commission; and the Executive Secretary, while
on a trip through the East, urged upon several members of the 
New York Commission, the importance of uniformity of investiga­
tion. Fortunately both the President and Secretary of our New York
State Branch were added to this commission by Governor Hughes, 
while in Wisconsin, frequent conferences at the headquarters of 
the Association aided still more in bringing about the desired result. 
In June, Secretary Commons wrote to Mr. Mercer of the Minnesota 
Commission, urging him to call an Interstate Conference on Work-
men's Compensation. The call was issued on July 14th. Thus the
way was paved for a meeting which took place at the end of July 
(29-31st) in Atlantic City. The results of this conference, which 
was  attended by members of  the  Minnesota,  Wisconsin,  and 
New York Commissions, by officials of the State and National 
Governments, and by experts from various insurance corporations, 
were most satisfactory.20 
In Atlantic City a permanent National Conference on Work-
men's Compensation was organized. It met three times in 1910in 
January in Washington, and in Chicago in June and November. 
By the last conference, commissions from ten states sent represen­
tatives. By joining together, these commissions were able to iron 
19 Pierce. 
20 Proceedings, Third Annual Meeting of the American Association for Labor Legisla­
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out many of their difficulties and smooth the way for effective 
action. 
By 1910 a number of powerful groups joined the American 
Association for Labor Legislation in its work for workmen's 
compensation legislation. Labor, which at first had not been en­
tirely sympathetic with the movement, committed itself to the pro­
gram in 1909.21 Even the National Association of Manufacturers 
appointed a committee whose studies committed it to workmen's 
compensation. The National Civic Federation created a special de­
partment on Compensation for Industrial Accidents, which ac­
tively helped to keep the program before the people. It also pre­
pared a "model bill" to aid legislatures in preparing laws on the 
subject. Important among the groups newly won to the movement 
was the American Bar Association. Finally, the American Acad­
emy of Political and Social Science devoted its entire 1911 meeting 
to the subject.22 It secured numerous speakers, many of whom 
were important backers of the movement. 
The first success came in 1910 when New York enacted two 
laws on workmen's compensation. One law was a compulsory act 
covering eight dangerous occupations. The other strengthened em­
ployers' liability, but permitted employers and employees to agree 
to accept a workmen's compensation system instead of employ­
ers' liability. The framers made the program compulsory only in 
the dangerous trades so that the law would have a better chance of 
being upheld as constitutional. Under the doctrine of the time, reg­
ulation of dangerous trades, they believed, would come under the 
"police power" of the states. 
The New York compulsory act had a short life. The New 
York Court of Appeals (Ives versus South Buffalo Railway Com­
pany) decided "the liability sought to be imposed upon the employ­
21 Previously the labor leaders had preferred strengthening employers' liability laws.
The prospect of large legal settlements for injured workers appeared more attractive than 
modest insurance payments. Furthermore the leadership suspected any state operated pro­
gram. By 1909 the failure of the employers' liability laws had become apparent to them,
and the leaders of the A. F. of L. endorsed the principles of workmen's compensation. 
Rubinow, Social Insurance, pp. 156-163. 
Lorwin, pp. 408-9.
American Association for Labor Legislation, General Administrative Council Meeting, 
Chicago, April 10, 1909.
Labor deserves very little credit for any protective labor legislation or social security.
Elizabeth Brandeis wrote that in regard to protective labor legislation, "Most of this 
legislation was the result of the efforts of middle class humanitarism reformers working
in small but remarkably effective organizations, especially the National Child Labor Com­
mittee, the National Consumers League, and the American Association for Labor Legisla­
tion." Elizabeth Brandeis, "Protective Legislation" in Derber and Young, p. 196.
22 "Risks in Modern Industry," Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
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ers is a taking of property without due process of law, and the sta­
tute is therefore void."23 It imputed fault to the employers when 
there was none, and took away their property without their con­
sent. As to the voluntary workmen's compensation law in New 
York, it became a dead letter when employers and employees 
failed to elect to come under its provisions. 
But the Ives case did not stop the workmen's compensation 
movement. By 1911 ten states enacted compensation laws, and nine 
more legislatures created commissions to study the problem that 
year." 
In Wisconsin agitation for workmen's compensation had been 
going on since 1905. In that year F. Brockhausen, secretary-
treasurer of the Wisconsin State Federation of Labor and a mem­
ber of the legislature, introduced a bill to that effect.25 During the 
1907 and 1909 sessions of the legislature he again submitted sim­
ilar bills. 
In the meantime, Commons and his group in the American 
Association for Labor Legislation pushed their campaign both in 
Wisconsin and in other states. In January of 1909 at a "Smoker 
on Industrial Insurance," sponsored by the Merchants' and Manu­
facturers' Association of Milwaukee, Commons outlined a tenta­
tive plan. He stressed the need for a special committee to represent 
all groups in formulating the plans. Because of the constitutional 
difficulties, he said, the system of workmen's compensation insur­
ance should be voluntary. Release from liability laws was what he 
offered as an inducement to the employers. 
Speaking with Commons was J. D. Beck, the commissioner 
of the Wisconsin Bureau of Labor and Industrial Statistics, Max 
Otto Lorenz of the same bureau, and Professor W. W. Cook, 
law professor of the University of Wisconsin." One of the jus­
tices of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, who was to be a speaker 
but was unable to attend, sent word that he favored remedying the 
employers' liability laws. 
Soon after his election in 1910, Governor McGovern asked 
Commons to draft laws for workmen's compensation insurance and 
23 Ives vs. South Buffalo Railway Co., 201 N. Y. 271; 94 N. E., 431, on March 24, 
1911. 
24 States enacting laws: California, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Washington, Wisconsin. American Labor Legislation Re­
view, Vol. I, October, 1911. 
25 Altmeyer, p. 25.
26 The Merchants' and Manufacturers' Association of Milwaukee Bulletin No. 24, 
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accident prevention. Commons and his student, Francis Bird, joined 
Charles McCarthy in the Legislative Reference Library to work 
on the proposed legislation. These three, while working closely 
with other members of the American Association for Labor Legis­
lation in other states, brought together employers, union people, 
safety experts, and anyone else who would contribute to the final 
results. 
Commons' innovation was to combine the workmen's compen­
sation program with the safety legislation. Previously, safety reg­
ulations were forced upon the employers by factory inspectors. 
Commons believed that coercion should be replaced by giving the 
employers an inducement. The state or the insurance company 
should charge the employers in proportion to their employees' 
losses in wages from accidents. Then, instead of "police officer" 
factory inspectors, the state should use the safety experts to help 
the employers save money. Education, always a vital part of any 
Commons' project, was to be a prominent feature. 
To replace the piecemeal factory safety legislation, he pro­
posed to make use of the same device he used with the public utility 
commission. An administrative commission would have the power 
to make and enforce safety rules. However, at this point, he and 
the other framers of the law faced a constitutional problem. They 
agreed that the legislature had the power to authorize a commis­
sion to determine what would be reasonable standards of safety. 
They also agreed that the legislature could give the commission 
the power to enforce such standards. But the problem arose over 
the necessity of including the word "reasonable." McCarthy in­
formed them that the word "reasonable" meant customary or 
ordinary practices.27 If the commission could order only customary 
practices, it would be powerless to raise the standards of safety. 
Yet, McCarthy pointed out to his colleagues, without the word 
"reasonable," the courts would declare the law unconstitutional as 
taking property without "due process of law." 
Commons had his student, Bird, work on the problem. After 
much research in law encyclopedias and court cases, Bird, ac­
cording to Commons, came out with what was a brilliant solution. 
His definition of "reasonableness" included ".  .  . the highest degree 
of safety, health, well-being of employees, etc., that the nature of 
the industry or employment would reasonably permit."28 Such a 
27 McCarthy and his aides in the Legislative Reference Library, as usual, provided 
the technical wording while Commons and his students developed the concepts.
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definition promised to be, and turned out to be, the key to effective 
safety legislation. 
While Commons was working on the safe employment statute, 
the  legislative  interim  committee worked on the workmen's 
compensation act. The legislature in 1909 had appointed Senators 
A. W. Sanborn, E. T. Fairchild, J. J. Blaine and Assemblymen 
Wallace Ingalls, George Drew, Walter Eagan, and Clarence Cul­
bertson as members of the committee.2° For counsel, the committee 
retained Harry Butler, a Madison attorney. 
After considerable work by all concerned, the Wisconsin 
legislature, on May 3, 1911, passed the law authorizing workmen's 
compensation insurance.30 It was to be administered by an Indus­
trial Accident Board of three membersJoseph D. Beck, who had 
headed the Wisconsin Bureau of Labor and Industrial Statistics; 
Charles H. Crownhart, a lawyer; and John R. Commons. In July 
this board was superseded by the Wisconsin Industrial Commis­
sion, which had the same membership but wider powers." It was 
to administer all the labor laws of the state. In the beginning the 
two most important were those providing workmen's compensation 
and safety regulations. 
Wisconsin chose the elective form of workmen's compensation 
because many people, including Commons, believed that a com­
pulsory law would be unconstitutional. The Ives case in New York 
seemed to confirm the opinions he expressed in 1909 before the 
Merchants' and Manufacturers' Association of Milwaukee. Fur­
thermore, all other states at that time, except Washington, adopted 
the elective form. 
Employers could choose to come under the law to avoid their 
common law liabilities to employees who also accepted the law. 
If they failed to accept the law, they could be sued by injured 
employees. But their chances of winning their cases would be 
diminished because the law stripped them of their common law 
defenses if they had four or more employees.32 On the other hand, 
by accepting the law their liabilities were limited and could be 
covered by insurance. 
Under the law, an injured workman was entitled to com­
pensation based upon a percentage of his previous average earn­
29 Altmeyer, p. 25, 
30 Laws of Wisconsin, 1911, Chapter 50. 
31 Laws of Wisconsin, 1911, Chapter 485. 
32 This provision was in a separate bill so that if it were declared unconstitutional,
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ings. The percentage varied with the seriousness of the injury and 
was determined by the Industrial Commission. The  awards were 
subject to review by the circuit court of Dane County, but the law 
limited the discretion of the courts. 
Employers were to insure themselves against liability in any 
form of approved insurance they desired. Large employers with 
strong enough financial resources to meet almost any claim with­
out the help of insurance would be exempt from buying insur­
ance. It was expected that rates would vary in proportion to the 
size of the insurance claims companies had to pay to injured 
employees. Employers with good safety records would find their 
insurance premiums less than those with poorer records. 
Commons envisioned a safety campaign that would reduce the 
industrial accident rates in Wisconsin sufficiently to make the com­
pensation insurance cheaper than the liability insurance. During 
the first two years after the passage of workmen's compensation 
legislation, the private insurance companies charged more for 
compensation insurance than for common law liability insurance.33 
However, on September 2, 1911, a mutual insurance company, the 
Employers' Mutual Liability Insurance of Wausau, 'Wisconsin, 
was founded. It charged forty percent less than the rates quoted 
by private insurance companies on compensation insurance. Also 
its rates on such insurance were less than those charged by private 
insurance companies on full common law liability insurance. After 
two years' experience and competition, the private companies 
settled on rates for compensation insurance at ten percent under 
those on common law liability. 
To bring down the accident rate in Wisconsin, the Industrial 
Commission overhauled existing safety regulations. To aid in this 
process, it established advisory committees,  including employers, 
union leaders, and experts. Commons had inserted in the law the 
provision that the commission could appoint advisers without com­
pensation. As a member of the commission, Commons chose as 
his particular concern the organization of the advisory committees. 
For some time he had been harboring the idea that important 
labor reforms are best devised by compromises among the inter­
ested parties. He had followed the practice of consulting all in­
33 The 'Conference' stock companies did not promulgate rates for compensation in­
surance until September 1, 1911. Their rates were fixed in combination and averaged
more than two and one-half times those for common-law liability. Inasmuch as  they had 
previously doubled their common-law liability rates,  .  .  the rates were practically pro­
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terested parties whenever he drafted any legislation. By making 
his final proposals joint products of those interested in the legisla­
tion, he maximized its chances of acceptance, both before and 
after passage. 
During Commons' membership, the commission adopted the 
practice of referring all proposed safety regulations first to an 
advisory committee. If the committee could agree on the regula­
tions, the commission would adopt them. Apparently, the pro­
cedure worked satisfactorily, because after twenty years of opera­
tion, A. J. Altmeyer, the secretary of the commission, claimed: 
Moreover, the commission invariably followed the recommenda­
tion of its advisory committees. With the exception of one or two 
orders, the members of the advisory committees have always been 
unanimous in their recommendations, all differences of opinion hav­
ing been reconciled and a working solution reached in the com­
mittee meetings.34 
After an advisory committee recommended a safety rule, the 
commission held public hearings to ferret out any possible objec­
tions. Then, if the committee was convinced the regulation was 
reasonable it would issue a general order effective at some future 
date. Until that time it would use publicity to bring the order to the 
attention of all who might be concerned. 
If an employer objected to a safety regulation he could ap­
peal to the commission for a modification. If, after hearings, he 
was denied the requested modification, he could take his case to 
the Dane County circuit court. Employees or employers objecting 
to compensation awards could follow the same procedure. In either 
case, the court accepted the commission's findings of fact as con­
clusive. A decision was set aside only if the commission had acted 
in excess of its powers, if any award was procured by fraud, or 
if the findings of fact did not support the award or need for a 
ruling. As a matter of practice, the courts almost never questioned 
the reasonableness of the commission's safety rulings.35 
Commons believed that education was as important as the 
enforcement of the laws. Besides turning the factory inspectors 
into "safety experts" to help save the employers' money, he also 
launched a safety program. He induced the commission to hire 
C. W. Price of International Harvester to head the program. At 
first he was hired on a loan basis from the company, but finally 
he was persuaded to take a full-time position with the commission. 
34 Ibid., p. 125.
 
35 Ibid., p. 149.
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Commons said that Price ".  .  knew how to get technicians to 
work for safety and welfare. He was a whirlwind of energy, 
sagacity, and persuasiveness."36 All over the state he organized 
safety committees, and he organized a statewide Conference of 
Safety. 
The combined effects of the safety campaigns, the new safety 
regulations, and the workmen's compensation paid off in reduced 
accidents. Price declared that accidental deaths in Wisconsin were 
cut down sixty-one percent during the five years he worked for 
the commission.37 He said at least half the credit should go to the 
"stimulus which the compensation law gave to the whole safety 
movement."38 After his service with the commission Price became 
the director of the National Safety Council, an organization he 
and Commons were instrumental in founding. 
The Wisconsin law had a considerable impact on the national 
scene. In the field of workmen's compensation it was just another 
law backed by the American Association for Labor Legislation; 
but the use of an administrative commission as a technique in 
creating and enforcing safety regulations was an innovation of 
great importance. At the 1911 convention of the American Associa­
tion for Labor Legislation Commons explained his new creation. 
The conference subject was "The Prevention and Reporting of 
Industrial Accidents." After the earlier speakers described the 
difficulties with the laws then existing, Commons climaxed the 
meeting by describing the Wisconsin Industrial Commission and 
its safety program. 
The discussion following Commons' talk demonstrated the 
interest of the audience. Henry Seager, a Columbia University 
professor, declared: 
The Wisconsin plan, described by Professor Commons, must 
appeal to everyone who has learned by experience how impossible 
it is to embody in rigid statutes the regulations called for by the 
complex and everchanging industrial conditions of today.39 
Professor Seager went on to say that in New York it was 
feared such a delegation of power by the legislature would be 
declared unconstitutional. Others at the meeting expressed the 
same fear. However, Commons then explained the difference 
between the way his law was constructed and the way the uncon­
36 Commons, Myself, p. 161.

37 Ouoted in American Labor Legislation Review, Vol. XVL, p. 190.
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39 American Labor Legislation Review, Vol. I, December, 1911, p. 102.
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stitutional laws were worded. He argued that for a law to be con­
stitutional the granting of discretionary powers had to be within 
certain limits and that it had to have procedures safeguarding 
constitutional rights. 
After Commons had shown the way past the constitutional 
barriers, other important states followed Wisconsin's lead. The 
American Labor Legislation Review reported in 1913 : 
Of special significance in the labor legislation of this year are 
the laws of five states, California, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, 
and Pennsylvania, extending the commission form of factory legisla­
tion as adopted in Wisconsin two years ago. In these states the 
legislatures have laid down the law in a broad way, and as rapidly 
as circumstances permit, the commissions or industrial boards may 
fill in the detail through administrative orders.4° 
Commons helped spread the idea of the Industrial Commis­
sion by publishing several articles about it. The first was his 1911 
speech to the American Association for Labor Legislation, which 
printed it in their Review.41 Two years later, he further explained 
the commission idea in an article in The Survey, entitled, "Con­
structive Investigation and the Wisconsin Industrial Commis­
sion."42 When he published his book, Labor and Administration, 
he included reprints of both papers." 
In addition to writing on the subject, he also appeared before 
the legislatures, or legislative committees of Ohio, New York, and 
Colorado. Each of these states, plus many others, adopted his plan 
for administration of safety regulations. Governor Cox of Ohio, 
who was interested in much of the progressive legislation in Wis­
consin, invited him to Ohio to explain his program.44 In most 
states the officials charged with administering labor laws belonged 
to the American Association for Labor Legislation and were thus 
in contact with him and other leaders of the association. If any­
one could be said to be the leader of the movement to create in­
dustrial commissions, it would be Commons. 
Important though the administrative commission was in the 
field of safety regulation, the compensation program for injured 
workmen was even more significant. In this latter movement Com­
mons was a leader but not the innovator. The significance of work-
men's compensation was that it opened the door to further wel­
40 Ibid., Vol. III, October, 1913, p. 301.
41 American Labor Legislation Review, Vol. I, December, 1911, p. 61. 
42 Commons, The Survey, January 4, 1913, p. 440. 
43 Commons, Labor and Administration. 
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fare legislation. If workmen could be compensated because they 
were injured in their work, why shouldn't they be paid if they 
were sick from other causes, or if they were unemployed? Cer­
tainly they would be equally unfortunate and equally blameless 
in many cases. Individual responsibility would decrease, while 
social responsibility grew to accept more welfare state concepts and 
legislation. 
The Unemployment Compensation Law 
The last of the three most significant Commons-sponsored 
laws of Wisconsin created in 1932 the first state unemployment 
compensation program.45 Like the law creating the Industrial Com­
mission, its impact reached far beyond the borders of Wisconsin. 
Today its principles are embedded in most of the unemployment 
compensation laws in the country. Commons' students and col­
leagues in the movement designed the national law in such a way 
that it preserved the Wisconsin law and encouraged other states 
to follow its example. 
Acceptance of the principle of unemployment compensation 
implied accepting the idea that the principle of individual respon­
sibility should not bar aid to the unfortunate. The individual states 
and local government had always had poor laws to care for the 
indigent, but they had never, except in emergencies, accepted re­
sponsibility for the able-bodied unemployed. Such responsibility 
was clearly beyond the recognized scope of the federal govern­
ment. 
By the time of the first unemployment compensation legisla­
tion in 1932, the principle of individual responsibility was under 
severe strain. Local governments, with their antiquated laws con­
cerned with poverty, struggled to meet the crisis arising from mass 
unemployment. When they faltered, the states assumed the burden. 
Finally, the federal government under a reluctant President ac­
cepted the responsibility for providing money to the hard-pressed 
states." Shortly afterwards, a new President led the nation into 
acceptance of the responsibility to provide relief for the unem­
ployed and to use its powers to combat unemployment. Finally, a 
few years after the passage of the Wisconsin law, the national 
45 Wisconsin Statutes, Chapter 108, (Chapter 20, Laws of Special Session 1931-32).
46 President Hoover, in a vain effort to balance the budget, vigorously resisted the
assumption by the federal government of the responsibility for providing relief for the
unemployed. However, when it was apparent that state and local agencies were reaching
the end of their resources in trying to feed the unemployed, he agreed to loans to the
states by the R.F.C., so that they could continue to carry this responsibility. Broadus Mit­
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government passed a social security law that provided both unem­
ployment compensation and old-age pensions. The U. S. did not 
quite have a "welfare state," but the old laissez-faire individualistic 
order was gone. 
Commons had long favored complete protection for workers 
against economic hardship. In his Distribution of Wealth, written 
in 1893, he insisted that the right to employment was a fundamental 
right. He claimed that each person has the "right to security in 
the tenure of employment against arbitrary discharge, as long as 
one proves efficient and honest," and that the unemployed have 
the right to work furnished by the government." In 1896 he advo­
cated municipal public works to alleviate unemployment's A few 
years later, in 1905, in his Trade Unionism and Labor Problems, 
he included an article by W. F. Willoughby of Princeton Uni­
versity on "Insurance Against Unemployment."49 
His increasing interest in unemployment insurance is mir­
rored in the successive editions of his textbook, Principles of Labor 
Legislation.5° This volume, which he wrote jointly with John 
Andrews, came out in four editions, 1916, 1920, 1927, and 1936. 
The treatment in the first edition covered just five and one-half 
pages ; by 1936 the authors used twenty-three pages.51 
In the first edition, they wrote: 
Finally,  the destitution due to unemployment, until recently 
considered a matter of purely individual concern, or at best as an 
occasion for charitable activity, is now beginning to be recognized 
as an evil which must be met by the coordinated forethought of 
society as a whole. The demoralization of individuals and com­
munities by prolonged and widespread deprivation of income due to 
involuntary idleness, it is now generally agreed, should no longer 
be allowed to continue unchecked. 
.  . Here again the collective method of insurance has demonstrated 
its superiority.52 
Commons and Andrews were pointing to the European picture 
where unemployment compensation had been accepted for some 
time. They believed European experience demonstrated a superior 
method of preventing destitution from unemployment. They urged 
that it be extended to American industry. 
47 Commons, Distribution of Wealth, p. 81. 
48 Commons, American Federationist. 
49 Commons, Trade Unionism and Labor Problems, 1905. 
50 Commons and Andrews. 
51 Total pages in the 1916 edition were 464; the 1936 edition contained 534. 
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Commons' experience in 1919 and 1920 increased his interest 
in the unemployment problem to the extent that he became a leader 
in the movement to solve it. From July to September, 1919, he 
visited thirty industrial establishments with seven of his students. 
Their purpose was to study what they called industrial government 
in America. But their study resulted in more than Industrial Gov­
ernment, a book on apparatus for formulating and implementing 
personnel policies. During this study Commons observed the ef­
fects of the postwar inflation and subsequent depression on labor 
relations. 
He reacted to the depression in two ways. First, he began a 
study of the cure for unemployment. This led him to study the 
banking system and to write a series of articles on banking policy. 
He even became president of the National Monetary Association, 
which was organized in 1922 as the successor to Irving Fisher's 
Stable Money League.53 Besides writing articles on monetary 
policy, he explained banking policy before the 1927 Strong Com­
mittee of the Congress, which employed him as staff expert.54 
His interest in the problem of business cycles also led to his partici­
pation as an associate director in the National Bureau of Economic 
Research between 1920 and 1928. 
His views were not novel. He believed that monetary con­
trols of the Federal Reserve System should be used to stabilize 
the price level. He thought our economy was inherently unstable 
and that price movements, once started, tend to move either to an 
inflationary boom or into a deflationary spiral. Like other econo­
mists of his time, he claimed that depressions might be prevented 
if the booms preceding them could be moderated. 
His second reaction to the 1920 depression was the drafting 
of an unemployment compensation bill in that year, with the help 
of some of his students. In 1921 Senator Huber introduced this 
bill into the Wisconsin legislature. Although the bill failed to be­
come law, it set the pattern for future bills offered before other 
state legislatures. When local organizations in Pennsylvania re­
quested the American Association for Labor Legislation to draft 
a bill on the subject, it submitted one similar to the Wisconsin 
bill.55 
53 Irving Fisher named Commons as one of the eighteen foremost world authorities
on money. Wisconsin State Journal, Madison, Wise., Dec. 26, 1933. 
54 "Hearings," Congressional Record, 69th Congress, pp. 3834-3848.
55 "Growth of the Job Insurance Program," American Labor Legislation Review,
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For the next decade Commons' bill was reintroduced with 
modifications at each session of the legislature in Wisconsin. Fin­
ally, in 1931, when Harold Groves, a Commons' student and a 
professor at the University of Wisconsin, as well as a member 
of the legislature, presented another modified version of it,  it 
met with success. Governor Philip La Follette signed the bill on 
January 15, 1932. 
This first unemployment compensation law came only after 
a long campaign by Commons and his colleagues in the American 
Association for Labor Legislation. The association campaigned 
not only in Wisconsin, but everywhere it could win a response. 
Using Commons' bill as a model, it drafted bills which were intro­
duced into the Pennsylvania and Massachusetts legislatures in 
1922. The Minnesota legislature considered a similar bill in 1923, 
1925, and 1927. Although none of these bills became law, they were 
part of the constant pressure of the association to sell the unem­
ployment compensation program. In its publication, the American 
Labor Legislation Review, and in its meetings, it kept the idea 
alive in spite of prosperity and public apathy. 
During the twenties what discussion continued centered on 
Wisconsin's Huber Bill. Allen B. Forsberg's debater's handbook, 
Selected Articles on Unemployment Insurance, demonstrated this 
focus of interest.56 Wherever the writers in it discussed a particular 
program, they mentioned either the British system or the proposed 
Wisconsin bill. Over and over again writers on both sides of the 
argument specifically mentioned Commons as if equating unem­
ployment compensation with his program. Articles in the Ameri­
can Labor Relations Review suggested this same identification. 
During the twenties, Commons published a stream of litera­
ture on the subject.57 I. M. Rubinow, another leader in the unem­
56 Forsberg. [Forsberg was a student of Commons.]
57 Commons, "Putting an End to Unemployment," La Follette's Magazine, Vol.
XIII, March, 1921, P. 38. 
"Unemployment: Compensation and Prevention," The Survey, Vol.
XIII, October 1, 1921, p. 5. 
"Unemployment Insurance," The Monitor (official publication of As­
sociated Industries of New York State), Vol. VIII, February, 1922, p. 2.
"Unemployment Preventions," American Labor Legislation Review,
Vol. XII, March, 1922, p. 15.
"Unemployment: Prevention and InsuranceChapter IV," The Sta­
bilization of Business, ed. Lionel T. Edie, (New York: MacMillan Co.. 1923), p.  164. 
The Limits of Unemptoyment Insurance, (Toronto: The British As­
sociation for the Advancement of Science, 1924). 
.  "The True Scope of Unemployment Insurance," American Labor
Legislation Review, Vol. XV, March, 1925, p. 43. 
"Unemployment Compensation," American Labor Legislation Review,
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ployment compensation movement, said of him : 
In keeping the torch burning for the principle of unemployment
insurance throughout the years of the hectic decade, Professor
John R. Commons, of the University of Wisconsinthe veteran 
fighter for better relations between capital and labor and for better 
labor standardshas performed a unique service.58 
In addition to writing articles and giving speeches on the 
subject of unemployment compensation, Commons joined with 
other writers in a book, The Stabilization of Business, edited by 
Lionel Edie in  1923." The other contributors were Wesley 
Mitchell, Irving Fisher, Frank Haight Dixon, Lionel Edie, Edwin 
R. A. Seligman, John B. Andrews, Walter Dill Scott, and Harry 
D. Dennison. Herbert Hoover furnished the introduction. Com­
mons' part, as might be expected, was "Unemployment : Preven­
tion and Insurance." In it he warned of the dangers to our society 
from unemployment. Workers without security, he said, become 
radical, but when secure they forget their radicalism. He offered 
his unemployment compensation program as a protection  to 
America. 
In 1925, jointly with Sam Lewisohn, Ernest Draper, and Don 
Lescohier (one of his students), he published the book Can Busi­
ness Prevent Unemployment?" Lewisohn, vice  president and 
treasurer of the Miami Copper Company, and Draper, treasurer 
of Hills Brothers Company, were two leaders in the movement 
for regularizing employment. The tone of the book was what 
"we businessmen" could do to prevent unemployment. The efforts 
of  individual  firms at  stabilizing employment were displayed 
prominently. The book presented the government's responsibility 
58 Rubinaw, The Quest for Security, p. 430. 
59 Edie. 
60 Commons, Lewisohn, Draper, and Lescohier.
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for employment as a program for planning public works. Com­
mons' ideas on the need for unemployment compensation, as well 
as its history and mechanics, rated a chapter. 
One of the ways in which he contributed to the unemploy­
ment compensation movement was by serving as chairman for 
a compensation fund for the 35,000 clothing workers of Chicago. 
In 1923 Leo Wolman, the economist for the Amalgamated Cloth­
ing Workers, offered him this position in behalf of the manu­
facturers and the union. They chose him as their first chairman 
because, in the words of Earl Dean Howard, the labor manager 
for Hart, Schaffner, and Marx, "He is [was] undoubtedly by 
study and experience the foremost authority on the subject in the 
country."61 
The clothing workers' program was very similar to the one 
Commons had devised and had been pushing. The job proved to 
be mostly an administrative one. After the first month his work 
was routine for the rest of his eighteen months. The position pro­
vided him with both experience in ;unemployment compensation 
administration and greater standing as an authority on the subject. 
When the depression of 1929 hit the nation, interest in unem­
ployment compensation intensified among experts. However, there 
was much skepticism. The intense criticism of the operations of 
the British unemployment insurance plan indicated the need for 
caution. In England the prolonged depression made it necessary 
to extend benefits to persons whose compensation rights had ex­
pired. Because the income of the program was not increased 
proportionately, huge deficits developed that had to be covered by 
other government funds. In the resulting controversy, considerable 
confusion arose as to whether the program was a cause or result 
of the depression. Many Americans pointed to the fact that since 
the inception of the British insurance system, in 1911, there had 
been either unemployment or war. They then jumped to the non 
sequitur that the British system, or "dole," as they called it, de­
moralized the workers, handicapped employers, and caused the 
government to become bankrupt. America, they said, would be 
wise to avoid such a system. 
Consequently, when the members of the American Associa­
tion for Labor Legislation presented their plan in 1930, they called 
it the "American Plan," and went to great pains to show its di f­
61 Quoted from the Chicago Sun, in American Labor Legislation Review, Vol. XIV, 
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ferences from the British system. They had formulated this plan 
at a conference called to study unemployment compensation.62 
Members of the conference studied both American experience with 
voluntary plans and British experience with a governmental plan. 
Sir William Beveridge, a co-author of the British plan, recounted 
British experience. Morris Leeds of Northrup and Leeds, and 
Ernest Draper of Hills Brothers explained their voluntary plans. 
The situation in the clothing industry was given by Leo Wolman 
and Sidney Hillman. To help with the legal phases of the prob­
lem there was Joseph P. Chamberlain, then president of the associ­
ation, as well as being a director of the Columbia University Legis­
lation Drafting Bureau. Francis Perkins, who had been a member 
of the association for years, and was then the New York State In­
dustrial Commissioner, was also one of the contributors ; and natu­
rally, Commons and Andrews were there with their proposals. 
This group formulated a draft of "An American Plan for 
Unemployment Reserves," which they published in the December, 
1930, issue of the American Labor Legislation Review." The 
association also distributed 33,000 copies of the bill. Essentially, 
the bill was similar to the Huber Bill, which Commons had been 
pushing. The Huber Bill would have required employers to buy 
unemployment insurance from mutual insurance companies. In
turn these companies were to pay benefits to the unemployed 
according to a scale prescribed in the bill. Presumably, the insur­
ance companies would charge employers according to the risks 
they encountered. 
The association's American Plan provided for a system of 
self-insurance by employers to meet unemployment compensation 
liabilities. Those employers who could not demonstrate financial 
ability to meet such liabilities were to be required to pay a tax 
of one and one-half percent of their payrolls into state funds. 
A fund was to be set up for each industry or in some cases for 
groups of industries. Boards administering funds would have the 
power to pay dividends to employers who maintained good records 
of maintaining employment. Under both the Huber Bill and the 
association's bill employers would have had a ceiling on their 
liability. Also, under each, the employer would have had an in­
centive to minimize unemployment. 
Powerful support developed for the movement in the summer 
of 1930 when Franklin Roosevelt, then governor of New York, 
62 American Labor Legislation Review, Vol. XXIII, September, 1933, p. 349. 
63 American Labor Legislation Review, Vol. XX, 1930, p. 349. Commons and Social Legislation  121 
joined it. At the conference of governors meeting at Salt Lake 
City, on June 30, 1930, he said : 
Unemployment insurance we shall come to in this country just
as certainly as we have come to workman's compensation for in­
dustrial injury, just as certainly as we are today in the midst of a 
national wave of insuring against old age want.64 
Roosevelt further demonstrated his interest by calling for a con­
ference of governors of seven industrial states, to be held in 
Albany in January, 1931. There the governors met with "experts" 
of the unemployment compensation movement. After this con­
ference a continuing committee was formed for further study. 
The committee published its report in 1932, supporting an unem­
ployment insurance program similar to that of the American 
Association for Labor Legislation. 
Interest in unemployment compensation spread rapidly across 
the nation. Numerous committees to study the problem were ap­
pointed by various governors. The state legislatures were presented 
with numerous bills. Finally, even the labor movement endorsed 
the idea. At the 1932 convention the American Federation of 
Labor reversed its previous stand and threw its support behind 
the movement. 
In the meantime, Commons was busy campaigning. In addi­
tion to his writings and his efforts with the American Association 
for Labor Legislation, he made a number of speeches on the 
subject.65 Some of these were published. One of his addresses in 
1930 was to the convention of the Wisconsin Federation of Labor. 
Another was to the Ernployers' Association of Eau Claire, Wis­
consin. He made a third before the Conference on Permanent 
Preventives of Unemployment, held in Washington in January, 
1931. His fourth was before the Initial Conference on Unemploy­
ment, held in Madison in February, 1932. Finally, in April of 
64 Quoted in American Labor Legislation Review, Vol. XX, September, 1930, p. 254. 
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1932, he carried his message to a nationwide radio audience, in an 
address over the National Broadcasting Company network. 
By 1931 the campaign for unemployment compensation began 
to show results in Wisconsin. The depression of 1929 had brought 
widespread unemployment throughout the state. During the sum­
mer of 1930 Governor Kohler appointed Don Lescohier, a Com­
mons' student, to serve as executive secretary of the State's Citi­
zen Committee on Unemployment." With the municipal govern­
ments straining to provide relief to the unemployed, the state 
stepped in with a $6,500,000 appropriation in March of 1931.67 To 
pay for increased relief costs the Progressives advocated drastic 
increases in income taxes. At this period employers spent most 
of their efforts fighting the increased taxes. At the same time 
farmers began to look on unemployment compensation as a pro­
gram under which employers, instead of the state, would pay for 
the care of the unemployed. Consequently, several farm organiza­
tions at their 1931 fall meetings endorsed unemployment com­
pensation." Their support, when added to that already given by 
the Wisconsin labor movement, began to tip the scales in favor 
of the program. The only problem was to work out a program 
that would draw a minimum of opposition from the employers. 
Commons and his students went over their previous proposals 
to reshape them into an acceptable bill. Two of them, a husband 
and wife team, Paul Raushenbush and Elizabeth Brandeis, drafted 
a bill that was introduced in 1931 by Harold Groves, a third Com­
mons' student.69 At that time Groves was an assemblyman, Senator 
Huber was lieutenant governor, and Philip LaFoilette was gov­
ernor. The Progressives had a clear majority in the  Assembly, 
but needed a few independent votes in the Senate to pass the bill. 
After a few compromises to make the bill more palatable to the 
employers it was passed and signed in January, 1932. 
The Groves Act provided for a two percent payroll tax to be 
paid by the employers, unless they created individual programs 
that provided workers with comparable benefits. Although the 
employers' contributions would go into a central fund, each em­
ployer would have a separate account. When an employer had 
paid fifty-five dollars per employee his contribution would be re­
duced to one percent until the account reached seventy-five dol­
66 American Labor Legislation Review, Vol. XX, September, 1930, p. 230.
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lars per employee. As long as the employer's account remained 
above seventy-five dollars he was to be excused from all further 
contributions. If the benefits lowered the level of an employer's 
account too much the scale of benefits was to be reduced and even 
eliminated if necessary. No provision was made for the state to 
contribute any money to the fund or to incur any liability. Conse­
quently, no employer would pay more than seventy-five dollars 
per employee, or pay benefits to anyone other than his own 
employees. 
Unemployed workers were to be subjected to a two-week 
waiting period. Then their weekly benefits were to be fifty percent 
of their weekly wages, up to a maximum of ten dollars per week. 
Minimum benefits were to be five dollars per week. Benefits were 
to be paid in the ratio of one week for every four weeks of work, 
with a maximum of ten weeks' benefits. If a worker had more 
than one employer in the last year, employee benefits were to be 
charged against the account of his last employer. Then after 
exhausting his rights under that employer or exhausting that em­
ployer's account, if he had remaining benefits due him, such bene­
fits would be charged to the next to the last employer's account. 
The law placed the administration under the Industrial Commis­
sion. Because this agency had handled Wisconsin's social legisla­
tion since 1911, the law could be implemented with a minimum of 
new machinery. 
Although all employers were to have the same liability they had 
their choice of entering the statewide plan or instituting plans of 
their own, which would follow state standards. If employers al­
ready had voluntary plans for unemployment compensation the 
law allowed considerable flexibility in fitting their plans to condi­
tions of the law. To encourage employers to enter into voluntary 
plans and to appease opponents the act provided that the program 
would go into effect only if employers of less than 175,000 work­
ers of the state failed to set up their own plans by June 1, 1933. 
Because of the depression, payments by employers were postponed 
later until July, 1934. Benefits to employees began in July, 1936. 
Commons believed that this unemployment compensation pro­
gram was more than a relief measure for the unemployed. Just as 
he had designed his workmen's compensation law to provide in­
centives for employers to promote safety, he intended to use the 
unemployment compensation program to induce them to reduce 
unemployment. Those completely successful in preventing unem­124  JOHN R. COMMONS 
ployment among their employees would be relieved of further 
payments once their reserves reached the seventy-five dollar level. 
On the other hand, those with poor records would be compelled 
to pay the full two percent of their payrolls. 
Although there had been variations in the various bills he 
drafted, they all had the principle of providing an incentive. The 
American Labor Legislation Review of March, 1921, quoted th,'. 
sponsors of the earlier Huber Bill of Wisconsin as saying: 
The bill  offers an inducement to scientific production, where 
workmen are employed steadily. Nonprofit making mutual insur­
ance companies will be the main agencies which will endeavor to 
prevent unemployment. Its experts will be at the service of its mem­
bers. They will devise methods for reducing unnecessary labor turn­
over. Spasmodic employment of workmen will be discouraged by a 
system of premium rates which will be based upon the stability 
of employment for each establishment. The establishment with the
greatest number of "hirings" and "firings" will pay the largest 
premium rates. Hence good management will be rewarded by its 
efficiency in preventing unnecessary layoffs. There are many em­
ployers today who so reduce their labor turnover that men are never
laid off on account of lack of work. This bill would not affect 
these employers materiallytheir premium rates would be prac­
tically nil. 
.  .  . And of  crowning importance in the movement toward regu­
larization of industry is the careful development of this form of
insurance with its continuous pressure toward the prevention of 
unemployment.70 
Commons did not rely on this program to prevent all unem­
ployment. It must be remembered that he also stressed the role 
of monetary policy in preventing booms from becoming dangerous 
breeders of depression. He also believed in public works programs 
to relieve unemployment during bad times. But he did have con­
siderable faith in the incentives created by the unemployment 
compensation program. Because business operated on such narrow 
margins, he believed that relief from even a two percent assess­
ment on payrolls would be an effective inducement in a great many 
cases. 
The Groves Act went further than the previous bills in limiting 
employers' liability. Each employer's contribution was kept in a 
separate account out of which payments would go only to his own 
workers. If payments exhausted an employer's account, payments 
to eligible workers ceased even though there was an abundance of 
funds in other accounts. Previous bills had called for pooling of 
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funds so that all eligible workers could be paid. In other respects 
these previous bills were similar to the Groves Act and provided 
similar incentives to employers to prevent layoffs. 
The limiting of employer's liabilities kept the scale of benefits 
at a very modest level. As soon as other states began investigating 
the possibilities of adopting unemployment compensation some of 
the experts began to doubt the wisdom of such limitations. Paul 
Douglas, I. M. Rubinow, Abraham Epstein, and even some of 
Commons' students, such as William Leiserson, questioned the 
practicality of using the program in an attempt to prevent unem­
ployment. They declared that the program should be for relief and 
not economic manipulation. Hence, they stressed the insurance 
principle instead of Wisconsin's prevention feature. 
The first rival plan to break sharply with Wisconsin's plan 
was the Ohio Plan. By providing a pooling of funds the sponsors 
were able to place the level of benefits considerably highera 
maximum of fifteen dollars instead of ten dollars per week, and 
a maximum of sixteen instead of ten weeks. However, the backers 
found they had to yield to mass sentiment sufficiently to include a 
modified merit rating system under which employers with good 
records would pay reduced rates.71 The public opinion which 
forced the Ohio planners to yield was the product of the campaign 
initiated and pushed by Commons and his colleagues. From the 
first they had pursued a strategy of declaring the welfare of the 
unemployed workers to be the responsibility of those who layed 
them off and not that of the state or other employers. 
The unemployment compensation campaign was not exclu­
sively one by nonemployers trying to force employers to accept 
their responsibilities. It was a campaign that included an ever-
growing number of employers as well as reformers. Commons 
had sought out employers who already had accepted voluntary 
programs. He used them to sell more employers on the profitability 
of such attempts to smooth out production. Then he combined 
these employers with a sprinkling of those a little less enthusiastic 
and had them participate in formulating a statewide compulsory 
program. For this program planning Commons brought together 
employers, employees, union officials, economists, and state gov­
ernment officials. In the resulting bargaining each group found 
itself arguing over details and not over the decision as to whether 
there should be any such program. 
71 Rubinow, The Quest for Security, p. 442. 126  JOHN R. COMMONS 
Employers accepted the principle of limited liability seriously. 
They also believed that Commons' preventive principle actually 
did work. Many of them had been chosen precisely because they 
had been the most successful with the voluntary programs. They 
thought other employers could also prevent layoffs if they were 
given proper incentives. Because employers were such an important 
group within the unemployment compensation movement, their 
acceptance of Commons' reasoning affected the thinking of many 
others. 
However, a growing number of experts kept alive the objec­
tions to the Wisconsin plan. When the American Association for 
Labor Legislation continued to back Commons' program under the 
name "The American Plan," the other experts formed a new or­
ganization, the American Association for Social Security. It was 
a successor to an earlier group, the American Association for Old 
Age Security. Although then the unemployment compensation 
movement was split, it was divided on only one important issue, 
insurance versus unemployment prevention. 
The coming of the New Deal provided opportunity for extend­
ing unemployment compensation to the nation. The Democratic 
Party platform of 1932 had endorsed the idea. President Roose­
velt was committed to it, and had chosen Frances Perkins, an 
active and longstanding member of the American Association for 
Labor Legislation, for his Secretary of Labor. 
Several proposals were placed before Congress, but the first 
significant move came on June 8, 1934, when the President in a 
message to Congress urged the adoption of unemployment insur­
ance and other forms of social security. He followed up his mes­
sage by appointing the Committee on Economic Security to study 
the problems and to propose legislation for the January session of 
Congress. The committee consisted of Frances Perkins, Secretary 
of Labor; Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury; 
Homer Cummings, Secretary of Commerce; Henry Wallace, Sec­
retary  of  Agriculture;  and Harry Hopkins, Federal  Relief 
Administrator. 
Because Wisconsin was the only state with an unemployment 
compensation law, it probably was natural that it had an unusual 
influence in the drafting of a national law. The cabinet committee 
chose E. E. Witte of the University of Wisconsin as its executive 
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His experience as secretary of Wisconsin's Industrial Commission 
acquainted him with problems of administration. Perhaps his most 
important qualification was that he had been chief of Wisconsin's 
Legislative Reference Library. In this capacity he had worked 
with Commons as the technical draftsman of the Wisconsin unem­
ployment compensation bills. 
The committee created a bewildering group of advisory com­
mittees to aid in the drafting of the law. The co-ordinating group 
was an Advisory Council consisting of twenty-three outstanding 
citizens representing the public, the employers, and the employees. 
Dr. Frank Graham, President of the University of North Carolina, 
headed this group. A. J. Altmeyer, the second assistant Secretary 
of Labor, headed an Interdepartmental Technical Board of twenty 
members, bringing together persons interested in social security 
from the various executive departments. Altmeyer, another of 
Commons' students, also had been secretary of the Wisconsin 
Industrial Commission. Then, in addition to these groups, six 
special committees of experts were formed, including a Medical 
Advisory Board, a Public Health Committee, a Hospital Com­
mittee, a Dental Work Committee, an Advisory Committee on 
Public Employment and Assistance, and a Child Welfare Com­
mittee. 
Not only were these groups made up of a generous sprinkling 
of Commons' students, but they also heavily represented the Ameri­
can Association for Labor Legislation. The employers in particular 
were those who had worked extensively with Commons. By this 
time he was too old to take an active part in the work, but his 
influence was strong. 
Two reasons explain why the U. S. unemployment compen­
sation system has fifty state programs instead of one, nationally 
administered. One reason was that the sponsors feared the action of 
a conservative Supreme Court. Because the Constitution does not 
explicitly give Congress the power to legislate such a program into 
existence, the sponsors reasoned it would be safest to depend on 
state legislation. Hence, they created a national law designed to 
induce the states to adopt their own programs. Such a law ulti­
mately might be declared unconstitutional but not before it had 
served its purpose. At least some of the state programs might sur­
vive such a contingency. 
The second reason for avoiding a national program was that 
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experts on the subject were split over the insurance versus the 
prevention principle. Those employers who favored any program 
insisted that the Wisconsin system be permitted to continue so 
they might be rewarded it they prevented layoffs. Therefore, the 
decision as to the type of program was thrown back to the states. 
The law imposed a three percent levy on all payrolls. In states 
where adequate programs were adopted all but ten percent of the 
tax would be remitted. Within a very short time all the states 
responded by adopting their own programs. While a few of them 
adopted a merit system under which employers with good records 
ployers' liability, almost all of the states, in recent years, have 
adopted a merit system under which employers with good records 
pay less than the others.72 
Experience has not vindicated Commons' preventive principle, 
but the idea is by no means dead. When Walter Reuther de­
clares that the guaranteed annual wage makes layoffs expensive 
enough for employers to prevent them, he is enunciating the same 
principle. Commons' preventive principle may be questionable, but 
the validity of it is not its importance. The real significance was 
its part in the strategy of getting any program adopted. Using it, 
he could sell a few employers, then a state, and finally a nation. 
This is not the place to describe or to analyze the nation's 
social security law or the corresponding state laws, except as they 
relate to Commons. What is important is to point out that these 
laws represented unprecedented acceptance of social rather than 
individual responsibility for personal security. The laws may be 
broadened from time to time until the U. S. becomes what is 
known as a "welfare state." No single man was responsible in 
bringing it about, but if anyone could be called its father, he would 
be John R. Commons. 
The changes in this country's society from the turn of the 
century until the New Deal were many and profound. Although 
the New Deal would seem to be a break with the past, it was in 
reality only the climax for movements of rather lengthy duration. 
The acceptance of social responsibility for the welfare of the indi­
72 The only method by which the states could reduce the total unemployment taxes
was by adopting a merit system. Employers could deduct their payment of taxes to the
state (up to two and seven-tenths percent of their payrolls). Except under a merit sys­
tem under which the law permitted them to deduce a full two and seven-tenths percent
whether they paid it to the state or not, any reduction of state rates merely caused a cor­
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vidual, the expansion of administrative machinery, and the imposi­
tion of economic controls began on local and state levels. Three 
Wisconsin laws registered the progress of this development. They 
also provided models for other states and for the federal govern­
ment in drafting legislation. Commons is comparatively obscure in 
American history, but his leadership in the drafting and adoption 
of social legislation entitles him to more attention than he has so 
far received. THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION 
ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
T N JUNE OF 1913 John R. Commons received a telegram from 
1 Senator LaFollette, stating that President Wilson offered him 
the position of chairman of a new Industrial Relations Commis­
sion.1 Commons declined the offer because he had just completed 
a two-year leave of absence from the University of Wisconsin, 
serving as a member of the Wisconsin Industrial Commission. He 
did not feel he should spend any more time away from the uni­
versity. Finally, he did agree to become a member of the com­
mission on the condition that he would work only during his 
vacation periods for the commission, and that his duties would 
not interfere with his teaching at the university. 
The demands for a commission 
The Congress that created the commission directed it to find 
the causes of industrial unrest and report back its findings and 
recommendations.2 Evidence of such unrest had attracted the 
attention of the nation and the Congress after disclosures of 
1 Commons, Myself, op. cit., pp. 165, 167.
 
2 Mark Perlman, Labor Union Theories in America, pp. 279-304
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union responsibility for the Los Angeles Times explosion.3 After a 
sensational trial during which union officers confessed to the crime, 
labor and its sympathizers found themselves in an awkward posi­
tion. No longer able to deny that labor unions were sometimes 
violent, they only could offer explanations of why unions might be 
provoked to take such action. Labor had a group of friends who 
were willing to find extenuating circumstances that would explain, 
if not excuse, such action. These friends consisted of a group of 
liberals very similar in outlook to some of the New Dealers of 
a later day. By profession they were social workers, ministers, 
officials  in  state labor departments or industrial commissions, 
journalists, university professors (such as Commons), and even 
a sprinkling of businessmen. Although these liberals represented a 
great diversity of opinion, the desire for reforms to combat poverty 
united them. They reasoned that diseases, crimes, and industrial 
unrest all grew out of miserable conditions which had to be en­
dured by the poor. Because they concerned themselves with the 
suffering of the poor, they tended to develop the attitude that the 
distribution of wealth and income in our society was unjust. Yet 
most of them did not advocate a radical redistribution of wealth 
or change in our social order. What they agreed on was that 
labor's bargaining power should be increased so workers could 
obtain a greater share of the nation's income. Consequently, in 
the struggle between the great corporations and labor unions, the 
liberals tended to sympathize with the underdogs, the unions. 
Hence, they were righteously indignant whenever they found 
abuses by business leaders, but they sought extenuating circum­
stances for the misdeeds of unions. 
Complete identification of this group of liberals is impossible 
because they included both genuine radicals and comparative con­
3 On the morning of October 1, 1910, an explosion wrecked the building of the Los 
Angeles Times, killing 20 and injuring 17 persons. After an extensive investigation, W. J. 
Burns, a well-known detective, arrested Ortie McManigal, and the brothers J. B. and John
J. McNamara. Because John J. McNamara was the secretary-treasurer of the Interna­
tional Association of Bridge and Structural Iron Workers, the case was sensational. Most 
of the prominent leaders of the labor movement, including the cautious Samuel Gompers,
rose to the defense. And the famed defense lawyer, Clarence Darrow, was obtained to
represent the accused. Unfortunately for labor and its sympathizers, the facts were not
as they believed. Ortie McManigal confessed and there was sufficient corraborating evi­
dence to make conviction likely. Consequently, Darrow bargained with the prosecution
to save his clients' lives; they confessed and J. B. McNamara received a life sentence, his
brother was sentenced for fifteen years, and McManigal went free soon after the trial.
There were further trials before the federal courts in Indianapolis, where fifty-four mem­
bers of the International Association of Bridge and Structural Iron Workers were in­
dicted. Of these, forty were tried and thirty-eight convicted of conspiracy to transport
dynamite illegally across state lines. Their terms ranged from one year up to seven for 
the president of the union, Frank Ryan. Perlman and Taft, pp. 318-325. Adamic, pp. 249­
352. The U. S. Commission on Industrial Relations  133 
servatives. However they shared a passion for charity, doubts as 
to the justice of the status quo, and a sympathy for labor unions. 
They were found in such reform organizations as The National 
Council of Charities and Correction, The American Association 
for Labor Legislation, The National Consumers' League, and The 
National Child Labor Committee. The literature of these organiza­
tions shows many of the same names contributing articles, taking 
part in conferences, and being praised for reform activities. 
One of the liberals' important publications was The Survey, 
which described itself as a journal of constructive philanthropy. 
Although it was, and is yet, dedicated to social workers, its con­
tributors have included many people of other professions, such as 
Commons, who was a departmental editor.4 It grew out of a 
magazine called Charities, which had been founded in 1897 by 
Edward T. Devine, who remained as editor until it was reorganized 
in 1909.5 After reorganizing the magazine as The Survey, Devine 
turned over the editorship to Paul U. Kellogg. Although he re­
mained an associate editor and frequent contributor, his chief occu­
pation thereafter was heading the New York School of Phi­
lanthropy. 
Devine and his group of liberals were shocked by the dis­
closures growing out of the McNamara trial, and they tried to find 
reasons why such things could happen.6 Their answer  had to be 
consistent with their sympathies for labor. They contended that 
labor had been driven to the point where violation was the only 
outlet for its frustrations.? To support this contention they pointed 
to widespread cases of grinding poverty and economic insecurity. 
Yet when the workers tried to help themselves by collective action, 
their organizations were ruthlessly suppressed by legal or even 
illegal means. The law protected the employers, but did little to 
benefit the worker. 
To prove and, even more important, to dramatize these con­
tentions, the liberals proposed that the federal government appoint 
a commission to investigate the causes of industrial unrest.8  The 
group held a meeting, under the chairmanship of Jane  Addams, 
to organize to campaign for the creation of this commission.° 
4 Commons served as Departmental Editor for labor legislation while he was secretary
for the American Association for Labor Legislation. In 1910 his student, John 13. An­
drews, replaced him on both jobs. 
5 The Survey, Vol. XXX, pp. 561-564. 
6 The Survey, Vol. XXVII, pp. 1430-1431. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 The Survey, Vol. XXX, pp. 571-578. 134  JOHN R. COMMONS 
During this meeting they formed a committee of which Edward 
Devine was chairman. The first act of this committee was to send 
a petition to President Taft, urging the creation of the commis­
sion. Then it began to lobby for an enabling act by Congress. 
Edward Devine and  Paul  Kellogg approached  Samuel 
Gompers to gain labor's support for their project.1° He agreed 
readily, but insisted labor should be represented on the commis­
sion. Furthermore, he said labor should choose its own representa­
tives. Consequently, the commission was to become a tripartite 
body with representatives of employers, unions, and the public, 
instead of a group of experts studying labor conditions. As soon 
as Gompers joined the campaign, the labor sympathizers in Con­
gress, such as Congressman Wilson (later Secretary of Labor), 
began to give the measure support. Finally, in August of 1912, 
President Taft signed the Hughes-Borah Act creating the com­
mission. 
The commission consisted of nine members, three representa­
tives each for the employers, the unions, and the public. The com­
missioners were to spend $500,000 and three years to study the 
general conditions of labor and the underlying causes of dissatis­
faction. They were to submit their findings and the recommenda­
tions to Congress. 
The selection of the commissioners 
It was not until December that the President announced his 
nominations. When he did the liberals were disappointed with his 
choices.11 They felt that the membership was neither distinguished 
nor sufficiently representative of all interests. The labor representa­
tives, two of whom had been chosen by the American Federation of 
Labor and the third by the railroad brotherhoods, were considered 
too conservative by these liberals. Paul Kellogg complained that 
the two A. F. of L. representatives were so unrepresentative that 
they had been voted out of office by their own international 
unions.12 He agreed that the A. F. of L. was entitled to repre­
sentation, but not to the exclusion of the industrial unions. At least 
someone on the commission should be sympathetic with such 
unions, even if no one represented them directly. 
10 Gompers, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 447.
11 Public members: Senator George Sutherland, from Utah; George B. Chandler;
Charles Simon Barnett. Employer representatives: Frederick A. Delano, Adolph Lewis­
ohn, Ferd C. Schwedtman. Union representatives: Austin B. Garretson, John B. Lennon, 
and James O'Connell. The Survey, Vol. XXIX, p. 381.
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"How absurd," he declared, "that there should be no one on it 
who has the least sympathy with, or understanding of, the new 
industrial unionism which is the dynamic element of that unrest."" 
Apparently, Kellogg and his group believed that fairness re­
quired that all shades of opinion be represented no matter how 
extreme or in how much disrepute. The important segment of 
industrial unionism of that time was the International Workers of 
the World. 
The liberals objected to the nominations for employer repre­
sentatives on the grounds that they were men who tended to deal 
with the structural rather than the human side of industry. Two 
were engineers while the third was a large investor and  director, 
who did not deal with the "immediate personal equations of a 
manager."14 One of them was a vice president of the anti-union 
National Association of Manufacturers, Although the liberals con­
ceded that these were admirable men, their good qualities tended to 
duplicate each other. None was a conspicuous defender of "de­
mocracy in industry."15 
The liberals were more greatly disappointed over the nominees 
who were to represent the public. The absence of any woman 
on the commission and the failure to  include any well-known 
economist or social worker were particularly disappointing. Paul 
Kellogg complained, "Freund, Brandeis, Commons, there is no 
name that rings out like these on the list."" 
After the President's announcement, the New York members 
of the committee to sponsor the commission met to express their 
dissatisfaction. They read telegrams from the out-of-town members 
and then prepared a statement for the press, summarizing their 
views.17 They hoped the President would either reconsider his 
nominations or that the Senate would fail to confirm them. 
When the Senate refused to confirm Taft's nominees, the job 
of making the new nominations fell to President Wilson. The 
various groups began to exert pressure on the new administration 
to influence the President in his choices. Samuel Gompers met 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Signed by John B. Andrews, Frank Oliver Hall, John Haynes Holmes, J. W.
Jenks, Arthur Kellogg, Paul U. Kellogg, Paul Kennaday, John A. Kingsbury, Samuel
McCune Lindsay, Owen R. Lovejoy, A. J. McKelway, Henry Morgenthau, Henry Mos­
kowitz, James P. Reynolds, William Jay Schlieffelin, Stephen S. Wise, Edward T. De-
vine, Lillian D. Wald. The Survey, Vol. XXIX, p. 382. 136  JOHN R. COMMONS 
with the President to discuss the nominations and had further 
access to the administration through Secretary of Labor Wilson.18 
The liberal group of charity and social reform workers also con­
ferred with the President to get their point of view represented.19 
They urged the President to appoint Edward T. Devine as chair­
man and a public representative. For a woman as a public repre­
sentative, they backed Florence Kelly. As to the third public repre­
sentative, they suggested John R. Commons. 
When Ralph Easley, secretary of the National Civic Federa­
tion, heard that the liberals had met with the President, he became 
alarmed.2° He described them as "radical but superficial social 
reformers," and "sentimental and theoretical."21 They were entitled 
to express their opinions, he said, "but when they put themselves 
on record in favor of a Red Flag revolutionary socialist to repre­
sent the women of the country," they were going too far.22 
In place of Florence Kelly, Easley advocated substituting Mrs. 
J. Borden Harriman.23 In addition to being an active member in 
the National Civic Federation, she also had qualified herself politi­
cally by being president of the women's organization for the 
Democratic campaign for 1912. Besides being an able person, 
sympathetic to labor, she was, in Easley's opinion, skilled in organi­
zation. She would help the commission achieve harmony rather 
than stir up continual rows, as would Florence Kelly. For the 
other two public members, Easley suggested Louis Brandeis and 
John R. Commons.24 
On June 26, 1913, President Wilson announced his nomina­
tions.25 The list included the same labor members as had Presi­
dent Taft's. He substituted Harris Weinstock and S. Thurston 
Ballard for two of the employers chosen by Taft, but he retained 
Frederic A. Delano from the previous list of nominees. Frank P. 
18 Gompers, Vol. I, p. 544. 
19 Green, p. 348. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., pp. 345, 348. 
22 Ibid., p. 348. Mrs. Kelly had voted for Debs in the last election. 
23 Ibid., p. 349. 
24 Marguarite Green quotes a portion of Easley's letter to an unnamed official high 
in the administration: "Mr. Commons would meet the expectations of the saner elements
among what are termed radicals and, at the same time, would be very pleasing to Senator
LaFollette and all his friends. He is an able man." Ibid., p. 350. Easley's enthusiasm for
Brandeis cooled upon learning he had been urging I. W. W. representation on the com­
mission. Ibid., p. 349. 
25 Public members: Frank Walsh, John R. Commons, Mrs. J. Borden Harriman. Em­
ployer representatives: Frederick A. Delano, Harris Weinstock, S. Thurston Ballard.
Union members: Austin B. Garretson, John B. Lennon, James O'Connell. On March 
17, 1915 Richard H. Aishton was appointed to serve the unexpired term of Frederick
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Walsh, Mrs. J. Borden Harriman, and John R. Commons were 
named as the representatives of the public. 
Frank P. Walsh, the chairman, was the third choice for his 
post after both Commons and Louis Brandeis had turned it down.26 
His appointment probably stemmed from the fact that he, a promi­
nent liberal attorney from Kansas City, had thrown his support to 
the Democrats in the 1912 election. For the rest of his life he 
remained a member of the Democratic Party and held a number 
of high offices.27 
The Wilson nominees seemed to please the major groups 
interested in the commission. Easley was pleased that no socialist, 
or member of the I. W. W. had been chosen.28 He was particularly 
pleased that eight of the nine members, including Commons, be­
longed to the National Civic Federation. Labor had reason to be 
satisfied with the choices, because their slate of representatives had 
been chosen. Even the group of liberals found the new list sub­
stantially superior to the old. They were happy that no member of 
an anti-union organization had been chosen. The Survey, in an 
editorial, explained why Wilson's choices made a better impres­
sion than Taft's : 
An especial reason for this impression they find in the appoint­
ment of Professor Commons, the one man in America who, as econo­
mist and investigator, has thought out industrial reforms, as states­
man has drafted them into laws which would give them effect and as 
administrator has practically enforced those laws with unexampled 
co-operation of employers and employee.29 
After the nominations had been made public but before the 
Senate had confirmed them, The Survey published a symposium 
on what the commission ought to accomplish.30 As befitted their 
liberal approach, they printed opinions from such diverse sources 
as W. D. Haywood of the Industrial Workers of the World and 
Ferdinand C. Schwedtman of the National Association of Manu­
facturers. They also included an article by John R. Commons that 
had been written before he knew he was going to be on the com­
mission.31 Not much agreement was apparent as to the goals of 
the commission, but the symposium did help arouse interest. 
26 Harriman, p. 133. 
27 Walsh later became co-chairman (with Taft) of War Labor Conference Board, and
a representative of the people on the War Labor Board of 1918. In 1929 he was ap­
pointed by Governor Roosevelt as a member of New York Commission on Revision of
Public Utility Laws. He became chairman of the Power Authority of the State of New 
York in 1931. 
28 Green, pp. 349, 350. 
29 The Survey, Vol. XXX, pp. 452, 453.
30 The Survey, Vol. XXX, pp. 571-578. 
31 He stressed the need for better organization of agencies administering labor laws. 138  JOHN R. COMMONS 
The commission's organization and work 
On September 10, 1913, the Senate confirmed the President's 
nominees. One month later $100,000 for the first year's work was 
made available, and on October 23, 1913, the commission began 
its work at last. By then only twenty-two months remained in 
which to make investigations and prepare reports. 
After a certain amount of discussion the commissioners de­
cided on a two-part investigation. Part of the work was to be car­
ried on in the form of public hearings where facts and viewpoints 
could be gained from numerous witnesses. For the second part of 
the investigations the commission hired a group of scholars to 
make reports on a number of topics. These reports were to be 
submitted to the commission for approval, and to be incorporated 
into the report to Congress. 
Walsh, being a lawyer, was more interested in the hearings 
than in reports by scholars. He was a skilled interrogator who 
could perform well during the hearings. On the other hand, Com­
mons, the scholar, was more interested in research. Before accept­
ing the position he had made an arrangement with Walsh that 
he would concentrate his efforts on the staff reports.32 They agreed 
that he would hire most of the experts on the staff and would give 
them a certain amount of supervision. 
Not being able to devote full time to the work, Commons 
left the immediate supervision to W. Jett Lauck, who had been 
the chief examiner for the tariff board. When the progress of 
the work lagged, Commons persuaded the commission to hire 
Charles McCarthy, of the Wisconsin Legislative Reference Li­
brary, to be in charge of the staff investigations. As soon as Mc-
Carthy joined the staff, in the summer of 1914, the work pro­
ceeded more vigorously. Fitch reported, "To a singular degree 
Dr. McCarthy has promoted an esprit de corps, giving promise of 
results."33 McCarthy divided the work into nine divisions, each 
with a chief and a staff. A system of submitting regular reports 
kept him informed as to their progress. If any member of the 
staff needed help he was ready with many fertile suggestions. It 
appeared that McCarthy would insure the success of this joint 
scholarly effort. 
In the meantime, the commissioners conducted a series of 
public hearings around the country. Although the commissioners 
interviewed witnesses representing both employers and workers, 
32 Commons, Myself.

33 Fitch, The Survey, Vol. XXXIII, p. 578.
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the latter had more spectacular stories. When the commissioners 
heard lurid accounts of incidents such as the "Ludlow Massacre," 
their investigations became a study of employer abuses.34 Before 
long the entire purpose of the commission seemed to shift. Instead 
of attempting to discover the underlying causes of industrial 
unrest, they changed to an attempt to prove that the blame rested 
almost entirely with the employers. Walsh, in particular, became 
abusive when he had such persons as John D. Rockefeller, Jr. on 
the stand." 
Rockefeller was drawn into the hearings because he and his 
father were principal stockholders in the Colorado Fuel and Iron 
Company, the company whose striking employees suffered in the 
Ludlow tragedy. Although the testimony did not support such 
conclusions, Walsh tried to prove that Rockefeller was personally 
responsible for the unfortunate conditions and events in Colorado. 
What the testimony and correspondence produced for the com­
mission showed was that Rockefeller had given the company offi­
cials a free hand. He did this on the basis of misinformation which 
they had supplied him. Finally, when he became aware of the 
nature of the situation, he hired MacKenzie King to conduct an 
independent investigation on the causes of industrial unrest, includ­
ing that in Colorado.36 He made this a project of the Rockefeller 
Foundation. 
Walsh, believing the King investigation to be a sinister propa­
ganda move, attacked the Rockefeller Foundation as well as Rocke­
feller personally. He then extended his attack to all large founda­
tions because he considered them potential menaces to democracy. 
During these hearings on foundations, Walsh strayed far away 
from the path of objectivity. Not only was he vindicative, but at 
times he abused his witnesses.37 Furthermore, the relation between 
foundations and industrial unrest was tenuous at best. 
The hearings of the commission produced much material use­
ful for the students of labor relations. Almost every point of view, 
34 Members of the Colorado National Guard fired into a tent city inhabited by evicted
strikers. In the course of a pitched battle the camp burned, resulting in the killing of two
women and eleven children. Final Report and Testimony Submitted to Congress by the 
Commission on Industrial Relations, Vol. 7, pp. 6346-6356. 
35 Ibid., Vol. 8, pp. 7763-7895.
36 MacKenzie King drafted and administered the Canadian Disputes Act. Later he 
became Prime Minister of Canada. 
37 The Nation, Vol. C, p. 161. Mrs. Harriman also testified that "Frank Walsh was
perfectly frightful; he was rude, dictatorial, and kept witnesses waiting unnecessarily. He
was nice to labor people, but awful to Rockefeller." Personal interview on September 9,
1958, at the home of Mrs. Harriman's granddaughter, Mrs. Robert Fulton of Ross, Cali­
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from those of arch reactionaries to those of extreme radicals, was 
expressed before the commission. Yet the overall picture the 
chairman, Walsh, tried to bring out was that the employers were 
responsible for industrial unrest. He succeeded in winning the 
labor representatives over to his point of view, but the others 
could not agree with him. Naturally, the employer representatives 
resented what they felt was an unfair approach. Commons and 
Mrs. Harriman, although both extremely sympathetic to labor, 
could not go along with Walsh's one-sided approach.38 Hence, the 
commission divided on a five to four basis. 
The commission ran into trouble 
The hearings brought the commission more disagreements 
than those arising from the treatment of witnesses and testimony. 
Because the hearings consumed so much time and money, they 
began to crowd the other parts of the investigation. While hearings 
were going on, Commons' experts were making their own investi­
gations to prepare their reports. This work required a considerable 
amount of money though not as much as for the conducting of 
hearings. Trouble came when it became apparent that the money 
appropriated by the Congress would not cover both types of 
activities. 
Early in its life the commission had voted to give Walsh the 
power to control finances." Thus, when the shortage of money 
became apparent, he was in a strategic position to decide which 
type of activity should have the priority. It is not surprising that 
he decided that money should go to the hearings, even if the staff 
investigations had to be abandoned. 
It was some time before the commissioners became aware 
of the shortage of money. The shortage was due partly to bad 
management by Walsh and partly because of the way Congress 
appropriated the money. In the enabling act Congress had stated 
that the commission should spend $500,000, but it appropriated 
the money on an annual basis. Finally, the full amount was spent, 
but Congress doled it out in installments and then reluctantly under 
pressure. At times Walsh had to drop his work to go to Washing­
ton to plead for money. Congress appropriated only $100,000 for 
the first year, but finally was induced to supplement it with a 
deficiency appropriation of $50,000. For the fiscal year 1914-1915 
Congress appropriated $200,000. By February of 1915 this last 
38 Commons, Myself, p. 177.
 
39 Ibid.
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appropriation was running out, and Walsh had to plead for 
$100,000 to complete the year and $40,000 for the work after 
July 1 until August 23, 1915, when the commission's term was to 
expire. 
At the time of the last grant, money was needed both to com­
plete the hearings and to edit and publish the staff reports, the 
commission reports, and the testimony. John Fitch of The Survey 
quoted an unnamed commissioner as saying that "$90,000 at least 
will be used for editing and investigations and $50,000 for public 
hearings."40 This commissioner was inaccurate for two reasons : 
(1) the figure for the staff investigations was grossly insufficient 
to cover the cost of publishing the reports; and (2) any money 
that Walsh could obtain would go for the hearings. 
When Walsh went to Washington to plead for this last ap­
propriation, he met with great opposition. Congressman J. Hamp­
ton Moore of Philadelphia told the House that : 
.  .  if some of the reported utterances of the chairman of this 
commission are correct, it would appear that the general disposi­
tion is to spend the money in the propogation of ideas and theories 
based very largely upon what is known as modern socialism.41 
Moore was particularly disturbed about Walsh's lack of intentions 
to use any of the money to pay for the printing of the results of 
the investigation. He quoted Walsh as telling the Committee on 
Appropriations : 
My idea was this, that if you wanted anything printed there 
was some way of having it ordered printed in Congress so that 
we did not have to take cognizance of it in our appropriations.42 
Although Congressman Henry Allen Cooper of Racine, Wis­
consin, defended the commission,'" Congress showed its disap­
proval by limiting the appropriation to $100,000. It specified that 
this appropriation was to cover printing costs. Having spent 
$350,000 already, Congress hesitated to kill the commission alto­
gether, but by limiting its funds it nearly did so anyway. 
The limitation  of  funds immediately made the Walsh-
Commons compromise as to the conduct of the commission impos­
sible. Not enough money was left to complete the staff investiga­
tions and also pay for completion of hearings, which already had 
been announced. Walsh had planned to take the commission to 
40 The Survey, Vol. XXXIII, p. 582.
 
41 Congressional Record, 1915, p. 582.
 
42 Ibid.
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Chicago; Houghton, Michigan; Atlanta; Boston; Pittsburgh; and 
Washington. And Walsh held the purse strings. 
By early March the lack of money resulted in a controversy 
between Walsh and the chief of the staff investigations, Charles 
McCarthy. Without consulting the other commissioners, Walsh 
suddenly dismissed McCarthy." Apparently friction had existed 
between the two men for some time. McCarthy had insisted that 
Walsh should draw up some sort of a budget for his guidance.45 
Instead of doing so, Walsh put him off, telling him not to worry 
about the money. Finally, when the financial plight of the com­
mission became known, trouble was inevitable, as Walsh was ready 
to sacrifice the staff investigations, if necessary. 
Though McCarthy was willing to work without pay to wind 
up the investigations, a bitter quarrel developed from which there 
was no compromise.46 Although the budget problem probably was 
at the root, the avowed issue was McCarthy's friendship with 
John D. Rockefeller, Jr.47 This friendship was of many years' 
standing, beginning in their college days at Brown University. 
Before Rockefeller had announced that Mackenzie King would 
conduct an investigation into industrial unrest for the Rockefeller 
Foundation, McCarthy had advised his friend on how to or­
ganize it. 
The upshot of the dispute was that Walsh fired McCarthy.48 
The firing prompted resignations of a number of investigators 
Commons had hired.' Walsh then fired some of the others. Com­
mons tried to undo Walsh's decisions by introducing resolutions 
before the commission to take back the power of the purse from 
Walsh. When these proposals were defeated by a tie vote, Walsh 
44 Harriman, p. 172. 
45 Fitzpatrick, p. 195. 
46 Ibid. 
47 At first, Walsh expressed no objections to McCarthy's relationship with Rocke­
feller; later after the quarrel over the budget had developed, he made it a major issue. 
Ibid., p. 197.
48 Blame for the dispute is not easily allocated; neither man was easy to get along
with. Commons described them as "two Killarney Irishmen, who could never agree." 
Commons, Myself, p. 176. Walsh often became embroiled in futile controversies, such as
that with Paul Kellogg, editor of The Survey, over the King investigations. As to Mc-
Carthy, the case is not so clear; many times in his career as Director of Wisconsin's Leg­
islative Reference Library he had to restrain his feelings. However, he admitted that he
could never get along with Robert M. La Follette. (He was not unique in this respect.)
Quoted in Fitzpatrick, p. 114. However, the conflict between the two types of investiga­
tion and the lack of adequate funds could well provoke a quarrel between men of very 
even temper.
Also see The Survey, Vol. XXXIII, November 14, 1914, pp. 175-181.
"Charles McCarthy On Why He Is Out of Federal Inquiry," The Survey, Vol.
XXXIV, April 10, 1915, p. 40. 
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was free to conduct the affairs of the commission as he saw  fit.5° 
Thus, the work of the staff of experts was almost entirely 
abandoned while the hearings were continued until almost the end 
of the commission's term. 
Even if the expert staff members had been permitted to finish 
their work, it is doubtful the commission would have had time to 
consider their reports. Originally Commons had planned that 
these reports be submitted to the commission for approval or 
revision. Although the staff would compile information, draft 
proposed laws, and do all the work of a technical nature, the 
decisions would be left up to the commission. Its report would 
then be a consensus of opinion as to causes and possible cures 
for industrial unrest in America. 
To aid in the reaching of such a consensus Commons organ­
ized outside of the commission a group of employers, union men, 
and some of his students to go over the staff reports.51 Apparently, 
he thought of this group as having relations with the commission 
similar to that which the advisory committees in Wisconsin had 
with the State Industrial Commission. However, before this group 
had made more than a good start Walsh brought its activities to 
an end when he cut off all funds for Commons'  staff. Further­
more, even if money had been available, it is unlikely there  would 
have been time enough to complete such a project. 
Because the reports of the experts never were submitted to 
the commission, Commons did not recognize them as part of its 
findings or recommendations. He believed they should be published 
as findings of individual scholars. Some of the investigators did 
publish their works, but most of the reports never were printed. 
After McCarthy was dismissed, he was replaced by Basil 
Manly, who had been in charge of the staff for conducting the 
public hearings. Manly used the record of the testimony and re­
ports that had been finished by the experts to write a report for 
the commission. Chairman Walsh and the three labor representa­
tives signed this report. Each of these four made supplemental 
reports on details. 
Commons, Mrs. Harriman, and the employer representatives 
rejected the Manly report. They submitted a report which Corn­
50  Ibid.
 
Si Ibid.,  p. 175.
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mons wrote.52 Thus, the majority signed Commons' dissenting 
report, but the employers registered additional dissents on certain 
points. All in all, there were two major reports and six supple­
mental reports. (Some of the commissioners signed more than 
one supplemental report.) 
Exactly which report was to be the report of the commission 
never was made clear. In the printed volume the Manly report 
appeared first. It presented the findings and recommendations as 
those of the commission, even though only a minority agreed 
with them. In effect, this report by a minority was the "majority 
report" while the dissenting report was signed by the majority. 
Together these two major reports with their supplemental ones, 
demonstrated the chaotic disunity of the commission. 
Although Congress had specified that the commission should 
bear the expense of printing all reports, Walsh ordered only the 
one-volume report to be printed." The rest of the material, includ­
ing transcripts of testimony, exhibits, and staff reports, was de­
livered in typewritten form in wooden drygoods cases to Congress. 
Several congressmen sharply criticized such a procedure,54 and 
there was debate on whether to have the material printed. Because 
the chief value of the entire commission was in the record of 
testimony, Congress finally accepted the fact that it had no alterna­
tive but to print all of it if it wanted to salvage anything from 
its previous expenditures on the commission. As to the staff re­
ports, Congress followed Walsh's recommendations not to print 
them. Even so, the printing expense, according to the estimate 
of the Senate Committee on Printing, was over $92,000.55 Thus, 
the $50,000 Congress previously had withheld from the commis­
sion was more than replaced. 
The Manly report 
The Manly report placed the blame for industrial unrest with 
the employers and with the wealthy class." It contained four main 
contentions which it documented with evidence from the testimony 
52 Commons wrote the report with the help of Mrs. Harriman. During the last
days of the commission's term they were together almost daily. They even worked on the 
report while taking a train trip to California where Mrs. Harriman was meeting her daugh­
ter to go to the Exposition. She and Commons corresponded for years afterwards. The last
time Mrs. Harriman heard from Commons was when he wrote to her after hearing of her
escape from Norway where she had been Ambassadress during World War II. She re­
members him as a "dear sweet man." He was humble and retiring, slow to anger, but the
cleverest man on the commission. Harriman, Personal Interview, op. cit. 
53 Congressional Record, House Vol. 53, Part 1, 1915, p. 409. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Congressional Record, Senate Vol. 53, Part 5, 1916, p. 42761. 
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and also material from the unpublished reports of the expert staff. 
The report began with a description of the unjust and unequal 
distribution of wealth and income in the nation. It cited numerous 
statistics to demonstrate this inequality and went on to show the 
existence of widespread poverty as contrasted with the wealth of 
a few. 
The second contention was a claim that the poor suffered 
considerable unemployment and were denied opportunities for 
earning their living. The unemployment, Manly asserted, was 
caused by the unequal distribution of income and the monopoliza­
tion of land and natural resources. Workers did not receive suffi­
cient income to purchase the products they produced, while the 
wealthy few had such large incomes that they could spend it only 
by investing in machinery for production or for further monopoli­
zation of land and natural resources. The result, the report claimed, 
was that productive capacity was twenty-five percent in excess of 
needs during normal years. Yet each industrial enterprise was 
supplied with workers who would be employed for only part of 
the year. A second cause of unemployment resulted from the 
withholding of land and natural resources for development. While 
the owners eventually might enjoy the fruits of an unearned incre­
ment, the withholding of such resources deprived many workers 
of opportunities for employment. 
The third contention consisted of an indictment of the coun­
try's legal system. The report pointed to the great difficulty in 
passing any legislation protecting working people. When such 
legislation finally was passed in spite of unfair lobbying of em­
ployers, it of ten was invalidated by the courts. The courts had 
perverted the fourteenth amendment, the purpose of which was 
to protect human rights. By citing this amendment they had 
declared most social legislation unconstitutional. Yet the courts 
by unwarranted extension of their own powers had issued in­
junctions that suppressed the rights of the workers. In many cases 
the procedure had been evasion of the constitutional guarantees 
for persons accused of illegal acts. Instead of trying persons in 
criminal courts with juries for such activity as violence during 
strikes, authorities would cite defendents for contempt of court 
for violating injunctions. Such persons accused of such violations 
then were tried by the judges who had issued the injunctions. Not 
only did such a procedure deprive the accused of their rights, but 
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In addition to alleging that one-sided justice was dispensed by 
the courts, it was argued that powerful employers often controlled 
governments by the use of political machines. Not only could such 
control insure employers of favorable legislation, but by con­
trolling the governors, a powerful weapon would be at their dis­
posal. During a strike the governor could declare martial law and 
send troops to the scene. While such troops would protect strike­
breakers, anyone opposing these efforts could be subject to mili­
tary law. Answerable only to the governor, the military authorities 
could exercise wide discretion in jailing those involved in a strike. 
Under martial law civil liberties could be suppressed. The Manly 
report cited a number of cases where such actions had occurred. 
All in all, the report asserted there were two types of justice; 
one for the employer and another for the worker. The courts pro­
tected the property rights of the employer but were ineffective in 
protecting the rights of workers. The injured workman, or the 
workman who was unable to collect his salary, or one who had 
some other grievance, found the courts expensive and justice 
uncertain. Although the courts were quick to work against the 
poor, they tended to be indifferent in protecting them. 
The fourth contention of the report was that the employers 
denied the employees the right to form effective organizations. 
Wherever the right to belong to unions had been denied, "Freedom 
does not exist either politically, industrially, or socially, and that 
the fiber of manhood will inevitably be destroyed by the continu­
ance of the existing situation."57 Methods used by corporations 
to stamp out unions had led to the supression of freedom not only 
of the workers involved, but also of others in the community. 
Furthermore, denial of the right to form unions prevented workers 
from seeking relief from the first three causes of industrial unrest. 
To provide remedies for industrial unrest in the nation, the 
Manly report recommended a number of radical reforms. To 
reverse the trend toward concentration of wealth and income it 
advocated a graduated tax on inheritances with rates equaling 
one hundred percent on estates over $1,000,000. Taxes on unused 
land and natural resources were to be high enough to insure their 
use. A constitutional amendment was recommended to withdraw 
from the courts the power to declare legislative acts unconstitu­
tional. The telephone and telegraph industry would be nationalized 
if the report's recommendation were followed. Other recommenda­
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tions included the creation of a labor mediation system, the pro­
hibition of the transporting of company guards across interstate 
boundaries, prohibiting employers from refusing to deal with 
unions, law guaranteeing workers the right to belong to unions, 
government insurance against sickness for the workers,  special 
protection for people living in isolated company towns, and an 
end to the use of the doctrine of conspiracy in suppressing union 
activity. Recommendations were many and detailed. Some seem 
reasonable today but all were radical for 1915. 
The Commons Report 
Commons, along with Mrs. Harriman, submitted a dissenting 
report.58 Except on a few points the employer members (Harris 
Weinstock, S. Thurston Ballard, and Richard H. Aishton59) con­
curred with this report. These five rejected the findings and recom­
mendations of the Manly report. They asserted that the Manly 
report contained "few or no practicable suggestions  for legislation 
that would be enforceable, or because they are directed to making 
a few individuals scapegoats where what is needed is serious at­
tention to the system that produced the demand for scapegoats, 
and, with it, the breakdown of labor legislation in the country."6° 
The real trouble was that "our statute books are encumbered 
by laws that are conflicting, ambiguous, and unenforceable, or 
partly enforced." Consequently, "as soon as people lose  confidence 
in the making of laws by the legislature, in their interpretation by 
the courts and in their administration by officials, they  take the 
law into their own hands."61 The problem, therefore, was  how to 
reorganize the law so it would fit existing conditions  and be 
enforceable. 
To be effective any proposals had to recognize that a perma­
nent struggle existed between capital and labor. Yet the proposals 
also should take advantage of the fact that there were  certain 
points where the interests were harmonious or could  be made 
harmonious. This field of no actual conflict was wider than many 
realized. 
The heart of the Commons report was a recommendation  that 
industrial commissions, modeled on the one in Wisconsin, be set 
up in the various states and that a  similar one be created for the 
55 Ibid., pp. 171-230.
59 Appointed commissioner March 17, 1915, to serve the unexpired term of F. A. 
Delano who resigned.
so Final Report and Testimony, p. 11. 
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national government. All bureaus and divisions of the states or 
federal government dealing with conditions of labor, such as in­
dustrial safety or sanitation, workmen's compensation, employ­
ment offices, child labor, industrial education, statistics, immigra­
tion, and so on, would be placed under the direction of the com­
missions. The commissioners were to be appointed by the governors 
for the states and by the President for the federal commission. 
Their terms should be for six years, staggered in such a way that 
two expire each two years. 
To aid the commissions in their work, advisory councils such 
as used by the Wisconsin commission should be created repre­
senting employers, unions, and the public. Two of the members 
representing the public on the federal advisory council would be 
the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Labor. Although 
the President, in the case of federal advisory councils, and the 
governors for those in the states, would appoint the representa­
tives, appointment of employer or union representatives should be 
from lists submitted by organized groups of employers and labor. 
These councils would have no power to vote on any issues but 
would make recommendations to the various industrial commis­
sions. They would advise on all appointments, investigations, publi­
cations, and rules and regulations which should be decided by the 
commissions. Such recommendations would be published with both 
majority and minority opinions. Although the commissioners 
would not be bound by the advisory councils' recommendations, 
they could use them to strengthen their own decisions. 
Exactly what the powers of the various commissions were 
to be, the report did not make precisely clear. Presumably, the 
state commissions were to be patterned after that of Wisconsin's 
Industrial Commission. But the dividing line between the powers 
of the state and federal commissions was left indefinite in the 
report. Apparently the report was not an attempt to outline a 
complete labor legislation program, but just an attempt to suggest 
some procedures for formulating and then administering any 
program. 
Perhaps in recognition of the fact that it was not complete, 
the report stressed the role of investigation by the various com­
missions. The commissions were to make and publish investiga­
tions and recommendations on all subjects whose administration 
was entrusted to them. Any other investigations were to be made 
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Such investigations might include basic information for drafting 
laws by the legislatures and for formulating rules by which the 
commissions would enforce labor laws. More routine investigations 
would include the assembling of data on wages, hours, industrial 
disputes, and other labor matters. 
The report also spelled out how labor laws would be enforced, 
a procedure similar to that used by Wisconsin's commission. In 
the case of safety laws, the various legislatures would set down 
the broad requirement that all factories should be as safe as they 
could reasonably be made. Then the commissions would determine 
the exact standards that would meet the legislative directive. In 
setting such standards they would utilize the services of the ad­
visory councils to reach a reasonable basis on which employers, 
labor leaders, and experts in the field could agree. After public 
hearings at which all interested parties would have opportunities 
to raise objections, the commissions would promulgate their rules. 
If then there were objections, recourse could be had to the courts. 
Yet the burden of proof that the rules or regulations of the com­
missions were unreasonable would be on the party contesting them. 
In all these recommendations as to procedure the report was fol­
lowing those prescribed for the Wisconsin Industrial Commission. 
To aid in settling industrial disputes the report recommended 
that each commission (state and federal) appoint a chief mediator 
and several assistants. Such mediators would have no powers to 
compel testimony and would be prohibited from arbitrating any 
dispute. Also they were prohibited from disclosing any informa­
tion they might obtain from any parties to an industrial dispute. 
If a mediator was unable to obtain agreement between the dis­
puting parties he might recommend arbitration and aid the parties 
in selecting a board of arbitration. Such a board would have the 
power to compel testimony. However, in no case would arbitra­
tion be compulsory. If the disputing parties did not want inter­
vention the mediators would be barred even from making investi­
gations of the situation. 
Any approach towards compulsory arbitration, or even com­
pulsory investigation would plunge labor disputes into politics. 
Each side would try to capture the power to appoint arbitrators 
partial to its cause. Such widening of the area of conflict between 
capital and labor was considered unwise. Collective bargaining, it 
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While the recommendations of the report placed its chief 
reliance on collective bargaining in the determination of industrial 
conditions, Commons went even further. He insisted there should 
be no interference with the coercive weapons of strikes, lockouts, 
boycotting, or blacklists. He reasoned that because it is impossible 
to prevent blacklisting, it is unfair to take away labor's comparable 
weapon, the boycott. He even would permit secondary boycotts 
on the ground that any damage to third parties is minor and can be 
avoided by such parties if they comply with the primary boycott. 
The real victim is the boycotted employer who is involved in a 
dispute with a labor union. Because such an employer is free to 
use a blacklist against labor, Commons argued that he does not 
deserve protection against boycotts, whether primary or secondary. 
The employer members of the United States Commission on 
Industrial Relations dissented from this "no holds barred" point 
of view. They condemned both the blacklist and the secondary 
boycott. The latter they believed was illegal, but the former they 
merely condemned. But on the whole affected employers agreed 
with Commons' position. The only other major point of disagree­
ment was the employers' belief that the commissions should have 
the power to make investigations and to publicize the facts when 
an unsettled dispute seriously affected the public interests. They 
cited as examples disputes affecting necessary public utilities. 
In addition to setting up commissions and providing them 
with mediation services, the Commons report also had a few 
suggestions for labor laws. It recommended legislatures or Con­
gress to enact laws requiring companies that operate their plants on 
a twenty-four hour basis to divide their operations into three 
shifts. Such companies should require their employees to work 
only one shift a day for a six-day week. 
Congress or legislatures also should enact laws similar to 
the British Trades Disputes Act of 1906. The purpose of such 
laws would be to relieve employers' associations and labor unions 
of liability from criminal or damage suits and injunctions arising 
from a combination or conspiracy connected with a labor dispute. 
Any act that would be legal for an individual to perform ought 
to be legal when done by a union or employers' association. 
The commissions were to have the authority to regulate 
detective agencies and the hiring of armed guards to be used in 
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the federal commission and its advisory council, should draw up 
rules for preventing improper use of state militias during strikes. 
Miscellaneous proposals of the report included placing the 
enforcement of immigration laws under the federal commission. 
Also, the report contained the suggestion that some sort of land 
reform be instituted to prevent absentee ownership over farm 
lands. Other proposals endorsed minimum wage laws for women 
and children and a system of national and state employment 
offices. 
To finance any program for social welfare that might be 
adopted by Congress and legislatures the report recommended 
levying a federal inheritance tax on all estates over $25,000, begin­
ning at one percent on the excess above $25,000, and rising to 
fifteen percent on the excess above $1,000,000 for the class of 
direct heirs, such as wives, children, and parents. For more remote 
relatives and strangers, the report recommended higher rates, but 
did not specify what they should be. Such taxes were to be super­
taxes added upon existing states taxes. However, any state that 
would repeal its inheritance taxes would qualify to receive fifty 
cents per capita of its population from the federal government 
each year. The remaining money would be used to cover the ex­
penses of the federal commission for subsidies to the state com­
missions to aid in their part in the social welfare program. Such 
money would be granted on condition states maintained certain 
minimum conditions. 
Of what this welfare program actually would consist, and how 
the roles of the various state commissions would differ from that 
of the federal commission was not made clear. Formulation of such 
a program could be made by the federal commission after appropri­
ate study and consultation with its advisory council. 
Finally, the report ended with the suggestion of reforms to 
prevent corporations from controlling government. It suggested 
that protection of the secret ballot, limitation of expenditures and 
the number of paid electioneers in elections, direct primaries, 
proportional representation, initiative and recall (except for Su­
preme Court judges or members of legislatures) should be pro­
vided to prevent corrupt practices. 
On the whole, the Commons report aimed at providing 
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the main reliance remained on collective bargaining for specific 
disputes, the report, recommended the creation of commissions, 
advisory councils, and mediation machinery to resolve disputed 
issues. Although a few specific recommendations were made as to 
desirable labor laws, the report did not provide any detailed 
description of a labor program. Instead it suggested means by 
which investigations could be made, as well as compromises by 
capital and labor in the formulation of such a program of labor 
and social legislation. Clearly, it was patterned after what Com­
mons had learned in the creation and administration of the Wis­
consin Industrial Commission. 
The aftermath 
When the United States Commission on Industrial Relations 
submitted its several reports on August 23, 1915, other more 
dramatic news held the public's attention. News from the various 
fronts of World War I competed for newspaper space and head­
lines. Russia on the Eastern Front and the allies on the Western 
Front and at Gallipoli furnished reams of copy demanding atten­
tion. At sea the submarine campaign was highlighted by the sink­
ing of the Arabic. Stories of the sinking and testimony of the 
survivors crowded much of the other news from the front pages. 
The final press release from the commission did make the 
front pages of most important newspapers of the country, but 
only for one day. Then, after a day or two, each newspaper pro­
vided editorial comment on the commission's work. The magazines 
soon followed with their comments. By and large, the commission 
ended its career with a minimum of notice from the press. 
Except in the labor press most editorial comment was ex­
tremely critical. Much of the criticism was of Chairman Walsh. 
For example, the New York Times made a fairly typical estimate 
of him : 
Unfortunately, the Chairman of the commission, one of the 
three public members appointed to represent the public, has dis­
played from the first a heat and violence of bias and a passion 
of intemperant speech that have disgusted some of his colleagues, 
destroyed confidence and deadened interest in the commission, made 
it plainly a fantastic futility.62 
Commenting on the proposal to levy a 100 percent tax on all 
inheritances over $1,000,000, the Times suggested that a new verb 
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"to walsh" might enrich the language and be used to describe such 
a confiscation. Echoing this sentiment, The New York World 
sarcastically suggested there was no reason why such confiscation 
should begin at the $1,000,000 mark.63 As to the World's general 
impression of the commission's work, it called such a performance 
"barren."64 It displayed a cartoon showing Uncle Sam throwing 
the Report of Federal Commission on Industrial Relations into a 
wastepaper basket. Under the cartoon the caption read, "And it 
costs only $500,000." 
The magazines tended to agree with the newspapers. They 
too centered their fire on Chairman Walsh. The Nation called the 
performance of the commission a "fiasco."65 Commenting on the 
demise of the commission (its term expiring August 23, 1915), 
the Outlook declared that it would have few mourners.66 Dismis­
sing the work of the commission as "agitation," Harper's Weekly 
predicted that ".  .  .  all the reports, aggregating some two hundred 
thousand words, will be neglected by the public and the Con­
gress."67 
Some of the editorial comment made a distinction between the 
Manly and the Commons reports. The Nation predicted : 
The Commons-Harriman portion of the Industrial Relations Com­
mission will receive discussion where Walsh's maunderings will be 
thrown aside." 
Yet the Nation expressed doubts as to whether the proposed 
commissions could function harmoniously. It feared that deadlocks 
and quarrels might mar its performance. The fiasco of the Walsh 
commission had spotlighted such dangers. The New York Times 
characterized the proposed commissions as "another addition to 
bureaucracy."69 Outlook tended to look with favor on the use of 
commissions but thought the work could come under the Federal 
Trade Commission.7° The country, it declared, was not ready for 
the creation of the proposed commissions. Such a contention was 
probably correct after the example provided by the Walsh com­
mission. 
63 "Why $1,000,000?" The New York World, August 24, 1915, p. 8.
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More than any other periodical, the Survey contrasted the 
Manly report with that of Commons : 
What the Manly report most obviously lacks is,  first a phi­
losophy and second, a constructive plan of action. Both of these the 
Commons report has. Evidence of the first appears in those funda­
mental conceptions which are discussed in our summary of the 
report. Where the Manly report has no explanation of the conflict 
between capital and labor unless it be the wickedness of capital, and 
no plan except to get the capitalists on the run, the Commons re­
port sees in the struggle between capital and labor two factors of 
permanent opposition and progressive co-operation which can both 
be employed as forces for advance. Where the Manly report pre­
sents merely a partisan demand that labor be freed of all restraints 
and be permitted to organize at will to further its own interests, the 
Commons report holds that organization is essential in the interest 
of fundamental justice to all classes of society ... 
The time will come, however, when it will be recognized that 
in the conscientiously thoughtful proposals of Professor Commons
we have a program that is broad and constructive, the product 
of clear-sighted statesmanship.71 
The writer of the above words, John A. Fitch, was a student 
of Commons. As the correspondent of The Survey, he attended 
most of the hearings and reported on them.72 He knew most of 
the investigators Commons had hired. Perhaps no one else not con­
nected with the commission was as  familiar with  its work. 
Although he might be expected to be sympathetic with Commons, 
his reactions were typical of the others in the group of liberals 
who contributed to The Survey. On the editorial page, The Survey 
echoed Fitch's view as to Commons' contribution.73 
These liberals tended to accept Commons' proposed commis­
sion because it had been on the basis of his experience with the 
successful Wisconsin Industrial Commission that they had backed 
his nomination to the United States Commission on Industrial 
Relations. In his contribution to their symposium printed before 
the commission began its work, Commons stressed the need for 
"better organization and co-operation of all  state and federal 
agencies that deal with labor problems."' Consequently, his recom­
mendations were in line with what they might have anticipated. 
The same group of liberals rejected the Manly report as a partisan 
document. Although they tended to sympathize with labor when 
71 Fitch, The Survey, Vol. XXXV, pp. 401, 402.
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it was forced to play the role of the underdog, they could not 
condone the lack of objectivity in the report. 
On the other hand, the labor papers praised Walsh and the 
Manly report.75 They pictured Walsh as a fearless fighter who 
dared expose the misdeeds of the employers. Newspaper criticisms 
of him they construed as the reaction of the capitalistic press which 
was bent upon suppressing the facts. To prevent such suppression, 
the labor leaders warned their readers that they should urge their 
congressmen to authorize the printing of the commission's findings. 
Although their praise of Walsh and his findings were enthu­
siastic, the labor editors said very little concerning any of the rec­
ommendations of the commission. This is not surprising. They had 
had more time to digest and react to what happened during the 
hearings than they had had to analyze the numerous proposals 
contained in the various reports. For months they had been fol­
lowing the course of the hearings, but if they wished their com­
ments to be timely, they needed to express their opinions on the 
commission's report as soon as possible after its release. Further­
more, it  is doubtful that labor editors (or their union leaders) 
could have agreed in any numbers on the numerous and complex 
proposals in either the Manly or Commons report. However, it 
was easy for them to react enthusiastically to the partisan support 
on their behalf by Walsh. They could even rejoice that Commons, 
Mrs. Harriman, and the employers supported the principle of 
collective bargaining. 
Gomper's editorial was typical. He wrote, "The spirit of the 
report .  .  .  is representative of the fearless, direct investigations 
the commission made into industrial evils and injustices."76 He
quoted the Manly report on the subject of low wages and 
inequality of income. While he enumerated some of the proposals 
for redistribution of wealth and income, he did not comment on 
them. Instead, he quoted passages indicating that the commission 
supported the principle of collective bargaining. On this subject 
he quoted the Commons as well as the Manly report. Because 
the spirit of the report interested him more than the recommenda­
75 Gompers, "Industrial Relations Commission's Report," American Federationist, 
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tions, most of his comments centered on the Manly report. He 
promised to comment later on the details of the recommendations, 
but he never did. Even in his autobiography, he mentioned the 
"educational effect" of the commission's work while ignoring the 
recommendations.77 Obviously, he did not agree with many of 
them, but he was grateful for the commission's partisan support. 
The United Mine Workers, some of whose members had been 
killed in the Ludlow Massacre (which the commission investi­
gated) sided with the Manly report.78 While they praised Walsh 
and his recommendations, they criticized Commons. They feared 
that his advisory councils would smother the attempts of the 
workers for self help. Conceding that the Commons report was 
made in good faith, they asserted that because the authors were 
not of the working class, they could not be expected to understand 
the problems of the workers. 
The miners were not content merely to praise the Manly re­
port. According to Mrs. Harriman, they attempted to pressure 
her into signing it.79 "Mother" Jones, the fiery defender of the 
miners, pleaded with her by the hour. Commons, himself, found 
it distasteful to oppose the report backed by labor members." Two 
of the labor members, he said, did not take his dissent personally, 
but the third, A. B. Garretson, displayed his continuing dislike of 
Commons later by snubbing him whenever they met. 
Some labor leaders also gave their support to a committee 
formed for the purpose of furthering the recommendations of 
the Manly report.81 The committee hired Basil Manly to conduct 
a campaign in Washington to sell his report to influential people. 
Whatever influence he and his committee may have had, they 
failed to make much of an impression on Congress. 
Except for a wrangle over whether the reports and the record 
of testimony should be printed, Congress paid little attention to 
77 Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor, Vol. I, p. 448.
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either the findings or the recommendations of its commission. It 
ignored equally the Manly and the Commons reports. 
For its twenty-two months of work, the United States Com­
mission on Industrial Relations had nothing to show except its 
rejected reports and eleven volumes of reports, exhibits, and record 
of testimony. It could not agree on the basic underlying causes 
of industrial unrest. During its hearings, it uncovered and publi­
cized evidence of unrest. Yet when the commission's term expired, 
its reports did not bring the problems into focus. Because of the 
disagreements, these reports were written at the last possible 
minute and in considerable haste. The public was given the impres­
sion that there were as many reports as there were commissioners 
(if all the supplemental statements were counted). Furthermore, 
most of the staff reports were abandoned even though considerable 
sums had been spent on their preparations. All in all, the confusion 
in which it expired at the end of its term, merely underlined the 
fact that the commission was a failure. 
The effect on Commons 
The miserable failure by the commission did not alter Com­
mons' faith in his method of resolving conflicts through negotia­
tion and compromise. His success with the Wisconsin Industrial 
Commission prevented such a disillusionment. But he did recognize 
that one ingredient of his former success was lacking in this 
second experience.82 In Wisconsin he had convinced both sides 
that their respective welfare depended on accepting some one of 
the alternatives he offered them. He had managed to create the 
impression among those responsible for the negotiations that the 
reforms he proposed ultimately would be adopted with or without 
their co-operation. Consequently, they should concentrate their 
energies in trying to reach an acceptable compromise. If their 
opposition destroyed the basis for such a compromise, they would 
be narrowing the possibilities to two; one totally acceptable and 
one completely unacceptable. Because he made the latter appear 
the most probable to whichever side was hesitating, Commons suc­
ceeded in effecting compromises. 
Yet Commons' method could not work on the Commission on 
Industrial Relations except to a limited extent.83 Commons did not 
82 Commons, Myself, p. 179.
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have the same control over the situation. Instead of being the lead­
ing figure (as a chairman might be), he was merely one of the 
commissioners. Instead of spending all of his time on the job, he 
had to divide it between his university teaching and the commis­
sion work. 
Perhaps the most important difference between Commons' 
Wisconsin experience and the one on the federal commission was 
in the political situation. In Wisconsin he had strong political 
influences behind him, pushing toward reform legislation. The 
urgency of the situation almost compelled the various conflicting 
interests to work through him to achieve compromises. 
In contrast, the United States Commission on Industrial Re­
lations had almost no real political support behind it. Few ex­
pected that Congress would adopt any legislation because of it. 
Its role was the vague one of seeking the causes of unrest. The 
only urgency came from the dwindling of its allotted time. Except 
for the pride of individual commissioners in achieving a success­
ful conclusion to their work, there was no real necessity for 
compromise. Consequently, Commons' method did not apply. And 
the failure, although lamentable, was rather inconsequential. 
The failure did have a personal consequence for Commons. 
One of his investigators, Robert Hoxie, after being dropped by 
Walsh, came to Commons in distress. Commons described Hoxie 
as "in a nervous and incoherent state of mind."84 Yet the material 
he submitted to Commons was such that it was "the first really 
scientific study of scientific management, and it would be a serious 
misfortune if he did not publish as much of it as was already 
prepared."85 Commons promised to find a publisher for him, and 
after being encouraged, he "went home seemingly cheerful. "86 
Although the manuscript was not in the finished shape Hoxie 
wanted it to be, Commons urged him to publish it anyway. Ap­
parently, fearing criticism for publishing an imperfect book, but 
not feeling up to finishing it, Hoxie was in a dilemma.8' Shortly 
afterwards he committed suicide. 
Somehow Commons felt responsible for the tragedy. He said 
that it "burned" into his life." Despite Hoxie's death, he went 
84 commons, Myself, P.  179.
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ahead with plans to obtain a publisher for Hoxie's book on Scien­
tific Management.89 Then he aided Hoxie's wife in editing a large 
number of articles and unpublished manuscripts for another book, 
Trade Unionism in the United States." Both of these books be­
came classics in their fields. 
Commons did not escape the effects of tension either. In the 
spring of 1916 he suffered another of his nervous collapses, the 
first in ten years. To recuperate, he left Madison shortly before 
examination time for Lake Tenderfoot on the Wisconsin-Michigan 
border. There he spent a leisurely summer, followed by a long
visit at his sister's (Clara) home in Mt. Vernon, New York. 
Finally, in February, 1917, he returned to the university to resume 
teaching his classes. 
89 Hoxie, Scientific Management and Labor. 
00 Hoxie, Trade Unionism in the United States. PART III  COMMONS' 
THOUGHT JOHN R. COMMONS, 
STUDENT OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT 
JOHN R. COMMONS' influence on the thinking of students of the 
labor movement continues even in contemporary writing. While 
his works on general economics gather dust, his History of Labor 
remains a classic often quoted in its field.' No adequate substitute 
exists for its detailed coverage of the earlier years, so it is likely 
to remain an important history. Yet his influence on current think­
ing is due to much more than this one contribution. Commons 
wrote widely on the subject of labor and his works had wide cir­
culation. Although some of what he wrote is of historical impor­
tance only, his conceptions of the nature and origins of the labor 
movement have relevance today. 
His ideas on the labor movement are imbedded in the body of 
thought of what is often called the "Wisconsin School." This 
school includes Commons and a number of his students who spe­
cialized in labor economics.2 Not only did this group trace the ori­
gins of the American labor movement, but the members developed 
theories explaining the behavior of unions. In general, their theo­
ries painted the unions as organizations compatible with the capi­
1 Commons, History of Labor.
2 Selig Perlman, John B. Andrews, Don Lescohier, Ira Cross, Edwin Witte, Eliza­
beth Brandeis, Frank Carlton, David Saposs, Russell Bauder, Philip Taft, and Milton 
Derber. 
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talistic system. Unions with revolutionary aims were pictured as 
deviations from the normal. Working people, according to the 
"Wisconsin School," are more interested in immediate gains than 
in revolutions. Although radical "intellectuals" have at times se­
duced the rank and file, they have not been able to prevail perm­
anently over the workers' natural conservatism. 
Commons and his students were among the earliest scholarly 
observers of the American labor movement. They reported their 
observations accurately and convincingly. Because of the slow pace 
of change in the labor movement, their facts on the behavior of 
unions still are generally accepted. What have been challenged 
often, then and to this day, are their theories as to why unions be­
have as they do. Both the widespread acceptance of their theories, 
and the continuing challenges, demonstrated the degree of influ­
ence the "Wisconsin School" has enjoyed.3 
This founding of a continuing school of thought climaxed a 
successful career as a labor economist for Commons. It is fortu­
nate he turned to the subject of labor. Until he focused his attention 
on this subject, his scholarly efforts were unsuccessful. Further­
more, his constant dabbling into unpopular reforms had kept him 
in trouble. The study of labor enabled him to combine his zeal for 
reform, his ability to stimulate students, and his capacity for hard 
work in such a way that he became one of America's outstanding 
labor economists. 
Commons' background and experiences shaped his views 
Commons' theories and analysis always drew heavily from 
his experiences and contacts. In his day there was perhaps no way 
to become an authority on labor problems other than by studying 
them directly. There was no substantial amount of authoritative 
material written on such subjects. He and his students pioneered 
the digging up of facts from the past, and his conceptions grew 
out of his experiences. 
Although most of his firsthand knowledge of labor unions 
came from his contacts with labor leaders while attempting to solve 
labor problems, Commons did have a limited amount of experience 
as a union member. During his college days, he spent four sum­
mers as a compositor in Cleveland. Because the shop where he 
worked was a union shop, while the one across the street where his 
brother worked was not, he had an opportunity to compare con­
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ditions. In general, there was no great difference. Both shops had 
the same piece rates and the same working hours. What was differ­
ent was the method of distributing the easier and more lucrative 
type of work. In the nonunion shop the foreman gave such work 
to his favorites. In the shop where Commons worked the workers 
were permitted to bid for it, and on the process, earnings were 
equalized and the possibilities of discrimination minimized. Such 
differences in particular practices between union and nonunion 
printing shops may not have been typical, but to Commons they 
were significant. He valued his experience highly and in 1891 ac­
cepted an honorary membership in Typographical Union Local No. 
53 of Cleveland, Ohio.4 
More important than any direct experience as a worker were 
his contacts with labor leaders. In 1897 and 1898 the Federation­
ist published a series of articles written by Commons, entitled, "A 
Comparison of Day Labor and Contract System on Municipal 
Works."5 In view of the number of articles, the contact between 
Commons and the Federationist editor bust have been extensive. 
At least Gompers specifically mentioned in his autobiography that 
he knew Commons dating from this contact. They met on other oc­
casions later when Commons was working for the National Civic 
Federation, and when he was a member of the United States Com­
mission on Industrial Relations. 
Commons greatly admired Gompers. In the Gompers obituary 
he wrote, Commons declared, "Samuel Gompers was, in my opin­
ion, one of the ten or twelve great Americans." He went on to 
claim, "It is now twenty-seven years ago that I became personally 
acquainted with Gompers, and I have counted myself since among 
his f ollowers."6 
Just how far Commons meant to go in this last statement is 
subject to conjecture, but Commons' views on the labor movement 
closely paralleled those of Gompers. Even their methods of think­
ing displayed similarities. Yet the extent to which Commons was 
influenced by Gompers is impossible to know. He may have found 
in Gompers a labor leader who thought as Commons thought a 
labor leader should think, or Gompers may have been the direct 
source of his ideas. Gompers was the first prominent labor leader 
Commons knew. In any event, the similarity of thinking is striking. 
4 Commons, Myself, p.  19. 
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Gompers was described as "more intuitive than intellectual, 
more motor than reflective."7 Even Commons conceded that, "His 
mind seemed to be rather slow in action rather ponderous and 
heavy  .  .  ." Yet Commons claimed that Gompers "  .  .  .  thought 
in terms of experiment," with particular attention to facts and 
their applications.s 
Although Gompers perhaps was incapable of sustained analy­
sis, he had developed intuitions based on experience. To Commons, 
the pragmatist, Gompers' type of thinking was not inferior to that 
of glib-tongued theorists who commanded superior logic. Rather, 
he could be expected to believe it led to insights necessary for un­
derstanding the labor movement. He argued that Gompers, the em­
piricist, "knew that life and the experiences of life outran logic. "0 
Both Commons and Gompers viewed "intellectuals" in the 
trade union movement with suspicion. Each pointed to labor move­
ment difficulties caused by such individuals. Often intellectuals led 
the unions into the labyrinth of politics. Such futile expenditure of 
energies often led to neglect of the important function of unions 
improvement of wages and working conditions. Workers have 
tended to prefer immediate gains rather than wait for ultimate re­
sults from political efforts. Intellectuals often misjudge the psy­
chology of the worker and at times are amazed when he fails to 
share their enthusiasms. Sometimes this failure to understand the 
worker has contributed to failure in organizing and holding mem­
bers in unions, especially during crucial times. When intellectuals 
went so far as to make stable collective bargaining difficult or even 
impossible, they were particularly dangerous to the labor movement. 
Commons and Gompers especially disagreed with radical "in­
tellectuals" who believed members of the labor movement should 
work towards overthrowing the capitalistic system. It made little 
difference to the two of them whether the radicals proposed de­
stroying capitalism by violent revolutions or peacefully by radical 
legislation. Accepting capitalism, they opposed radical changes. In 
fact, they both feared rapid changes of any sort. They believed in a 
step-by-step evolutionary process that would avoid a host of un­
foreseeable troubles. When each step of progress becomes rooted 
in successful experience, the basis for the next step would be 
created. 
7 Harvey, p. 213.
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In promoting progress, the two men stressed the importance 
of forging institutions based on voluntary agreements. In  Gom­
pers' words : 
To my mind only development based on voluntary institutions holds 
promise of permanent progress, for such development is responsive 
to developing technology and cultural advance of individuals and 
group activity.10 
The American Federation of Labor under Gompers remained 
a voluntary institution. Lacking centralized control, Gompers used 
moral power to direct the efforts of his union to organize labor. 
In spite of serious jurisdictional conflicts, he relied on voluntary 
compromises in trying to hold his organization together. 
Gompers also believed that capital and labor had no basic con­
flicts that could not be resolved with voluntary agreements. Such 
collective bargaining, he claimed, rendered governmental interven­
tion unnecessary.n He completely rejected compulsory arbitration 
and instead insisted that the role of government should be neutral 
in labor disputes. 
Although Gompers did not expect labor to be neutral in poli­
tics, he was reluctant to commit the A. F. of L. to any political 
party. He was willing to use his influence to defeat known foes of 
labor or to elect friends. Yet he tended to minimize union involve­
ment in politics. Because he believed that few gains for labor could 
be obtained by legislation, he was content when government main­
tained a laissez-faire policy toward unions. Then they would be 
free to win their gains through economic pressure on employers. 
To a large extent, Commons shared Gompers' view as to the 
relation of unions and the government. He felt that unions should 
be wary of too much political action. Yet he was quite willing to 
utilize government to insure the welfare of the workers. In social 
legislation he was willing to go much further than Gompers. How­
ever, he agreed with Gompers that the government should not in­
terfere with the bargaining between labor and capital. Like Gom­
pers, he held the belief that workable compromises can be achieved 
through negotiations. 
How many of his ideas on labor Commons borrowed from 
Gompers is impossible to know. In addition to studying the history 
10 Gompers, p. 24.
11 In a few cases which he apparently saw as special cases, he advanced legislation
to protect workers' rights. For example, he urged the passage of LaFollette's Seamen's 
Act of 1915, and he backed the miners in their efforts to obtain legislation requiring ade­
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of the labor movement, which he believed confirmed such views, 
Commons could have derived some of his views from his experi­
ences with some of the other labor leaders.12 In his autobiography 
and elsewhere, he described such experiences much more minutely 
than he did those he shared with Gompers. 
After Commons was dismissed by the University of Syra­
cuse, his work for the next five years caused him to meet many of 
the leaders of the American labor movement. The first position 
was with the Industrial Commission appointed by President Mc­
Kinley; his job was to finish a report on immigration. In making 
his investigations before writing the report, he met members of 
both organized and unorganized labor. 
During his investigation he became acquainted with Abraham 
Bisno, who, he claimed, introduced to him the ideas of Karl Marx 
and also added to his knowledge of labor unionism. His sessions 
with Bisno constituted a daily seminar for six months. Bisno, an 
immigrant, had escaped at the age of twelve with his family from 
the pogroms of Kiev, Russia. With very little schooling, he was 
brought up in the sweatshops of the American clothing industry. 
Working in these shops, he developed a philosophy Commons de­
scribed as an American form of syndicalism. During busy seasons 
in the clothing industry Bisno worked in the sweatshops while 
organizing workers so they could obtain higher piece rates. As 
soon as the busy season was over he was the first to be laid off. 
His organization would collapse, and he spent the dull season as a 
real estate agent. With such a background, he was a stimulating as 
well as useful assistant. 
In addition to using it to make his report for the Industrial 
Commission, Commons used his material to write a series of arti­
cles entitled, "Racial Composition of the American People," pub­
lished during 1903 and 1904 in the Chautauguan.13 Later, in 1907, 
he again used it for a hook, Races and Immigrants in America.14 
He consistently campaigned for restrictions on immigration until 
they finally were provided. He maintained that unlimited immigra­
tions resulted in accentuating the business cycle by permitting em­
ployers to overexpand by using cheap labor. In the meantime, high 
tariffs would prevent imported goods from providing a check on 
rising domestic prices. With wages held low by the competition 
12 Commons, Myself, p. 69. 
13 Commons, Vol. XXXVIII, pp. 33-42, 118-125, 223-34, 333-40; Vol. XXXVIII, 
pp. 433-43, 533-43; Vol. XXXIX, pp. 13-22, 115-24, 217-25. 
14 Commons, Races and Immigrants in America. John R. Commons, Student of the Labor Movement  169 
of immigrant labor, price increases widened profit margins, provid­
ing irrestible incentives for business men to expand their opera­
tions. Yet lagging purchasing power foredoomed the expansion. 
Commons' study of problems resulting from unlimited immi­
gration also caused him to meet union leaders. During this study 
he visited about half of the national trade union headquarters and 
became acquainted with most of the prominent union leaders." 
When he visited the bituminous coal miners he was greatly 
impressed by their methods of collective bargaining. For about a 
week he observed the national joint conference of mine workers 
and their employers. He said that on one side of a great hall were 
nearly a thousand elected delegates from local unions. On the 
other side were seventy employers who owned coal mines. Such an 
arrangement reminded Commons of the British Parliament with a 
House of Commons and a House of Lords. He recognized it also 
as a variation on his own idea of representation of interests. The 
collective bargaining procedure required no third party. Yet this 
voluntary organization of representatives from conflicting inter­
ests could solve their mutual problems by creating working rules. 
In his enthusiasm, Commons wrote an article which he named, 
"Constitutional Government in Industry." However, the editor of 
the Review of Reviews, in which it was published, changed the 
name to "A New Way of Settling Labor Disputes."" Later Com­
mons drew on this experience in the formulation of advisory 
boards for the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin. 
While he was getting acquainted with labor leaders and their 
problems, he also came across a book that stimulated his thinking. 
For reading on the train between visits, he took a copy of the 
Webbs' Industrial Democracy." He was particularly impressed 
with their analysis of the "Common Rule" and "working rules." 
These concepts he further developed and combined under the riame 
of the "Working Rules" of collective action, by which workers 
protect themselves against competitive menaces." 
When Commons completed his work with the Industrial Com­
mission, he took a position as a conciliator with the newly formed 
National Civic Federation. As a member of this organization, Com­
mons shared in some very important developments affecting the 
15 Commons, Myself, p .71.
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labor movement. The National Civic Federation had been organ­
ized in 1900 when the Chicago Civic Federation was moved to 
New York for the purpose of increasing its scope to cover the 
nation. At that time the federation selected influential Senator 
Marcus A. Hanna of Ohio as its president. Besides being a lead­
ing politician of his day, Hanna, a powerful business leader, oper­
ated coal mines, shipping concerns, docks, and public utilities. 
Labor leaders respected and trusted him because he had dealt with 
them fairly.19 Unlike many business men of his day, he believed in 
collective bargaining. Consequently, in view of his reputation 
among business men, labor leaders, and politicians, he was an ideal 
choice to head the federation. 
Perhaps the most important part of the federation was the 
Division of Conciliation and Mediation. Its membership included 
representation from employer groups, labor leaders, and dis­
tinguished citizens to represent the public. On the roster for the 
division were ex-President Grover Cleveland, Charles Francis 
Adams, Charles W. Eliot, Archbishop Ireland, Marcus Hanna, 
Charles M. Schwab, Theodore Shaffer, Daniel J. Keefe, James 
O'Connell, James M. Lynch, John Mitchell, Samuel Gompers, 
Ralph Easley, and a number of others. 
In a day when labor unions were considered not quite respect­
able, such an organization was unusual, indeed. Respected political, 
educational,  religious, and industrial  leaders co-operated with 
labor's top leadership to channel industrial disputes into peaceful 
collective bargaining. Yet both industrialists and union leaders 
found their participation hotly opposed by other members of their 
own sides. The National Association of Manufacturers' "open 
shop" movement was in sharp contradiction with the federation's 
objectives. At the same time, the participating labor leaders found 
some of their members accusing them of selling out to the employ­
ers. Socialists, in particular, attacked Samuel Gompers, who served 
as the National Civic Federation's vice president. They accused 
him of being "chloroformed by the capitalists."20 
When Commons accepted the offer made by its executive sec­
retary, Ralph Easley, of a position with the National Civic Feder­
ation, he joined a novel experiment in industrial relations. As Eas­
ley's assistant, he arrived just in time to participate in one of 
labor's most historically important struggles. In 1902 a strike in 
the anthracite coal fields attracted national attention and resulted 
19 Gompers, Vol. II, p. 106.
 
20 Gompers, Vol. I, p. 400.
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in what Gompers called "the most important single incident in the 
labor movement in the United States."' 
Leading up to this strike, the United Mine Workers had 
staged an organizing campaign pointing out the miserable condi­
tions among the miners. While such conditions might be expected 
to create public sympathy for the miners, the mine operators 
counter-propaganda only tended to increase that sympathy. Not 
only were the operators uncompromising at a time when the public 
was concerned about its coal supply, but also some of their state­
ments were tactless. George Baer, who was president of the Phil­
adelphia and Reading Railroad, which controlled some of the 
mines, made the classic remark, "The welfare of the working men 
would be cared for, not by the agitators but by the Christian men 
to whom God, in his infinite wisdom, had entrusted the property 
interest of the country."" 
To prevent this strike the National Civic Federation offered 
its services. Commons' role was that of meeting the miners' lead­
ers and interpreting their side to the federation, while Ralph Eas­
ley, the executive secretary, Senator Hanna, and others tried to 
reason with the operators. On May 12, 1902, the mine workers 
left their jobs and remained on strike until October 23, 1902. In 
the meantime, while the operators refused to deal with the strikers, 
the reserves of anthracite coal dwindled. By the beginning of the 
winter season the per ton price of coal had risen from six to 
twenty dollars. With colder weather approaching, the public be­
came concerned over its fuel supply for the winter. At that time 
coal was the chief fuel for heating homes. 
On October 3 President Roosevelt summoned both sides to a 
White House conference, where he urged arbitration. Although 
the miners agreed, the operators refused to compromise, and at 
the same time, insisted that they could resume production if they 
were given adequate protection. Yet when the governor of the 
state of Pennsylvania provided additional troops, the operators 
were unable to increase production significantly. Meanwhile, pub­
lic anxiety mounted until on October 9 the mayors from 139 cities 
met in Detroit to discuss the problem. Feeling reached such a pitch 
that the mayors went on record in favor of governmental control 
of the anthracite coal mines. President Roosevelt did not go that 
far, but he continued to search for a solution. Finally, with the aid 
of J. P. Morgan, he got the operators to agree to arbitration by a 
21 /bid., Vol. II, p. 126.
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commission appointed by the President, provided that no labor 
leader or former labor leaders would be included. The union agreed 
and the men went back to work in the mines on October 23, 1902. 
Although President Roosevelt did not appoint a labor leader 
to be on the commission, he did appoint an ex-labor leader by call­
ing him a "sociologist." This was commissioner Edgar E. Clark 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Formerly, Clark had 
headed the Railroad Conductors Brotherhood. 
The Anthracite Commission held hearings for several months 
and received testimony from hundreds of witnesses. When the 
commission issued its report on March 18, 1903, it awarded the 
miners a ten percent wage increase, provided for check weighmen 
to safeguard miners' interests, and created a board of conciliation 
to adjudicate all disputes. However, it did not require the opera­
tors to recognize the union. 
Yet the victory was a significant one for the workers. They 
had held out for five months until governmental pressure forced 
the operators to compromise. Although the public was deprived of 
the coal used in heating homes, it remained sympathetic with the 
miners who were struggling against what they had characterized as 
"uncompromising monopolists." 
During this strike, Commons spent five months with John 
Mitchell, president of the coal miners. Mitchell was a labor leader 
who sensed the value of maintaining satisfactory public relations 
in an industry whose product was essential to the general public. 
By cautious and careful strategy he was able to base labor's cause 
on the principles of "fair play," which were sure to win public 
support. Although demanding justice, his reasonableness won the 
sympathy and support of members of the clergy and other influen­
tial men. He at least won Commons' sympathy during the negotia­
tions carried under the National Civic Federation. To Commons he 
appeared to be the ideal kind of labor leadera skillful negotiator, 
a powerful leader, and possessor of the psychology of the rank and 
file from which he had risen. 
Not all the labor leaders Commons met were like Mitchell. 
Some he described as "intellectuals" who had not arisen from the 
ranks. One such man Commons met in 1901, during the strike 
against the United States Steel Corporation.23 He was T. J. Shaf­
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fer, president of the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and 
Tin Workers. In Commons' opinion, Shaffer was responsible for 
the failure of that strike, which nearly destroyed the union. 
The situation was a critical one for the union and it sorely 
needed better leadership. In 1901 it was faced with the problem of 
how to deal with the newly formed United States Steel Corpora­
tion. In the process of its creation the corporation combined union 
and nonunion companies into one big organization. Yet the offi­
cials did not want the power of the unions to be extended to any 
of its companies not yet unionized. 
On the other hand, union leaders feared that the presence of 
nonunion firms within the same organization would be dangerous 
to the union. They had experienced the shifting of production by 
some companies to their nonunion plants, while using harassing 
tactics to drive unionism out of all their plants. 
In the inevitable struggle that took place the union had a few 
advantages. The most important was that because the steel com­
pany was newly formed, many of its securities remained in the 
hands of the underwriting companies. Furthermore, the possibility 
that it might be charged as a monopoly made its officials reluctant 
to become involved in an unpopular strike. 
Although the time was opportune for such a strike, the union 
was in no condition to carry it out. Ten years before, the strike at 
Homestead had nearly decimated its ranks, and it had never been 
able to regain its lost members. An even greater disadvantage was 
that it lacked proper organization and leadership. Its president, 
Shaffer, was a poor negotiator to whom the "Civic Federation of 
`Capitalists' was anathema  .  .  ."24 He lead his union into "the 
strike without funds, or organization, or negotiational leadership, 
or attempts toward a trade agreement."25 
Not even Samuel Gompers nor John Mitchell could reason 
with Shaffer. Commons described him as an "intellectual" and "an 
unsuccessful or dismissed minister, who entered by a side door, as 
it were, into the union."26 Because of this man's incompetent lead­
ership, the corporation succeeded in both crushing the strike and 
in suppressing unionism among the steel workers for many years. 
Commons concluded from this experience that the "intellec­
tual" misunderstands the desires of laborers. What workers want 
24 Commons, Myself, p. 87.
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are bread and butter, here and now. Changes in the economic sys­
tem as envisioned by the "intellectuals" have no reality for the 
worker. Better wages, shorter hours, and better working condi­
tions are goals the common man can understand. Because he has 
been one himself, the union official who has risen from the ranks 
realizes what the workers want and how many sacrifices they are 
willing to make. Such an official feels the same anxiety as to risks 
that the workers do, because if he is beaten he cannot turn to some 
other line of work. Furthermore, he knows that the desires of re­
formers are not always compatible with the immediate objectives 
of the workers. Consequently, union leaders such as Gompers and 
Mitchell, who have been workers themselves, favor what is called 
"business unionism," which is essentially the concentration on im­
mediate objectives of workers. These and other experiences while 
working for the National Civic Federation gave Commons a pic­
ture of sharp contrasts between "wage conscious" union leaders 
and those "intellectuals" with ideologies to sell. 
Commons' experiences during this five years produced a burst 
of writing. Although he had written a few articles on labor before, 
he now began what was an impressively long list of books and ar­
ticles on the subject. At first many were short unsigned editorials 
written for the Independent, but his contributions to scholarly 
journals also were impressive. 
Commons' history of labor 
In 1904 Commons' former teacher, Richard T. Ely, obtained 
for him a position at the University of Wisconsin. In addition to 
teaching, Commons was to write a history of labor. Up to this 
time, labor history had been a comparatively untouched field.27 In 
1886 Richard T. Ely had published his book, Labor Movement in 
America, which was intended to be a preliminary to a larger and 
more comprehensive work. To this end he had collected a consid­
erable amount of materials and notes. His collection included a 
large number of rare documents he had obtained at considerable 
expense. After bringing Commons to Wisconsin to work on the 
labor history, Ely finally turned the entire project over to him. 
Another beginning of a labor history came into Commons' 
care when Colonel Carroll D. Wright, commissioner of the Bureau 
of Labor, died. Colonel Wright had been working on a history of 
labor for the Department of Economics and Sociology of the Car­
negie Institute of Washington. His contribution on labor was to be 
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the fourth in a contemplated series under the title, Contributions to 
American Economic History. By the time of his death he had ob­
tained a considerable amount of monographic and documentary 
material he intended to use in his history. To carry on the work of 
Wright, the Carnegie Institute turned to Commons. 
In addition to the materials to which he fell heir, Commons 
and his students scoured the libraries of the nation for more. To 
five hundred libraries they sent printed finding lists containing a 
list of one hundred and sixty labor papers and papers sympathetic 
to labor, published before 1872. For three years Commons spent 
one semester in Madison and eight months traveling with some of 
his graduate students to libraries for research. The documentary 
material he and his associates published in an eleven-volume work, 
A Documentary History of American Industrial Society.28 They 
published the history itself in the History of Labor in the United 
States. Except for the introduction which he signed himself, Com­
mons gave credit for each part of the history to the student work­
ing on it. However, the history is not just a book of readings. 
Rather, it is a co-ordinated work done under Commons' careful 
direction. The task was so large that the first two volumes were not 
completed until 1918. Finally, in 1935, Commons' students finished 
two more volumes. 
The History of Labor in the United States is the pioneer 
classic in American labor history. With the Documentary History, 
it brought together fragmentary sources to provide labor historians 
with a basis on which to build their subsequent histories. Along 
with his many other writings on labor and his teaching of labor 
courses at the University of Wisconsin, Commons' History of 
Labor established him as an authority in the field. 
Recognition came first in the form of glowing reviews for the 
two works. Ernest Bogart, the economic historian, in reviewing 
the Documentary History, declared: 
Now that the series have been completed, and it  is possible 
to estimate the work as a whole, only the highest praise can be 
given the editors for the scholarly and able fashion in which they 
have performed their task ;  criticism of minor features must give 
way at this point. The result is a noteworthy collection of the most 
valuable documents, which fully justifies the large expenditure of 
time and money involved in their publication ; many of these must 
soon have been completely lost but for their timely rescue and 
preservation in this form by Professor Commons and his coeditors.29 
28 Commons and associates, A Documentary History of American Industrial Society. 
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Reviewers also hailed the History of Labor as an important 
achievement. George Barnett of Johns Hopkins University testi­
fied that : 
The work is more, however, than merely the best available 
account of the events in the history of the labor movement. Careful 
attention has been paid throughout to the general economic back­
ground and to the labor philosophy of each period.30 
In addition to his praise, Barnett suggested that an additional 
volume on the theory of the labor movement be written. While also 
making this suggestion, Ira Cross claimed, "This study is unques­
tionably the greatest contribution thus far made to our literature 
dealing with the field of labor in the United States."31 Frank Carl-
ton, also the writer of a history of labor, indicated both Commons' 
stature and the importance of this contribution when he said : 
This first fairly complete and authoritative history of Ameri­
can labor movements is the result of the combined efforts of the 
best-known student of the American labor history and his students 
from the time he went to the University of Wisconsin in 1904 to the 
date of publication  .  .  .  Over thirty investigators having access
to the collected materials have written monographs and articles 
which have been used in connection with the two volumes under 
consideration.32 
Commons' History was not the first important history of 
labor ; Ely's work had that honor.33 A year after Ely published his 
book, George McNeil, a labor leader, edited (in 1887) a book 
studying a number of phases of labor history.34 Later (in 1911) 
Frank Carlton completed his History and Problems of the Labor 
Movement.35 All of these books added to the knowledge of labor 
history, but none were as complete as the Commons book. 
By gathering a great mass of heretofore unaccessible ma­
terial, Commons and his students were able to assemble the first 
complete labor history. Especially for the early years, it is the rich­
est single source of information. 
VOW The development of the labor movement 
Commons and his students intended to do more than provide 
a chronicle of events. They intended to explain the origins and 
30 Barnett, "Review," p. 340.
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course of the development of the labor movement. In doing so, 
they found themselves studying the problem of economic devel­
opment. 
Because of Ely's influence, Commons held the German histori­
cal school of economists in high respect. Possessing a reading 
knowledge of German, he naturally explored their works before 
formulating any theory of his own. In reading some of the writ­
ings of Karl Biicher, Gustav Schmoller, and Werner Sombart, he 
ran across the concept of economic evolution propelled by exten­
sion of markets. He thought their data on European economic his­
tory prevented them from developing the idea as completely as 
they might have. Certain considerations, he said, "obliterated or 
confused the economic facts."36 In America, to the contrary, the 
absence of feudalism, militarism, ecclesiastical and guild regulations 
and restrictions allowed economic development to unfold in a man­
ner much easier to trace. 
Commons adopted the principle of extension of the markets 
to explain economic development. He then explant, unionism as a 
reaction of workers against their relations with their employers. 
Because the relationships changed with the extension of markets 
over wider areas, the nature of the reaction changed over the years. 
These changes, he said, explain the development of the labor 
movement. 
The heart of his explanation is that unions are formed among 
workers for the purpose of protecting themselves against menacing 
competition. They are engaged in a class struggle with their em­
ployers but not in the sense used by Karl Marx. They do struggle 
with their employers, but not necessarily to overthrow capitalism. 
Instead, they strive to preserve or enhance their own status in the 
existing capitalistic society. 
The early unions ;rose when some new development threat­
ened the security of th.- workers. When extending markets brought 
workers new sources of competition, they united to protect them­
selves. There was nothing sinister or subversive about such action. 
It was merely what might be expected of any group of people fac­
ing the same problems. 
Commons found that the application of the principle of the 
influence of extending markets easier to demonstrate in the case of 
single unions than for the entire labor movement. Long before he 
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published the History, he illustrated his thesis by writing an arti­
cle on "The American Shoemakers,  1648-1895." In this work he 
traced the growth of unions in the shoe industry from the time 
itinerant workers went to customers' homes to make boots, until 
finally shoes were mass-produced in factories." 
Organizations among shoemakers began soon after they 
started to make shoes in their own shops. At that time they faced 
the competitive menace from shoemakers who produced inferior 
products. Consequently, to control the quality of work done, the 
better workmen set up craft guilds with the power to discipline 
their members. Although very few guilds were established in 
America, the shoemakers of Boston had such an organization in 
1648. 
Soon the American shoemakers entered the stage when part 
of their work was for stock in addition to custom work for specific 
customers. At this time the master shoemaker might have a jour­
neyman or two working for him, but no real conflict existed be­
tween employers and employees. The relationship remained a very 
personal one with both master and workman working side by side. 
In this retail stage the serious competitive menace came from those 
retailers who advertised or did cheap work for auctions or public 
markets. To combat this menace the masters organized the equiv­
alent of a retail merchants' association. An example of this kind of 
organization in Philadelphia was called the "Society of Master 
Cordwainers." 
When waterways made the transportation of goods easier, the 
markets expanded beyond the boundaries of the local community. 
Some of the master shoemakers began taking wholesale orders 
from retailers in distant cities. It was in this stage that the con­
flict between masters and the journeymen began. Facing competi­
tion from producers in other communities, masters found it neces­
sary to compete on the basis of keeping wages down. Such action 
brought into existence protective organizations for journeymen. 
Temporarily, such organizations transferred the weight of bar­
gaining power from employer to employees. However, when em­
ployers found themselves at a disadvantage in bargaining, they 
transformed their own retail merchants' associations into employ­
ers' associations. Without such organizations, an employer who 
had a wholesale contract to make a large number of shoes might 
find the profits squeezed between the contract price and the in­
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creased costs from the journeymen's demands. Yet a strike could 
cause disastrous losses for him. Consequently, he used his organi­
zations, the courts, and anything else at his disposal to win over 
the journeymen's organizations. Thus, both types of organizaitons, 
those for employers and those for the journeymen, resulted from 
the extension of markets. 
In time wholesalers developed their business to a stage Com­
mons called "wholesale speculative." Instead of merely producing 
for orders, the wholesaler accumulated stocks of merchandise to 
fill orders later when they might be received. Rather than make 
shoes themselves, the wholesalers bought shoes on contract from 
master shoemakers. Now the merchant function was separated 
at the wholesale level from either producing or retailing merchan­
dise. The retailer, instead of making his own shoes, began to buy 
all he sold from the wholesaler, who in turn had bought them from 
the manufacturer. 
When the wholesaler accumulated inventories by buying wher­
ever he could buy cheapest, shoemakers were faced with competi­
tion from shoes produced either in prisons or in sweatshops. Com­
petition reduced the master shoemaker to little more than an em­
ployer of journeymen. His ability to take profits was concentrated 
in the possibilities of keeping down costs. Because in this age (be­
fore the introduction of complicated and expensive machinery) the 
chief cost was labor, shoemakers were forced to keep wages down 
and to work their workers as much as possible. Today their sim­
ple factories would be called "sweatshops." 
In this wholesale speculative stage, the antagonism between 
employer and employee was increased. Employees continued to 
rely on their journeymen's associations as employers did on their 
organizations, but both groups became increasingly dependent on a 
growing merchant class that controlled both sources of materials 
and the distribution of finished shoes to consumers. It was during 
this stage that associationism became an important goal in America. 
Working men dreamed of co-operative warehouses and co­
operative purchases of raw materials. They aimed at freeing them­
selves from the merchant capitalism so they could be independent 
producers. 
The introduction of machinery into the shoe industry, such as 
the pegging machine in 1857 and the McKay sewing machine in 
1862, coincided with the broader extension of the market brought 
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factory be a simple sweatshop without machinery. As factories 
grew in size owners began to see possibilities of freeing themselves 
from the domination of the wholesaler. Larger manufacturers 
began to sell directly to retailers. Instead of depending on orders 
from wholesalers, they developed sales forces of their own to build 
markets. In some cases they even bought their own retail stores. 
To further increase their independence, some manufacturers also 
acquired facilities for producing their own raw materials. 
Not all the development of integrated firms came from ex­
pansion by manufacturers. In many cases wholesalers possessing 
adequate capital could buy factories more easily than the manufac­
turer could build up new marketing organizations. At first the 
older type wholesaler retained his dominance, but as time wore on 
the new integrated manufacturing firms gained dominance regard­
less of from which source they had developed. 
Commons called the earlier part of this stage before the man­
ufacturer gained dominance, the wholesale speculative stage. By 
then, rails extended markets to the nation's borders. To protect 
themselves from nationwide competition,  it was necessary for 
unions to organize on a nationwide scale. The shoemakers accom­
plished this organization with a national union they called the 
Knights of St. Crispin. But as this wholesale speculative stage de­
veloped, the competitive menace from introduction of machinery 
overwhelmed the Knights. Green hands using new machinery dis­
placed skilled journeymen shoemakers. Eventually, such competi­
tion eliminated the Knights from the shoe industry. 
In this stage, which Commons called the factory order stage, 
the workers turned to the industrial type of unionism. Instead of 
excluding the semiskilled or unskilled workers as competitors, they 
were brought into the union. They called their organization the 
Boot and Shoe Workers' Union. Commons ends his article about 
the shoemakers by describing this union. 
In his Institutional Economics he continued his analysis of the 
development of capitalism.38 He added one more stage :  banker 
capitalism. Again he illustrated this development with the shoe­
makers' case. For shoe manufacturing, banker capitalism meant 
the regulation of the industry by control of the necessary machin­
ery. The United Shoe Machinery Company owned the basic pat­
ents on crucial machinery. It would not sell this machinery ; instead 
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it rented machines on condition that the renter use only those be­
longing to the United Shoe Machinery Company. Hence, all com­
panies that made shoes were forced to meet the machinery com­
pany's terms. 
The shoe manufacturing industry remained competitive. Even 
small firms could obtain the necessary machinery through leases. 
Capital requirements therefore were low and plants could be moved 
easily to new locations. Consequently, this possibility of employers 
moving away from union territory was a constant threat to unions. 
Therefore, although the industry in the earlier stages was highly 
unionized, unions lost much of their power and membership in 
this last period. 
Problems resulting from the lease of machinery was not com­
mon in other industries. But with the development of multiplant 
manufacturing firms, an analogous threat developed. Firms could 
shift production from unionized plants to those not yet under 
union control. They also had other means of defeating unions. As 
Commons reported: 
.  .  .  the unions have practically disappeared from the trusts, and 
are disappearing from the large corporations as they grow large 
enough to specialize minutely their labor. The organized workmen 
are found in the small establishments like the building trades, or 
in the fringe of independents on the skirts of the trusts ; on the 
railways, where skill and responsibility are not yet displaced by 
division of labor ;  in the mines where strikebreakers cannot be 
shipped in; on the docks and in other places where they hold a 
strategic position.39 
.  .  .  especially after employers have consolidated in great corpora­
tions and trusts, their capacity for united action exceeds that of
organized labor. Their tactics are directed, not so much toward 
winning of strikes as toward preventing strikes and disintegrating 
unions. By wise promotions, by watchful detectives, by prompt dis­
charge of agitators, by an all round increase of wages when agita­
tion is active on the outside, by a reduction only when the menace 
has passed or when work is slack, by shutting down a plant where 
unionism is taking root and throwing orders to other plants, by estab­
lishing the so-called "open shop," these and other masterful strate­
gems set up a problem different from what unionism has heretofore 
met. It does not seem possible under such conditions that organiza­
tion will get a footing in the great consolidated industries.4° 
Writing these words in 1906, Commons could not foresee that 
the mass-production industries eventually would be unionized with 
the help of legislation. His words give the impression that he was 
39 Commons, Labor and Administration, p. 75.
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very pessimistic over the development of the labor movement. 
However, he actually never was a pessimist. Writing in his Insti­
tutional Economics in 1934, he maintained that although the Amer­
ican trade unionists included only fifteen percent of the wage earn­
ers, they were more powerful than their European counterparts 
who made up sixty to seventy percent of their wage force.41 He 
claimed that "big business" was attempting to forestall unionism 
by voluntarily giving their employees all the advantages that 
might be gained by joining unions. He observed that pay often was 
higher and working conditions often were better in these mass-
production industries than in those that were unionized. By merely 
existing as a threat to potentially selfish businessmen, unions could 
serve their function. Consequently, he was optimistic over the con­
tinuing influences of unions, even if he doubted that they could 
grow much larger. 
Applying the formula 
Commons provided a preview of his theme for his History of 
Labor in his article on the shoemakers, which he published in 1909. 
His reading about other theories of economic development, his ex­
perience with labor leaders, and his survey of historical material 
convinced him that he should stress the consequences of expanding 
markets. By the time he had formulated his theory by testing it 
with an analysis of the shoemakers, he had much of his material on 
the labor movement available. In the following year he and his stu­
dents published much of this data in the Documentary History of 
American Industrial Society. They included the article on the shoe­
makers as a preface. At that time the job ahead was to test the 
theme with their data. 
The job of combining a complete labor history with a theory 
of the development of the labor movement proved difficult. In the 
process of providing a rich variety of materials to complete the 
history, the theory was so submerged that it is difficult to find. 
Commons wrote the introduction and then parceled out the 
rest to his students. He stated the theme but sandwiched it in be­
tween discussions on the conditions peculiar to the American en­
vironment for labor. Torn between a desire to summarize what his 
students actually wrote and the desire to remain faithful to his pre­
arranged schedule, he compromised. The result was that few recog­
nized the importance he placed on the concept of expanding 
markets. 
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A close study of the History of Labor will disclose the fact 
that every single writer somewhere in his discussion included an 
analysis of the expansion of markets. A fair history of American 
transportation could be drawn from their accounts. They also de­
scribed the changing market patterns. Over and over again they 
mention competitive menaces similar to those described in Com­
mons' "Shoemakers." 
David Saposs, whose assignment covered the first labor unions 
in America, displayed most prominently the theme of extending 
markets and the struggle against competitive menaces.42 He also 
discussed the theories of Marx, Schmoller, and Bucher, as did 
Commons in the "Shoemakers." His language and his analysis 
followed closely the pattern of Commons' article. Because he had 
to explain the beginnings, he perhaps needed to follow the theory 
closer than the others did. 
The second writer, Helen Sumner, in her second page ex­
plained that economic pressures from extension of markets (based 
upon turnpike and canal) were affecting labor. A few pages later 
she declared : 
The decreasing bargaining power of mechanics, resulting from 
the revolution in the means of marketing the product, coupled with 
the horrors of the depression, was doubtless sufficient to account 
for a labour movement.43 [sic] 
However, she spent very few words following the theme. In­
stead, she wrote on the politics of the working class and called her 
section "Citizenship." 
Shortly after beginning the third section, "Trade Unionism, 
1833-1839," Edward B. Mittelman launched into a discussion of 
the growth of the merchant capitalist and the extension of mar­
kets.44 He then went on to describe competitive menaces and the 
local organizations created to combat them. Later when he dis­
cussed national unions, he described the developments in transpor­
tation that stimulated them. Yet these elements of Commons' theme 
did not stand out in Mittelman's contribution. They are almost lost 
in a mass of details concerning the activities of labor unions. 
In the work of the next writer, Henry E. Hoagland, the theme 
was almost lost. His section on "Humanitarianism (1840-1860)" 
42 Commons, History of Labor, Vol. I, pp. 25-165.
 
43 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 175.
 
44 Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 338.
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concerned the retreat away from job-conscious unionism. During 
the early years, depression swept away many of the unions. The 
working people, and the intellectuals who tried to lead them, turned 
to schemes of speculative reform.45 Consequently, Hoagland con­
centrated on such schemes and the people who devised them. But 
in the end when he reached the period when unions on a national 
scale were organized, he explained, "The rapid extension of the 
market in the years immediately preceding the Civil War showed 
the necessity of a wider organization."46 
The job of explaining "Nationalization (1860-1877)" fell to 
John B. Andrews.47 In doing so, he kept closer to the Commons' 
theme than any other writer, except Saposs. He began by bringing 
up to date the history of transportation. Then he went on to ex­
plain that the extension of markets stimulated the growth of na­
tional unions. He illustrated this proposition by describing the 
origins of a number of such organizations. But he had much more 
to say about unions than their origins. Consequently, even in his 
contribution, the theme was submerged until it was barely no­
ticeable. 
The last writer, Selig Perlman, in his section, "Upheaval and 
Reorganization (Since 1876)," took many pages before touching 
on the theme." Much of his early discussion involved the Knights 
of Labor, socialism, and political activities of unions. When he 
reached the development of more wage-conscious unionisms, he 
was close to it. Finally, in his description of new economic condi­
tions in the eighties, he brought up the subject of extension-of mar­
kets and the changing methods of marketing.49 Like the other writ­
ers, he included a discussion of the history of railroads in the 
country. After this brush with the theme, he moved on to other 
developments in the labor movement. 
However, the theme was not so buried that critics failed to 
notice it. Frank T. Carlton, one of Commons' students and a writer 
of labor history in his own right, complained that he did not think 
any such single-track explanation of the evolution of the labor 
movement was sufficient:5° He then went on to add that, indeed, 
other explanations had crept into the work in question. 
45 Ibid., VOL I, pp. 487-623.

46 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 620.
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George Barnett took substantially that same position taken in 
this publication.51 Undoubtedly, the authors of the various parts 
built on the foundation of theory outlined by Commons in his 
preface. However, the amount of detail was so great that the 
theory was not closely knit with the facts. Yet the theory did not 
conflict with the facts. 
Barnett was right in saying that Commons' theory of the labor 
movement was obscured by the mass of other information. And 
Ira Cross, a Commons' student, was also correct when he claimed 
that the work might have had more unity if it had been written by 
one person instead of by many. Whether Commons would have 
pulled  it  closer together is another question; and whether he 
should have is  still another. He never felt compelled to write a 
clean logical theory if it meant leaving out pertinent information. 
At any rate, he did not sacrifice the history by dogmatically stick­
ing to his theory. 
The effect of special American conditions on labor's goals 
While the History of Labor did not contain a theory of the 
development of the labor movement, it was a history of the ideas 
and goals held by labor leaders. Commons and his students were 
anxious to explain the nature of the labor movement and its im­
plications for this country's society.52 Individual unions, structures 
of unions, their policies, and labor legislation were secondary. Fur­
thermore, such supplementary information not always was avail­
able for many cases. Consequently, they centered their history on 
the philosophies of labor developing within a changing environment. 
They might have extended their analysis on the effect of fear 
of competitive menaces to explain the attitudes of labor leaders. 
Later on, one of the students, Selig Perlman, developed this analy­
sis rather thoroughly. However, at the time of the writing of the 
History, Commons and his group used other conditions in Amer­
ican society to explain the thinking of labor leaders. 
In tracing the development of ideas by laboring people and 
their leaders, Commons and his associates included a considerable 
amount of the economic, and some of the political history of the 
United States. They were drawing together all the various condi­
51 Barnett, op. cit.
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tions in American environment that influenced the ideas of influ­
ential members of the labor movement on unionism, class strug­
gles, and humanitarian goals. 
They believed that the existence of vast amounts of unoccu­
pied land had flavored the thinking of the working people in the 
early days.53 For many years the struggle over how the vast public 
domain would be distributed was a contest between those who at­
tempted to gain large holdings and those who thought the land 
should be given to homesteaders. In the eyes of the laboring people, 
it was a struggle between the monopolists and the people. e. According 
to them, big interests bought land from the government at ex­
tremely low prices to resell at higher prices to settlers. Working 
people had a stake in the outcome of this struggle because many of 
them were potential settlers themselves. The possibilities of sharing 
in greater job opportunities or of obtaining their own homesteads 
in the West caused them to side with the settlers. Furthermore, 
laborers were interested in encouraging some of their numbers to 
emigrate westward and thus reduce competition among those re­
maining. 
Hence, the class struggle of the early days of the country 
tended to be between producer classes, consisting of an alliance be­
tween laborers and small farmers, and the classes that had large 
holdings.54 Such a class struggle had quite different implications 
than that later envisioned by Karl Marx. Instead of trying to 
abolish private property, the producer classes were attempting to 
increase their opportunities to gain some property for themselves.55 
Their aim was not equality, but rather greater equality of oppor­
tunity. Hence, they saw monopolists as their prime enemies rather 
than employers as such. 
Because many workers thought in terms of acquiring busi­
nesses or farms, they were slow to develop class consciousness. 
Because of abundant business opportunities constantly opening up 
in the expanding economy enough workers became independent 
farmers or businessmen to provide credence to these aspirations. 
Furthermore, no feudal traditions barred the way for workers to 
better themselves. Consequently, in the absence of class conscious­
ness, the revolutionary type of unionism found in some European 
countries could not gain much of a foothold in America. 
53 Commons, History of Labor, Vol. I, pp. 4, 234, 362, 522, 562; Vol. II, pp. 122, 447.
54 Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 175, 193, 218, 261, 304, 462; Vol. II, pp. 122, 169, 240, 440. 
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Class consciousness in America also was limited because very 
early the working man received his right to vote.56 By missing the 
struggle for suffrage the American working men were not made 
conscious of class status while their unions were in the formulative 
stages. American laboring men turned naturally to politics, but 
they never achieved a feeling of class solidarity sufficient for the 
formulation of successful labor political parties. Politicians, always 
quick to bring minority groups into the older parties, managed to 
take advantage of this lack of solidarity. They made promises as­
suring laboring groups that more could be gained through coali­
tions than by forming minority parties. Although working men 
formed many political organizations during their history, they 
found that minority parties seldom were effective in America. The 
major parties were far too effective and often sensitive to labor's 
desires. 
Yet America's governmental structure made it difficult for 
labor unions to achieve goals through legislation." The federal 
system, with each state creating, maintaining, and administering 
laws applying to labor, multiplied the problems involved whenever 
any group tried to introduce reforms. Because the areas of com­
petition for business and industry spread far beyond the borders of 
each state, the obtaining of laws for any one state could not be ef­
fective. A reform law in one state could, and sometimes did, drive 
businessmen across state boundaries. Yet until sometime after 
Commons wrote his history, the national government lacked power 
to regulate labor conditions. 
Although the legislative branches of government could not 
effectively intervene on behalf of labor's causes, the judicial branch 
did enter the picture.58 Employers used the courts to veto as un­
constitutional legislation benefitting labor on one hand, and then 
used them to restrict labor on the other. Even the federal courts 
were used to obtain injunctions that would hamper unions in their 
operations.  Consequently, labor's experiences with government 
were not happy. It failed to achieve much in the way of reform 
through legislation, and it found the courts dangerous enemies. 
Hence, thought Commons, it was natural that many labor leaders 
in America came to prefer a laissez-faire policy on the part of 
government. 
56 Ibid.,  p. 5.
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But labor demanded that government put an end to unlimited 
immigration.59 Wherever the stream of new workers from abroad 
competed with native labor, unions found organization difficult. 
Employers could replace union members with foreigners who were 
not yet organized. By choosing workers who had diverse back­
grounds and who spoke different languages employers could delay 
the time when the newcomers' docility would wear off. 
Workers isolated by difficulties in languages could not be as 
independent as the native-born workers. Furthermore, the immi­
grants, often fleeing from extreme poverty abroad, usually ac­
cepted wages that were low by American standards. Hence, the 
immigrant caused a two-fold problem for unions : he made organi­
zation difficult, and his competition made maintenance of union 
standards even more difficult. 
In prosperous times immigrants came to this country in 
greater numbers than during depressions. During prosperity the 
supply of cheap labor enabled employers to overexpand their oper­
ations so that productive capacity expanded faster than purchasing 
power. While increases in wages were retarded by the influx of 
immigrant workers, prices were not held in check by increased 
imports. Tariffs prevented the inflow of goods that might have 
been competitive with those manufactured in the United States. 
Thus, the employer had his protection from competition, but the 
worker only could agitate. In the meantime, according to Commons, 
unlimited immigration aggravated the movement of the business 
cycle. 
The labor movement developed differently in each stage of the 
business cycle.6° In periods of rising prices, when cost of living 
rose faster than wages, union organization grew lustily. Where 
unions formerly did not exist workers formed new ones, while 
the older unions experienced new and rapid growth. In boom 
times, when employers made good profits and labor was scarce, 
unions provided workers with considerable bargaining power. 
Hence, their union organization and strikes could be aggressive. 
On the other hand, during depressions unions were on the 
defensive. In the face of rising unemployment, union leaders ex­
perienced difficulties in holding their organizations together. If 
they failed to provide protection to their members from wage cuts, 
they faced a withering away of their membership. Yet if they 
59 Ibid., p. 10.
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maintained their struggle with employers by sponsoring desperate 
and defensive strikes, the remaining core turned to politics, pana­
ceas, or schemes of universal reform.61 Desperation and failure 
bred radicalism just as prosperity formerly had stimulated wage-
conscious unionism. During depression years only a small group 
of leaders kept labor organizations together. Often such leaders 
were the "intellectual" type who had means other than union ac­
tivity of making a living.62 Thoroughly convinced of the futility of 
adjusting to the present social order, they maintained their zeal for 
radical measures even under difficult circumstances. As leaders they 
might be excellent speakers who could sway mobs to action, but 
their faithfulness to radical causes interfered at times with obtain­
ing the objectives of wage-conscious unionism. Although they 
might hold power during depressions when unionism tended to be 
ineffective, their power was diluted by the influx of new union 
members when prosperity returned. Little by little more practical 
union leaders, rising from the rank and file, crowded them out of 
places of leadership. 
At times the radical actually might grow into a wage-conscious 
unionist who concentrated on immediate gains instead of impend­
ing revolutions. The day-to-day problems of maintaining a union 
pressed on him sufficiently for his revolutionary ideas to fade fur­
ther into the vague future. Eventually, he even might become a 
conservative unionist. Such, at least, was the fate of Samuel Gom­
pers and some other well-known union leaders. 
Commons and his students filled their History with lengthy 
accounts of the various pressures on unions and union leaders. In 
general, the sum total of these pressures was consistent with the 
one chosen as the theme : the extension of markets. But the links 
between the theme and the various special American conditions are 
not well worked out. Instead, it appears as if the History offers a 
number of explanations for details of the development of the labor 
movement. In the process the theme is subdued. The work is one 
of history and not theory. 
Perlman's theory of the labor movement 
John R. Commons never labeled his ideas concerning the 
formation and growth of the labor movement as a theory. Although 
he certainly had expounded a theory in his article on the shoe­
makers and in his History, he encouraged his student, Selig Perl­
61 /bid., p. 11.

62 Ibid., p. 19.
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man, to write a theory of the labor movement.63 Hence, credit for 
the creation of such a theory went to Perlman for his book, A 
Theory of the Labor Movement." 
Although some authorities refer to the Commons-Perlman 
theory of the labor movement, others declare the two men's theo­
ries to be quite different. John Dunlop reported : 
.  .  , A rather sharp cleavage emerges, however, between  writers 
such as the Webbs and Commons, who look upon the labor move­
ment primarily as the manifestation of economic developments, 
and those, such as Perlman and Hoxie, who choose to emphasize 
the habits of wage earners.65 
At the third annual meeting of the Industrial Relations Re­
search Association, J. B. S. Hardman insisted that ".  .  .  I am not 
all of the opinion that the Commons-Perlman axis is really of one 
piece."f6 He referred to the fact that Commons had asserted that
ff. 
.  .  the labor movement is always a protest against capitalism." 
Furthermore, he doubted that Perlman fully underwrote Commons' 
position as to the interaction between the labor movement and the 
social, economic, and political milieu. 
At the same conference Russell Bauder agreed that "  .  .  .  the 
so-called Commons-Perlman theory is not all of one piece."67 In­
stead of being identical, they are complimentary. Bauder went on to 
suggest that "  .  .  . Commons was seeking to explain the varied 
forms of the program and structure while Professor Perlman has 
sought to find their permanent common characteristics."" 
Bauder is correct when he argues that Commons' and Perl­
man's theories are complementary. Yet the relationship between 
their theories is no coincidence. Theirs was a long association with 
much cross-fertilization of ideas. Extensive examination of both 
of their works shows that they finally draw close together. To dem­
onstrate any sharp distinction between the theories of the two men 
the comparison must be limited to Commons' theory in his "Shoe­
makers" and Perlman's theory. Further reading reveals many 
statements of Perlman echoing those of Commons. 
63 Mark Perlman, op. cit., p. 191.
64 Selig Perlman, A Theory of the Labor Movement. 
Selig Perlman, The History of Trade Unionism. 
65 Dunlop, p. 173.
66 Hardman, Proceedings of Third Annual Industrial Relations Research Associa­
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In 1900 as a nineteen-year-old Marxist refugee from Russia, 
Perlman joined Commons at the University of Wisconsin.69 There 
his training was financed by William English Walling, who was 
one of Commons' financial backers. Walling had found Perlman in 
Europe and had brought him back to help with the writing of a 
book on Russia.7° After finishing his work with Walling, which 
continued while he was at the university, Perlman began to work 
with Commons on the History of Labor. 
Under Commons' influence, Perlman gradually lost his en­
thusiasm for socialism and decided that radical movements were 
not good for either the labor movement or the working man. In 
his assigned portion of the labor history, Perlman followed Com­
mons' theme of the extension of the markets and the reaction of 
the labor movement. So far he clearly displayed Commons' influ­
ence. Yet as time went on he began developing ideas of his own. 
Finally, he had something he could label A Theory of the Labor 
Movement.71 Although consistent with Commons' ideas,  it was 
clearly an extension beyond what Commons had done either with 
his "Shoemakers" or in his History of Labor. From his contribu­
tion, Perlman derived a considerable amount of favorable rec­
ognition. 
Commons' influence in Perlman's earlier work is noticeably 
obvious, but the lines of influence seem to have been reversed in 
Commons' later writings. In Commons' article on "Jurisdictional 
Disputes"72 and in his contribution, "The Labor Movement," in 
the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences" can be found many of Perl­
man's arguments. This latter article might not have been very dif­
ferent if it had been written by Perlman. Who influenced whom? 
In all probability, they influenced each other during their long 
years of intimate and cordial association. 
69 Commons, Myself, p. 81.
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Perlman's theory of the labor movement is centered on the 
psychology of the working man as contrasted with that of the busi­
nessman and intellectual. Working men, or "manualists" as Perl­
man calls them, tend to fear that opportunities for jobs are scarce. 
They are aware of their shortcomings, so discount the possibility 
of being able to rise out of their class by their own efforts. Al­
though they may oppose the bosses, they do not have enough self-
assurance to believe they can replace them. Hence, the conflict be­
tween the "manualists" and the employer settles down to a struggle 
over immediate benefits such as better wages, shorter hours, and 
better working conditions, and above all, greater job security. 
Believing job opportunities scarce, workers prefer to submit 
to union control of job opportunities rather than to bargain in­
dividually. By doing so, they are released from pressure of compe­
tition with each other and hence are able to create "a solid bargain­
ing front against the employer." "Checking the race for employ­
ment opportunities tends to equalize security among the members, 
and simultaneously safeguards or raises the standard of life, es­
tablishes industrial liberty, protects future earning power, and in­
creases leisure."74 
Union leaders, responding to demands of the rank and file,
recognize the feeling of scarcity of job opportunities. Conse­
quently, many efforts of such union leaders are directed at gaining 
control over those opportunities. By increasing such control, unions 
may protect those opportunities and, at the same time, ration them 
in a manner desirable to the membership. Attempts to get union 
security clauses in collective bargaining contracts demonstrate this 
tendency. When such a clause approaches that calling for a "closed 
shop," control over jobs is almost complete. 
Although control over jobs may not be complete, the stronger 
it  is, the easier it is for the union to impose its working rules. 
Many of these rules either aim to spread work among the workers 
or to provide them with greater job security. Rules tending to 
shorten hours or to restrict output are examples of the first, while 
seniority rules or provisions for appeals to grievance machinery 
are examples of the latter. 
Although the worker prefers that his unions seek for him im­
mediate and narrow gains, leaders of unions sometimes have other 
ideas. Such leaders are those which Perlman, as well as Commons, 
described as "intellectuals." Usually these leaders have risen from 
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sources other than the rank and file and they do not share the psy­
chology of the workers. Instead, they tend to hold  adical views 
which they wish to implement with the aid of the workers. Al­
though grasping part of the psychologythe desire of the worker 
for solidaritythey tailto realize that the worker has no desire to 
take part in co-operatives or in self-governing workshops. Rather 
than share the risks of management, the worker understands and 
seeks only those union poliCITTrhat will provide more and better 
jobs_Furthermore, the worker has no dreams of a postrevolution­
ary society that would be a heaven on earth. Instead, the worker 
seeks only that which possibly can be attained earlier. He will seek 
higher wages and better working conditions, but not utopia. 
Following Marx or other radicals._intellon labor 
as a vehicle by which a new social order can be attained. Conse­
quently, a struggle takes place between the intellectuals and "or­
ganic labor." Perlman pointed to this struggle in European coun­
tries as well as in the United States. He concluded that in mature 
labor movements the "wage conscious" rank and file eventually 
wins over the "class conscious" intellectuals. 
The radical trying to run a trade union runs into conflicts be­
tween his carrying on of class warfare and trying to bargain with 
employers for improvement in wages and working conditions for 
the workers. Successful bargaining requires at least the expectation 
that agreements will be carried out. The making of such agree­
ments and the implementing of them implies at least a temporary 
suspension of hostilities. Unless the employer is unusually weak, 
he will not submit to an irresponsible union.°His resources and de­
termination usually are adequate for prolonged resistance. Under 
such circumstances, workers who are more interested in providing 
for their families than in improving conditions tend to desert their 
unions in times of crisis. They may fight fiercely for immediate 
union objectives, but they will lose interest quickly in a fight for 
changing the social order. 
The intellectual also misjudges the power of capitalists to re­
sist. Not only are capitalists prepared to defend their control with 
use of physical force, but they also defend themselves by convinc­
ing the other classes that they alone "know how to operate the com­
plex economic apparatus of modern society on which the material 
welfare of all depends."' Except under such unusual conditions, 
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as with the lack of a strong capitalistic class in Russia's case, the 
tadical intellectual is not likely to succeed in changing the social 
order by a successful revolution. Even when he tries revolution he 
may find that the labor movement, instead of aiding him, actually 
opposes him, as in Germany after World War I. Hence, the labor 
movement, instead of being a threat to capitalism, is actually a 
conservative influence. 
In addition to the..reyolutionary_type of intellectual, Perlman 
described two others : the "ethical" and the "efficiency' types. The 
"ethical" intellectual seeks to replace capitalism with self-governing 
workshops. By freeing the workers from wage-slavery, he would 
destroy the fetters that have inhibited full development of workers' 
personalities. Means of implementing programs vary from revolu­
tionary activity down to creating small producer co-operatives. Or 
the intellectual may rely on political means. In any case, his pro­
gram will run into conflicts with union activity. 
The third type of intellectual, the "efficiency" type, believes 
that capitalism is inefficient and gradually can be transformed into 
some form of socialism. Like the other two types, he thinks as an 
outsider and misjudges the worker's psychology. Usually he seeks 
his goals by political means. In doing so, he is forced to buck the 
workers' apathy and sometimes even antagonism growing into ac­
tive opposition. Such a case might arise when a strike required by 
strategic necessity might conflict with the need for industrial peace 
before a crucial election. Any leader trying to combine political 
action with union activity would thus risk sacrificing the interest 
of at least one of them. Even in less crucial situations, such a leader 
might be accused by his labor union followers of neglecting their 
interests while he was playing politics. Furthermore, the injection 
of political issues into the proceedings of labor meetings and con­
ventions provides more sources of possible disagreement. Except 
when some issue attains unusual urgency in the minds of working 
men, political activity tends to be a liability to the union leader. 
The union leader free from political commitments uninhibited 
by any ideological loyalties in his bargaining with employers, and 
willing to concentrate on immediate issues of unionism holds a 
considerable advantage over his intellectual rival. Furthermore, 
when he has risen from the ranks he has no stigma of the outsider. 
The workers feel they know him, and what is also important, he 
knows them. He knows intuitively how workers will react to each 
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how firmly his men will hold before giving way to the employer's 
pressure. He can maintain a strike long enough to exert maximum 
counter-pressure on the employer without allowing it to continue 
so long that the resistance of the membership collapses. 
Perlman demonstrated that in several countries "wage con­
scious" leaders struggled with "class conscious" intellectual leaders. 
He believed the tendency was for the "wage conscious" leaders to 
win and eventually crowd the radical rivals from their positions. 
In addition to pointing to the American experience, he described 
the German trade unions' struggle to free themselves from domin­
ation by the Social Democratic Party. Even in England, trade 
unionists endeavored to maintain their independence from social­
ists. Here, in view of the developments subsequent to the publish­
ing of Perlman's theory, the case seems a little weak. Yet even 
today considerable conflict exists between English trade union and 
party officials. 
This conflict between intellectuals and socialism has been 
noted by numerous observers other than Perlman. Even Lenin 
declared that the working class, if left to its own forces, can attain 
only trade union consciousness.76 George Bernard Shaw declared, 
"Trade Unionism is not Socialism; it is Capitalism of the Prole­
tariat."" More recently, Schumpeter has referred to "the funda­
mental antagonism between socialist intellectuals and labor."78 
To Perlman, this antagonism between the "manualists" and 
the "intellectuals" was crucial to the development of the labor 
movement. The degree to which each type of leader is able to dom­
inate labor unions determines relative development. Successful 
bargaining favors "manualists," while frustration provides oppor­
tunities for "intellectuals." Finally, when successes of unionism 
demonstrate the efficacy of "wage conscious" unionism (as op­
posed to the conflicting tactics of the "intellectuals"), the move­
ment matures under the dominance of "manualists." 
At this point it might be wondered just how Perlman's ideas 
differed from those of Commons. The difference was only one of 
emphasis for they did not conflict. If such a comparison is limited 
to that between Commons' theory as shown in his "Shoemakers" 
and his History with that displayed in Perlman's A Theory of the 
Labor Movement, there are differences. Commons emphasized the 
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effect of extension of markets on workers. By creating competitive 
menaces, extension stimulated workers to form unions to protect 
themselves. Numerous other circumstances shaped the develop­
ment, but Commons never wove them into a theory. He was quite 
content to view with favor numerous explanations of the develop­
ment of the labor movement without feeling any compulsion to 
unify them. 
Perlman emphasized the psychology of the worker as con­
trasted with that of the intellectual. This psychology did not differ 
from Commons' except that it was explicit. Perlman's concept of 
the workers' consciousness of job scarcity also could be explained 
in terms of their fear that market and technological developments 
might destroy the value of their skills. However, Commons did not 
use the concept of the scarcity of job opportunities in describing 
the labor movement until after Perlman did. Yet this concept fits 
perfectly with Commons' general institutional framework. Com­
mons in his Institutional Economics stressed the fact that conflicts 
in this country arise from existence of scarcity. To overcome these 
scarcities men engage in collective action to bring order out of con­
flict. They create working rules to provide means of settling con­
flicts in a way to determine patterns for future action. Perlman's 
concept, using the worker's belief in the scarcity of job opportuni­
ties coupled with the creation of unions with their working rules, 
is closely parallel to Commons' general institutional analysis. Con­
sidering that Commons derived his theoretical approach from his 
experiences and research as a labor economist, this parellel is not 
surprising. The two men, in close association, were studying the 
same phenomenon, weighing the same facts, and sharing many 
common experiences. 
The second point of difference between Commons and Perl­
man is in the latter's use of the role of the intellectual. Certainly, 
Commons shared Perlman's views on intellectuals in the labor 
movement, but initially he did not give them as large a role. In his 
introduction to the History of Labor, he referred to the failure of 
the intellectuals to dominate permanently the American labor 
movement. Yet this failure he explained in terms of special cir­
cumstances in American history. 
In contrast, Perlman demonstrated the failure in terms of 
psychology of the "manualists" who eventually frustrate the "in­
tellectuals." Such a psychology could be applied to European, as 
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of the Labor Movement consisted of analysis of European labor 
movements, whose workers had a type of psychology similar to 
their American counterparts. 
Because Commons was writing a history of American labor 
and not a theory, he refrained from claiming more than was neces­
sary for his own purposes. In his "Shoemakers," which he wrote 
with a still narrower purpose, he did not even mention the special 
circumstances in America that shaped the labor movement. In­
stead, he confined his discussion to the effect of the extension of 
markets. 
When Commons wrote his article on the "Labor Movement" 
for the Encyclopedia of The Social Sciences he had the broader 
purpose of explaining the labor movement. He retained his own 
previous explanations, but added some of Perlman's as well. Be­
ginning with his own theory of economic development, he dis­
cussed various stages in the growth of capitalism. When he ar­
rived at what he called Banker Capitalism, he began to branch off 
into the problem of unemployment. From the working man's fear 
of unemployment, he moved to a discussion of the psychology of 
laborers. At this point he brought in Perlman's concept of the 
workers' consciousness of job security. He then explained work 
rules (as did Perlman) as attempts to ration jobs among workers, 
and then mentioned that when workers are successful in protecting 
their jobs and in getting gains f r-Fril collective bargaining, they 
choose "business type" leaders. In earlier years, in depressions, or 
in countries where collective bargaining is handicapped, radical 
"intellectuals" emerge as leaders. Commons went on to discuss 
unionism in a number of countries. He returned to an explanation 
of why American unions have concentrated on economic rather 
than political or reform activities. Near the end of his article he 
treated efforts to organize labor on an international scale. Finally, 
he cautioned that the labor movement is "amazingly complicated 
and diverse," and that no single principle or permanent trend seems 
to underlie it, except that it usually encroaches on the domain of 
capitalism. In short, he shied away from any theory of the labor 
movement. 
Nothing in the article is incompatible with Perlman's work. 
In fact, the only real difference is in his rejection of any general 
theory. He incorporated Perlman's concepts, such as the role of con­
sciousness of job scarcity, the conflict between intellectuals and the 
workers, and the nonpolitical nature of American unions. The dif­198  JOHN R. COMMONS 
ferences between Commons and Perlman were always more of 
emphasis and manner of presentation than of substance. In this 
work the difference becomes so slight that it can be said there is a 
Commons-Perlman thesis which is one piece. 
Over the years, the Commons-Perlman thesis has maintained 
its prominence as a theory of the labor movement. Whenever writ­
ers have written on various theories of labor movement, they in­
variably have included that of Commons and Perlman. Sometimes 
they treated them separately, while other times they treated them 
as one, that of the "Wisconsin School." Shortly after the appear­
ance in 1928 of Perlman's Theory of the Labor Movement, Lyle 
W. Cooper reviewed five then recent books on the subject, includ­
ing Perlman's.79 In 1943, Russell Bauder again included a review 
of the Commons-Perlman theory along with two others.8° Then in 
1948 John Dunlop included separate reviews of Commons' and 
Perlman's works in a collection of six specimens of theories of the 
labor movement.81 Finally, in 1955 Clark Kerr and Abraham Siegel 
lumped Commons' and Perlman's analysis with other popular ver­
sions as "traditional" theories that should be broadened so they 
could explain labor movements in noncapitalistic countries.82 This 
lumping together of diverse theories drew objections from Milton 
Derber, who particularly defended Commons and Perlman." 
In late years, the Commons-Perlman thesis, itself, has re­
ceived renewed discussion. After a reprinting in 1949 of Perlman's 
Theory of the Labor Movement, Philip Taft reviewed it along 
with a discussion of Commons and Hoxie.84 He found that it con­
tinued to deserve reading by students of the labor movement. In 
1950 Adolf Sturmthal wrote : "The tremendous influence which 
this has exerted on the minds of American students, however, 
creates the obligation for subsequent generations to look back upon 
it from time to time and to re-examine its assumptions and con-
clusions."85 However, in following his own advice, Sturmthal con­
cluded that, while Perlman's theory seemed to fit the American 
scene, it was inadequate when analyzing labor movements abroad. 
More interest in the Theory of the Labor Movement appeared 
again in the December, 1950, meeting of the Industrial Relations 
79 Cooper, pp. 154-170.
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Research Association which met jointly with the American Eco­
nomic Association in Chicago." There one of the panel discussions 
centered on Perlman's work. While two of the speakers claimed 
the Theory had not been substantiated by events since its first pub­
lication, four of the speakers found that it continued to have 
validity. 
The Theory continued to show enough prominence to be a 
target for attack. In 1953 Simon Rottenburg insisted that workers 
are more interested in jobs at good wages than in job security 
as such." During the same year, C. A. Gulick and M. K. Bers, 
while describing Perlman's Theory as "  .  .  . one of the relatively 
few attempts we have 'to devise a general theory of the labor move­
ment .  .  .  which will apply to all areas and times,' " denied that it 
is even a theory. Instead, they said it is a system of definitions.88 
They claimed that because the terminological properties of such a 
system are flexible, Perlman's Theory would appear to be correct 
under almost any conditions. 
The mere fact that Gulick and Bers should launch such a vig­
orous attack on Perlman's Theory twenty-five years after its pub­
lication testifies as to the impact it has had on American thought. 
Although not all writers on the theory of the labor movement have 
referred to either Perlman's or Commons' work, most of them 
have. Few alternative theories have received attention approaching 
that given those of the leaders of the "Wisconsin School." 
None of the critics have disposed of the Commons-Perlman 
thesis. They have made some effective criticisms, but so far no 
satisfactory replacement has been made. Truly satisfactory theories 
of the labor movement are as difficult to devise as theories of the 
behavior of the American people. Interesting analytical f rame­
works can be devised, but the cramming of the innumerable varia­
bles into a manageable theory is perhaps impossible. No one has 
done the task satisfactorily yet, not even Perlman. 
An alternate formulation would need to explain the "job 
consciousness" of American labor, its apparent rejection of radi­
calism, its attitudes towards "intellectuals," and other facts that 
Commons and Perlman reported. Not only should it explain ori­
gins of labor unions, but it should account for their patterns of 
growth and their forms of organization. It should explain the dis­
86 A Theory of the Labor Movement, A Reappraisal, Reprinted from Proceedings of 
Third Annual Industrial Relations Research Association, Chicago, December, 1950. 
87 Rottenburg, pp. 346-52. 
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crepancies in behavior between labor movements of various coun­
tries. Such a theory should go much further into the role of unions 
in our society than did the expositions of Perlman and Commons. 
The economic effects should be explored more fully than they ex­
plored them. Finally, the theory should indicate the relations of 
unions to the future of capitalism. Commons and Perlman consid­
ered this relationship, but it needs more analysis. 
The task of writing a theory of the labor movement is a for­
midable one. Until someone succeeds in weaving all the elements 
together into such a theory, the Commons-Perlman thesis remains 
the classic approach. 
Commons publicized labor's conservatism 
Perhaps the reason the Commons-Perlman thesis has retained 
its vitality is that it was modeled after what labor leaders them­
selves thought. Commons certainly drew on his firsthand knowl­
edge of labor leaders and their activities when he wrote of the 
labor movement. His student, Selig Perlman, in close association 
with him, shared some of the same experiences. It is no coinci­
dence that their analysis bears considerable resemblance to these 
words of Gompers : 
The ground-work principle of America's labor movement has
been to recognize that first things must come first. The primary 
essential  in our mission has been the protection of the wage-
worker, now ; to increase his wages ; to cut hours off the long work­
day, which was killing him; to free him from the tyrannies, petty 
or otherwise, which served to make his existence a slavery. These,
in the nature of things, I repeat, were and are the primary objects 
of trade unionism. 
Our great Federation has uniformly refused to surrender this 
conviction and to rush to the support of any one of the numerous 
society-saving or society-destroying schemes which decade by decade
have been sprung upon this country. A score of such schemes, 
having a national scope, and being for the passing day subjects to 
popular discussion, have gone down behind the horizon and are 
now but ancient history. But while our Federation has thus been 
conservative, it has ever had its face turned toward whatever re­
forms, in politics or economics, could be of direct and obvious bene­
fit to the working classes. It has never given up its birthright for a 
mess of pottage. It has pursued its avowed policy with the conviction 
that if the lesser and immediate demands of labor could not be 
obtained now from society as it  is,  it would be mere dreaming to 
preach and pursue that will-o'-the-wisp, a new society constructed 
from rainbow materialsa system of society on which even the 
dreamers themselves have never agreed." 
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Although most responsible leaders prominent in the American 
labor movement agreed with Gompers as to the objectives of the 
labor movement, the public retained some scepticism. For many 
persons the labor movement had a slightly revolutionary taint. Rad­
icals, of course, insisted that labor unions existed as an institution 
training workers for the predicted revolution. William Z. Foster, 
the communist, even protested that unionists' pious protestations 
against radicalism were merely "protective coloration" to conceal 
their real purposes, which he implied were revolutionary.90 Union­
ists of the Gompers variety denied this, and insisted that their real 
purposes were to improve the workers' wages and working condi­
tions without destroying the capitalistic system. 
What Commons and Perlman did was provide a plausible 
theory in defense of the unions' point of view. Naturally, those 
who have shared the sentiments of union leaders have tended to 
grasp at such a theory, and as the number of sympathizers of labor 
has grown, so has the acceptance of the theory. 
The psychology of the worker may or may not be interpreted 
with complete accuracy by Commons or Perlman, but much of it 
corresponds to common experience. The implications of the psy­
chology may or may not lead to the conclusions drawn by these 
writers, but the conclusions have fitted the operations of American 
labor unions. Undoubtedly, they had the conclusions before they 
drew tip their premises. Yet because they derived their theory from 
a study of the operations of the labor movement, their reasoning 
seems to be a plausible picture of unionism in America. Because 
the labor movement evolves slowly, conditions have not changed 
sufficiently to invalidate their theory completely. Even if correct­
ness of the theory did not explain why their picture of the labor 
movement is not dated, this slowness of evolution would. When 
viewing the labor movement of today through their theory, we may 
yet recognize what we see. 
Much of the time their theory has competed with radical points 
of view derived from Marxian principles. Such competitors pre­
dicted consequences unpleasant to all except revolutionaries. With 
the obvious failure of unions to turn to revolutionary activity in 
America, it has seemed not only pleasanter but also more realistic 
to turn to a view such as the one by Commons and Perlman. Yet 
this theory had to come from someone not connected with the labor 
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movement. Coming from distinguished scholars, this view of the 
labor movement carried far more weight than the utterances of 
union leaders. 
Commons' efforts at spreading the word that labor was not 
naturally radical began somewhat earlier than those of his student, 
Perlman. By drawing on his experience with labor leaders, Com­
mons drew a picture of unions which matched that of the leaders 
themselves. His contribution was not one of originality, but rather 
it was one of justifying labor's cause before previously hostile 
scholars. As the Beards claimed : 
. John R.  Commons, much to the dismay of several college presi­
dents, was distributing the news abroad that the organization of
labor was as natural as flowing watera means of raising the 
standard of life for the masses and a procedure worthy of approval 
in polite society.91 
. . 
Indeed, Commons did distribute the news abroad that the 
labor movement was no sinister threat to society. Not only did his 
works on labor history trace the maturation of the labor movement 
into a responsible partner in the U. S. economic society, but he 
also made numerous other favorable contributions to the literature 
on labor problems. In addition to writing numerous articles on 
labor problems, he published a number of significant books on the 
subject. With his former student, John B. Andrews, he wrote the 
popular textbook, Principles of Labor Legislation." Through four 
editions, from 1916 until 1936, the textbook served as one of the 
most important in the field. Using articles by many outstanding 
labor economists, Commons edited two series of readings in labor 
problems entitled Trade Unionism and Labor Problems.93 On the 
subject of employee representation plans, Commons and his stu­
dents made an extensive study while visiting the establishments of 
thirty firms. Of these, they wrote accounts of eighteen in the book, 
Industrial Government." On his own, Commons described the role 
of psychology and industrial, morale in Industrial Goodwill." In 
this work his ideas on the theory of wages are not very different 
from those of the conservative economists of his day. A few of 
his important short articles were reprinted in Labor and Adminis­
tration.96 Many of his other books, including The Distribution of 
91 Charles and Mary Beard, Vol. II, p. 238.
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Wealth," Social Reform and the Church," Proportional Represen­
tation," Races and Immigration,10° Legal Foundations of Capital­
ism,101 Can Business Prevent Unemployment?102 Institutional Eco­
nomics,'" and The Economics of Collective Action,'" all have a 
bearing on labor problems. 
In addition to being a prolific writer on the subject of labor, 
Commons was also a doer. His activity in labor relations projects 
did not end when he left the National Civic Federation to join the 
staff of the University of Wisconsin. During vacation and leaves 
of absence, he participated in many activities involving labor rela­
tions. In addition to drafting labor laws, including the act creating 
the Wisconsin Industrial Commission, he served as one of the 
first commissioners. Here his skill in bringing together both em­
ployers and union leaders contributed to the conspicuous success 
of this pioneer commission. 
In 1916 Commons served on the United States Commission 
on Industrial Relations. This group dramatically placed labor's case 
before the public.105 Another pioneer experiment in labor relations 
included Commons as an important participant in 1924. Employ­
ers in the men's clothing industry and the dominant union in that 
industry, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, jointly 
sponsored an unemployment compensation fund. Because they rec­
ognized Commons as "the foremost authority on the subject in the 
country," they chose him to head the various boards administering
the program.'" Thus, Commons shared in  this example of 
employer-union co-operation that might very well have symbolized 
his ideal of "reasonable capitalism." It was class partnership for 
the purpose of achieving security for the worker without sacrific­
ing production. 
Commons' many activities with labor unions demonstrated 
that a university professor could recognize labor without losing 
respect. In addition to writing about unions in an academic way, he 
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lead the way for professors to participate actively in solving prob­
lems in labor relations. He even urged his students to take menial 
jpbs in industry, as he had in his younger days, to learn how work­
ers actually live and think. 
In the process of making the study of labor and labor prob­
lems respectable, Commons probably made his greatest contribu­
tion as a teacher. At the University of Wisconsin, he created a 
"school" of labor economists. In 1904 he began teaching labor sub­
jects with twenty-five or thirty students. Later on, from among 
former students of Commons, additional specialists in the field of 
labor were added to Wisconsin's Economics Department. Even­
tually, five taught labor subjects, including Commons himself. Over 
the years, the University of Wisconsin trained a host of students 
in the field. Many other universities, as they added labor econom­
ists to their staffs, hired these Wisconsin products. Numerous other 
Wisconsin-trained labor economists found positions with state and 
national  governments.  Thus,  the  University  of  Wisconsin's 
"school" of labor became a leader among universities in the study 
of such problems. 
When John R. Commons, around the turn of the century, 
began to study labor problems more intently than he had any other 
problem up to then, he found his medium. His studies, his many 
activities, and his teaching of labor relations and economics com­
bined gave him an outlet for his zeal for reform, his restlessness, 
and his desire to be a scholar. He succeeded in becoming one of the 
greatest authorities on labor problems in his day. At the same time, 
his encouragement to others to follow the subject pushed studies 
in this field beyond his own considerable contributions. QT.Li CU I 
Ia 
COMMONS' APPROACH TO ECONOMICS 
JOHN R. COMMONS called his kind of economics "institutional 
economics." He defined an institution as collective action in 
control, liberation, and expansion of individual action.1 To many 
persons, such a definition does not even sound as if it might refer 
to economics, but to Commons it was a reformulation of economic 
theory along new lines. Such a reformulation was not to supplant 
traditional economic theory, but rather it was to broaden the base 
of economic investigation. 
Commons derived institutional economics from his experiences 
Although a reading of his masterpiece, Institutional Eco­
nomics, might not so convince a reader, Commons was a practical 
man. To him the acquisition of economic understanding had one 
purpose;  it should be used to solve economic problems. He re­
jected the argument of laissez-faire and appeals to natural laws 
in economics. According to him, men adopt and adapt economic 
institutions to solve economic problems. Consequently, as an insti­
tutional economist, he always addressed himself to the economic 
problems of the day. In Wisconsin he was the drafter of laws to 
1 John R. Commons, "Institutional Economics," American Economic Review, XXI, 
p. 648. 
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aid the governors and legislatures in their work. Labor unions 
and corporations turned to him to help them solve economic prob­
lems. Even Congress sought his advice by hiring him as a special 
investigator. Most of his work as a writer was in the exploration 
for solutions for economic problems. 
Although he respected the economists who preferred deductive 
or historical approaches, he himself tried to practice what he called 
the pragamatic inductive method for most of his work. He seemed 
to feel that the men concerned with economic problems of ten have 
insights that may be overlooked by the logical deductive thinker. 
For example, even supposedly ignorant and uneducated workers 
often may contribute ideas valuable to their employers. Business 
men, bankers, and government officials in their attempts to cope 
with economic problems often gain insights before economists 
have allowed for them in theories. Consequently, Commons con­
stantly advised his graduate students to gain practical experience 
in addition to their studies. Many of his students followed this 
advice and became eminent applied-economics practitioners. They 
filled many important positions in government. Among his stu­
dents who rose to prominence were many who frankly admitted 
that they did not understand Commons' theoretical structure in
institutional economics. The emphasis on public policy and practi­
cal economic problems was enough for them. 
Yet for Commons the inductive approach to a science of eco­
nomic behavior required "analysis into similarities of cause, effect, 
or purpose, and a synthesis in a unified system of  principles."2 
All the time he worked with economic problems he was gathering 
material for his "great work," which would be this synthesis, the 
Institutional Economics became almost a lifetime project. Parts of 
it were rewritten many times, but with each revision only the 
corrected copy was kept. Finally, when he was almost seventy-two, 
he published his Institutional Economics. 
He derived his economic theories from a study of institutions. 
His method of study was a byproduct of his problem solving. Each 
time he worked on a particular problem he collected material to 
be used as a basis for creating theories. Finally, when he had 
sufficient material, he tried to tie it together as a "synthesis in a 
unified system of principles."3 To analyze the vast amount of data, 
2 Commons, Ibid., p. 648.
 
3 Commons, Ibid., pp. 648-657.
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he looked for similarities or common elements. He particularly 
looked for a problem and its possible solutions. Because most of 
these problems involved reforms and the means of selling them, 
many diverse elements in addition to economics crept into his 
analysis. 
Reforms seldom are sold on the basis of economics. Indeed, 
in Commons' day the teachings of economists tended to inhibit 
reform. The prevailing laissez-faire doctrine implied a presumption 
against governmental participation in any economic reform. Col­
lective action from labor unions or other groups also was con­
demned as unhealthy interference with free competition. To a con­
siderable extent, Commons sold his reforms not with economic 
arguments, but in spite of them. 
If reforms could not be sold on the basis of economic argu­
ments, they could on humanitarian grounds. By spotlighting what 
he believed to be injustices, he could effectively bring ethical and 
moral arguments to bear on the subject. He could point to the 
victims of industrial accidents, women working extremely long 
hours, the disaster to a family when a member contracts a long 
and serious illness, or the tragedy of a family whose wage earner 
loses his job. When the remedy conflicted with established rights 
of employers, he had to demonstrate the justice of his recom­
mendations. He was required to prove that employers should havey. 
responsibilities toward their employees, which must be considered 
even at the sacrifice of some rights. Yet to make his proposals 
palatable, he contended that the benefits of reform would accrue 
even to the employers. Happier and more secure workers, he as­
serted, were more productive. Finally, as the clincher to his argu­
ments, he brought in economics to prove that if the costs were 
applied to all employers, much of the ultimate burden would fall 
on the consumers.4 Because he believed that all costs necessary to 
maintain the working force in health, decency, and comfort should 
be part of the costs of business, he could see no reason why the 
employers or their customers should not bear them. Otherwise, he 
argued, the public faces expenses in caring for the destitute, either 
in the form of some sort of charitable relief or custodial care. To 
Commons, the orderly prevention of distress through employer or 
public responsibility was far more preferable than the haphazard 
relief after distress had been caused. 
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In some of Commons' reforms, such as workmen's compensa­
tion for accident victims and unemployment compensation, he 
devised means by which employers might avoid part of the costs. 
Those employers whose employees drew the least on the workmen's 
compensation or unemployment compensation funds would pay 
the least under the programs. Hence, they would be given in­
centives to attempt to prevent accidents and unemployment among 
their workers. 
Furthermore, the program aimed at fostering a sense of re­
sponsibility on the part of the employers. Not only would they be 
given incentives to establish good records, but they could have 
the feeling that they were paying only for their own workers and 
not for the employees of the less responsible employers. Hence, 
the employers who were in a position to avoid much of the costs 
could take pride in the humanitarian aspects of the program. Be­
cause of the small cost, they would provide less opposition to the 
introduction of the reform in question. In fact, many of them, 
under the influence of Commons' propaganda, even helped sell 
the program. 
Yet the economic arguments were always the negative ones. 
The effective arguments were the moral and ethical ones. The 
public particularly tended to react more favorably when such 
humanitarian arguments were stressed. Sympathy for the unfor­
tunate convinced more people than did dry economic arguments. 
As soon as Commons' reforms reached the stage when they 
were about to be adopted, the legal and administrative aspects 
gained importance. During much of his time, constitutional barriers 
to reforms presented formidable problems. Consequently, careful 
drafting of legislation required as much attention as did the actual 
selling of an idea. To be able to predict what would be constitu­
tional, he turned to an extensive study of the law and its history. 
This history he felt to be an evolution of economic institutions. 
Combining his ideas of ethical, moral, legal, and administrative 
aspects of economic institutions, he had the beginnings of his 
theories. 
Because he intended that his theories be a systematic synthesis 
of his studies of economic institutions, it was natural that they 
stress the ethical, moral, legal, and administrative principles. Yet 
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usually is considered economics, combining into the fields of phi­
losophy, psychology, sociology, and law. However, he made no 
superficial references in fields in which he was not familiar. Rather, 
he studied extensively until he felt at home in other fields. In doing 
so, he apparently neglected to keep up on the economic theories of 
his more orthodox colleagues. Except for some of the monetary 
theory, Commons used little of contemporary economic theory. 
Yet, in his theoretical works, he intended to write books on 
economics. He did not intend for his work to replace current 
economic theory. Rather it was to supplement by providing an 
understanding of the development of economic institutions. By 
explaining the role of economic decisions in this development, he 
then brought his thinking back to reforms in which he had partici­
pated. By encouraging reasonable decisions, the economy would 
develop in a way to provide high productivity, and hence stable 
and fair incomes for the people. 
Commons' theories had little influence 
Although Commons spent years writing and rewriting his 
works on this theories, he failed to achieve much influence either 
on the professional economists or even on his own students. He 
left no "school" of thought to carry on his work. With a few 
exceptions, most of his students have done little with his type of 
analysis. They displayed the benefits of his influence in many 
ways but not by developing his kind of theory. 
In judging Commons it must be admitted that the nature 
of his task presented considerable difficulties. Although he seemed 
to be addressing economists, his work contained little of what 
usually is discussed today on the subject by those in the profes­
sion. Rather, he was discussing the philosophical, psychological, 
legal, and organizational foundations of the U. S. economy. A 
mere economist, not feeling too much at home in fields other than 
his own, might prefer gaining his understanding of philosophy 
from a philosopher, his knowledge for psychology from a psy­
chologist, and his legal principles from a lawyer. At least he would 
be on the comparatively safe ground of learning what generally 
is accepted by specialists in these various fields. It is no wonder 
that when an economist found understanding of everything in 
Commons' exposition difficult  (except the rather obvious eco­
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dude that Commons was a muddy thinker who tried to verbalize 
without understanding. As his friendly critic, Wesley Mitchell, 
explained : 
.  .  .  all books which lie on the borderlands cover some territory 
that is strange to most of their readers. Economists will find the 
legal distinctions difficult, lawyers will be puzzled by the economic 
theory, few historians have patience with any sustained analysis, 
and I fear many reformers will find everything strange except a 
few wrong-headed legal decisions which they know only too wel1.5 
Mixing the various fields, as Commons did, presented diffi­
culties in exposition. Using the various vocabularies and nomen­
clatures burdened his exposition. Furthermore, whenever a term 
had a restricted meaning in one field, differing from its usage in 
other fields, the chance for misunderstanding increased. Even 
when Commons carefully defined a term, the reader was faced 
with the burden of remembering its special use. 
In addition to difficulties arising from divergent vocabularies, 
the mixing of various fields precluded the using of conventional 
methods of exposition. In each field special methods of expressive 
meanings have developed. Galbraith expressed this idea by ex­
plaining : 
Economics has developed a shorthand terminology which, however 
baffling  it may be to the layman, has great advantages in speed
and ease of communication for the initiated.  It also requires a 
certain precision of thought and statement which is a protection 
against careless thinking and which places critics on firm ground 
in recognizing and protesting error. It also assures the critics that 
the author is learned in the terminology of his subject.6 
By mixing several fields, Commons denied himself the use of 
conventional methods of exposition. Even if he had tried to use 
the conventional method of each discipline, he would have been 
frustrated by the fact that most of his readers would have been 
familiar with the terminology of only one field. 
Commons' difficulties in organization cannot be blamed entirely 
on the nature of his material. Clearly his weakest point was his 
tendency to be unsystematic. He confessed and his students com­
plained that his lectures were not systematic. When he wrote on 
subjects of limited scope or those possessing natural means of 
5 Wesley C. Mitchell, American Economic Review, XIV, pp. 240-253.
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organizing, his exposition was adequate.' He could argue eloquently 
and well for his reforms; but when he began to write on his 
theories, his exposition began to wander. Mitchell, in his review, 
described how a reader might react : 
He may feel that the ripe scholar who writes this book has 
much in common with the young instructor who failed when he 
tried to give a systematic course of lectures at Wesleyan in 1890. 
.  .  . The reader must do his own  systematizing of the rich materials 
before him, but the result will amply reward the effort.8 
Commons' poor exposition definitely limited the influence of 
his theoretical works. Most economists ignored his work com­
pletely. The reviewers of his Institutional Economics were confined 
to a few economists who had been influenced by the kind of insti­
tutional economics taught by Thorstein Veblen. The similarity of 
their ideas, in spite of their differences, provided them with a 
background enabling them to understand what Commons was try­
ing to do. Furthermore, being nurtured on Veblen's works, tough 
reading did not discourage them. 
Of these institutional economists, Wesley C. Mitchell gave 
the most sympathetic and understanding account of Commons' 
theories. Besides reviewing Institutional Economics, Mitchell also 
wrote a very respectful analysis of Commons' Legal Foundations 
of Capitalism.9 Included in his lecture notes, published by August 
Kelly, was an excellent section on John R. Commons.1° 
Some of the other institutional economists had certain reser­
vations as to Commons' work. He tended to be somewhat more 
conservative than others of that brand of economics. Morris A. 
Copeland, in his review of Institutional Economics, praised Com­
mons' scholarship but complained that he had limited the possi­
bilities of economic planning.11 In a like manner, Clifford L. James 
thought his method of economic reform unworkable.12 Rather 
than Commons' gradualism, he advocated considerably more gov­
ernmental controls. Then, as mentioned earlier, the most compre­
7 Leona Spilman writes of Commons' style: "When Commons was writing Institu­
tional Economics, which was published in 1934, he was equipped with so much experience 
that many of the passages of his book read as if he had put a multitude of pregnant ideas
into a basket and then tramped them down to get more in. As a result, his delightful style 
which appears again and again in magazine articles and books, not dealing with extensive
theories, is often weighted down by compressed thoughts. However, this book of his later
years is worth careful study, especially by those who consider that theory and history of 
economic thought is the core of economics." Spilman, p. 99. 
8 Mitchell, American Economic Review, XXV, pp. 635.652. 
9 Mitchell, American Economic Review, Vol. XIV. 
10 Mitchell, Lecture Notes on Types of Economic Theory, pp. 270-288. 
11 Copeland, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 50, pp. 333 346. 
12 Clifford L. James, pp. 61-75. 212  JOHN R. COMMONS 
hensive treatment of Commons' work was that by Allen G. Gruchy. 
In his Modern Economic Thought, The American Contribution, 
Gruchy included Commons as one of six important contributors 
to a "holistic" school of economists." His extensive analysis of 
Commons' theories demonstrated both an understanding and a 
reminder that they are not forgotten. Yet from the main body of 
economists Commons' theories received very little attention. 
It is even difficult to criticize Commons' theories after laboring 
conscientiously over his meanings. Unlike most works in economics 
that use a familiar terminology and then follow a step-by-step 
sequence of logic, Commons' writings, with their strange termi­
nology, follow no such pattern. Lacking definite check points, 
Commons' analysis does not offer ready points of attack. A reader 
can complain about his exposition, reject his policy recommenda­
tions, find a few faulty statements here and there, but he cannot 
easily find any vulnerable point crucial to the entire system. Com­
mons' very looseness in exposition makes criticism difficult. Conse­
quently, few economists have tried; most of those who might have 
objected to his analysis decided to ignore his work. 
Yet Commons' theory of  institutional development does 
deserve study, especially for those interested in the study of eco­
nomic history. Although his analysis of the evolution of this coun­
try's economy is perhaps not so comprehensive as to exclude 
alternatives, it does provide a convincing explanation. It provides 
an interesting picture of social behavior explaining how men 
create institutional structures to resolve their conflicts and, in 
doing so, set up working rules to determine future conduct. Com­
mons' theories are not neat, but they do deserve consideration from 
serious students of economic and social evolution." 
Common's theoretical works 
Commons' theory is concentrated in five works. In addition, 
numerous articles, reviews, and sections of other books he wrote 
contain fragments of his theories, but the five works provide a 
13 Gruchy, Modern Economic Thought, pp. 133-243. 
14 For other versions of economic and social evolution, see: Marx, Karl, Capital, 1889. 
Sombart. 
Weber, Max. 
Tawney.
Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class.
. The Theory of Business Enterprise. 
Schumpeter. 
Simons. 
Lindblom. 
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substantially complete picture. Of these five, the first two were 
written before he had formulated many of his ideas and methods. 
These were Distribution of Wealth15 (1893) and the series, "A 
Sociological View of Sovereignty," published in the American 
Journal of Sociology during 1899 and 1900.16 His major theoreti­
cal works were Legal Foundations of Capitalism17 (1924) and 
Institutional Economics" (1934). His final work, The Economics 
of Collective Action,19 was finished shortly before his death in 
1945 with the aid of his student, Kenneth Parsons. This last book, 
in which he aimed to clarify his previous writings, was published 
posthumously in 1950. 
In all of his works, Commons chose the role of economic 
institutions, how they developed and functioned, as the core of his 
theories. The evolutionary development of this theory reached its 
full maturity in the two middle works, Legal Foundations and 
Institutional Economics. He explained the relations of individuals 
to each other and to society in such terms as rights, duties, liber­
ties, and privileges. The roles of habits, customs, working rules, 
and laws were given prominence in the last three volumes, but in 
all five he gave laws and their development an important place. 
In each work Commons displayed a concern over monoply. 
Because he believed monopoly was inevitable, he did not intend 
to have society suppress it. Rather he intended to protect other 
members of the community from its abuses. Consequently, reform 
played a dominant role in both his writings and his own activities. 
He would equalize bargaining power by using collective action. 
He would bring together the various economic interests to resolve 
their conflicts by negotiation and compromise. Even in cases where 
the government might act unilaterally, as in the making of factory 
safety rules, he would use advisory commissions drawn from the 
interested parties to such an extent that the procedure would ap­
proximate collective bargaining. 
His reforms included the right of labor to employment. From 
the very first work he noted the suffering caused by unemployment 
during depressions to workers and their families. He devoted a 
large amount of his time to finding methods to prevent depressions 
and to alleviate the suffering they cause. Even in his theoretical 
15 Commons, Distribution of Wealth. 
16 Commons, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. IV, pp.  1-15,  155-71, 347-66; 
Vol. V, pp. 544-52, 653-93, 814-25; Vol. VI, pp. 67-89. 
17 Commons, Legal Foundations. 
18 Commons, Institutional Economics. 
19 Commons, The Economics of Collective Action. 214  JOHN R. COMMONS
 
works, he devoted considerable attention to such problems. When 
he advocated guaranteeing work to laborers in his first work 
(1893), he was radical; but by the last work, in 1945, the proposal 
was commonplace. Commons' own writing was one of the reasons 
for this change. 
In his first major work, he attempted to develop economic 
theory along lines similar to the approaches of other economists of 
his day. When the work, Distribution of Wealth, was written 
(1893), the contributions of the Austrian school were popular. He 
took their marginal utility theory, developed a number of interest­
ing diagrams, and then added his own ideas. 
Commons' Distribution of Wealth might have been named 
the Misdistribution of Wealth, because it demonstrated how actual 
distribution departs from what would take place under perfect 
competition. As has been described in a previous chapter, he 
analyzed monopoly in terms of marginal productivity theory and 
in terms of rent. He even unsuccessfully attempted to show how 
a monopolist might maximize his profits, by combining a marginal 
revenue product curve with a constant average cost curve.20 Where 
they crossed, the quantity sold at the prices on the corresponding 
demand curve would bring the maximum amount of profits. How­
ever, Commons lost his way when he tried to use increasing costs 
and practically admitted as much.21 His other analyses were not 
completely successful either. Yet Commons' theory of maximizing 
profits had value. Later, under other sponsors, and differently de­
veloped, it became a significant part of monopoly theory. 
The Distribution of Wealth failed to make a good impression 
on the economic profession. In addition to its analytic crudities, it 
also had a radical tone. Commons insisted that "All industries 
except agriculture and retail merchandising have become mo­
nopolies, and these are rapidly on the road to monopoly."22 Fol­
lowing this disconcerting assertion, Commons suggested drastic 
safeguards against monopoly. Consequently, his reviewers empha­
sized his radicalism rather than his shortcomings in analysis. 
Not only did the interesting part of the analysis in the Dis­
tribution of Wealth fail to survive its bad reception from econo­
mists, but it failed to sustain Commons' interest. Never again 
did he attempt to approximate the type of analysis which inter­
20 Commons, Distribution of Wealth, p. 151.
 
21 Ibid., p. 148.
 
22 Ibid., p. 81.
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ested his fellow economists. Instead he attempted to develop his 
own approach, which he finally explained in his Legal Foundations 
of Capitalism and his Institutional Economics. 
The part of the Distribution of Wealth that did survive in 
Commons' thinking involved his discussion of the rights of prop­
erty. In this discussion he examined the legal aspects of property 
and their relation to monopoly. In doing so he was examining 
institutional aspects of the economy as he would later on. This 
first attempt was incomplete and was almost in the nature of a 
digression from his main analysis of monopoly. Only this embry­
onic institutional economics survived. 
Much of Commons' interest in the legal aspects of economics 
goes back to his teacher, Richard T. Ely, who had a similar in­
terest. The interest of Ely finally culminated in the publishing of 
his book, Property and Contract in Their Relations to the Distribu­
tion of Wealth.23 After studying in Germany, Ely passed on to 
his students an enthusiasm for the historical approach with its 
emphasis on the entire social environment of an economy. This 
approach showed up in Commons' preoccupation with the legal 
aspects of property. Commons, like Ely, turned to German writers 
in his early ideas. He particularly praised Bohm-Bawerk's Rechte 
and Verhaltnisse vom volkswirthschlaftlichen Standpunkte. This 
earlier work of Bohm-Bawerk had explored the nature of property 
and the limitation of property rights. For the economic significance 
of property, Commons turned to Wagner's Lehrbuch der Polischen 
OeKonomie and Samter's Das Eigentum. Commons complained 
that British and American writers had neglected the subject of 
property except from a legal point of view. He did use many 
quotations from an English writer, T. E. Holland, The Elements 
of Jurisprudence." 
Besides his training under Ely, there were other reasons why 
Commons was interested in the legal aspects of economics. His 
heritage from his father included a tendency to view human 
activity from an evolutionary point of view. The elder Commons 
had been a devotee of Herbert Spencer and his ideas. Of those 
ideas, John R. Commons inherited the belief that all social phe­
nomena should be viewed from a dynamic evolutionary stand­
point. The clearest connection with this point of view was develop­
ment of the economic system as it became recognized in the courts 
23 Richard T. Ely, Property and Contracts.
 
24 Holland.
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of law. In Distribution of Wealth he displayed this interest which 
reached a fuller expression in the Legal Foundations of Capitalism, 
published thirty years later. 
He had yet another reason why legal analysis should be in­
cluded in a book on distribution theory. His reason was that he 
was writing about monopoly with its legal and economic considera­
tions. He maintained that monopoly power arises from the owner­
ship of property rights. The ability to withhold from others what 
they may desire gives the owner of property bargaining power. 
Such ability can exist only when the coercive power of the state 
guarantees property rights. One type of property that by its very 
nature is monopolized is that of land. Other monopoly privileges 
created by the government are patents, copyrights, trade-marks, 
and franchises. Commons found it necessary to remind his readers 
of all these legal possibilities of monopoly as well as others. To a 
reader of today, such a discussion seems to be laboring the obvious. 
This interest in legal aspects of economics and in monopoly 
continued to be present in all of his theoretical works. He centered 
his attention on the means of protecting the public from effects 
of monopoly and protecting the worker from insecurities of em­
ployment. His method of analysis changed slightly but his basic 
interests persisted because in addition to being a theorist he was 
above all a reformer. 
Commons' interest in institutions, as shown in the Distribu­
tion of Wealth, also was displayed in a series of articles he con­
tributed to the American Journal of Sociology in 1899 and 1900.25 
This series, entitled "A Sociological View of Sovereignty," was a 
conjectural history of the development of society. It contained the 
embryo of his later work, Institutional Economics. Although he 
was concerned with institutions and their development, his treat­
ment in this earlier work is much different from that in the later 
one. In this series he maintained that institutions developed as 
men organized themselves to escape from the static customs and 
conventional and ceremonious methods. Men passed from stages 
where they blindly followed the set ways of the past to stages 
where reason opened the way for more freedom of choice. 
Just why men should pass from one stage to another he did 
not adequately explain. Such an explanation was supplied later 
when he became familiar with the pragmatism of C. S. Peirce.26 
25 Commons.
 
26 Peirce, Popular Science Monthly, Vol. XII, pp. 286-302.
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Then he developed the psychology necessary to explain better the 
development of institutions. This psychology included a concept of 
thought processes. Men experience repeated sensations and re­
member them. They begin to anticipate the end of a sequence of 
sensations by noticing the similarities in the beginning. When 
their expectations turn out to be wrong, they become aware of 
differences. Consequently, the mind can organize its impressions 
by verifying the expectations. By reacting to stimuli in the manner 
in which they have had previous successes, men form habits. Such 
habits substitute order for random activity in men's behavior. 
Just as individuals follow habits, groups follow customs. To 
do so provides security of expectations. Yet because groups and 
their members have wide ranges of differences, habits and customs 
come into conflict with one another. These conflicts must be re­
solved either by the group or by its leader. Case by case, conflicts 
are solved in such a way that patterns are set up for the future. 
Customs are modified; and working rules and laws are created. As 
these customs, working rules, and laws are developed, the group 
concerned becomes part of a going concern, an institution. 
Such a treatment of habits and customs, as shown in Com­
mons' later works, is completely missing in this series on sover­
eignty. In this series habits and customs are something from which 
men are freed by reason instead of being the dynamic element in 
social development. 
In this series of articles, "A Sociological View of Sover­
eignty," Commons devoted considerable attention to how the sover­
eign power of institutions forces the membership to co-operate 
in its activities. However, in this series he lacked the "common 
law" organic development of institutions, which was so important 
in his later writings. The development here comes only from (1) 
the drive to obtain the increased productivity by creating the 
institutions, and (2) the struggle for control of sovereignty in 
a series of stages beginning with primitive man up to recent ones. 
Commons' "A Sociological View of Sovereignty" displayed a 
continued interest in monopoly, but he did not give it the promi­
nence that he did in his Distribution of Wealth. He declared that 
monopoly is inevitable because it brings order and deliverance 
from chaotic competition. What is necessary is some check on 
the capricious use of power by men in charge of monopolies. He 
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workers be established. Particularly, he wanted to provide work­
men with freedom from capricious discharge and provide them 
with the right to employment. Thus, the thread of continuity 
through Commons' works from the Distribution of Wealth be­
comes evident. Economic conflict causes a movement toward 
monopoly, which provides dangers for the workers. 
Commons' theories take form 
In the years that followed the publication of Distribution of 
Wealth and "A Sociological View of Sovereignty," Commons' 
ideas continued to develop. Yet his written works were addressed 
chiefly to specific economic problems. During this period he gained 
considerable recognition as a labor economist. He served in this 
capacity both as a participant in solving labor problems and as 
a writer. His list of writings on the subject of labor is an impres­
sive one, indeed. Often related to labor, but not necessarily limited 
to it, Commons energetically pushed many reforms during this time, 
including those which involved him in the drafting of bills to aid 
Wisconsin's legislative committees. Because of possible disputes 
as to constitutionality, Commons found it necessary to exercise 
extreme care in the drafting of such laws. All over the country 
the greatest roadblock to reform was the possibility that the courts 
would declare any effective law unconstitutional. One constant issue 
was the determination of "reasonable value." Whatever they found 
"reasonable," the courts would also find constitutional. Commons 
explained : 
From the Court decisions  it seemed that anything "reasonable"
would be sustained, and so we had to use the words reasonable 
value, reasonable safety, reasonable wages, and fix up reasonable 
conduct for public officials and private citizens, whether we knew 
what it meant or not.27 
To learn the meaning of reasonable, and particularly reason­
able value, Commons turned to a study of the law. This he did 
both by reading and consulting legal authorities while drafting 
laws. In drafting the Wisconsin public utility regulation law of 
1907, Commons had the aid of Harry L. Butler, one of the state's 
leading constitutional lawyers. Praising him, Commons said, "From 
him I learned to know in advance what the judges would do."28 
Such information proved extremely valuable in writing any re­
form law. Commons had other contributors to his legal education, 
27 commons, Legal Foundations, p. vii.
 
28 Commons, Myself, p. 122.
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among whom was Senator A. W. Sanborn, who had been a judge
 
in a circuit court. From this state senator, Commons testified :
 
.  .  .  I got the idea, thrilling to me at the time, of legal valuation
 
in economics as always looking toward the future. From this point
 
I worked for many years in making Futurity the main principle
 
of  economics,  distinguished from  all  the  schools  of economic
 
thought which based their theories on past labor or present feelings.
 
Sanborn's futurity became my connecting link between law, ethics,
 
psychology, and economics.29 
A third lawyer who worked with him on the public utility 
regulation law also played an important part in Commons' legal 
education. This was M. S. Dudgeon, with whom Commons then 
taught a course on public utilities at the University of Wisconsin. 
Dudgeon took the legal aspects while Commons took the economic 
aspects of "reasonable value." In this course Dudgeon traced his 
concepts back to the earliest history of common law. Commons, 
himself, became interested in the techniques of tracing decisions 
of courts and incorporated the method into his own researches.3° 
In studying the law, Commons made use of an idea he had 
gained from Veblen. Veblen had insisted that an evolutionary 
theory of value should be constructed out of the habits and cus­
toms of social life. Although Veblen had not used court decisions 
for his studies of habit and customs, Commons found them a 
rich source. Here in the development of common law, Commons 
maintained, was the method by which many customs are tested 
for survival. In economic evolution new forms of behavior grow 
up in response to new needs or opportunities. Many of these new 
forms give rise to conflicts which must be settled by the courts. 
Those that are "reasonable" or good in the eyes of the law are 
accepted, while those that are "unreasonable" or bad are sup­
pressed. Thus, case by case, common law produces standards for 
economic behavior. Hence, his study of the development of the 
country's economic system was to a considerable extent a history 
of the common law. 
In addition to the public utility course, which he soon turned 
over to others, Commons used his legal studies in two courses 
he taught for years. One was a lecture course on "Public Value," 
and the other was a graduate research course on "Value and Valu­
ations." In them he and his students worked out a comparison of 
legal and economic theories of value.31 They "tried to reconcile the 
29 Ibid., p. 125.
 
30 Ibid., p. 128.
 
31 Kirshen.
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economists from Quesnay to Cassell with the lawyers from Coke 
to Taf t."32 As their study progressed it became clear to them that 
instead of merely studying "reasonable value," they actually were 
exploring the legal foundations of capitalism. Consequently, Com­
mons developed material for two books, one focused on the legal 
decisions and the other on the development of economic thought 
leading up to institutional economics. The first became the Legal 
Foundations of Capitalism, published in 1924, and the second, 
published in 1934, was Institutional Economics, Its Place in Politi­
cal Economy. Although appearing ten years apart, they belong 
together as two aspects of the same theme. By the time he finished 
the first book his thinking had jelled sufficiently so the theories did 
not change appreciably by the time he wrote the second. Further­
more, his last book, The Economics of Collective Action, can be 
considered but an amplification and clarification of these earlier 
works. Consequently, the theories contained in all three books 
can be analyzed together. 
Commons believed traditional theory unrealistic 
John R. Commons believed traditional theory of his time was 
unrealistic.  Its focus on commodities and feelings about com­
modities caused it to be too mechanistic. In his own theory he 
shifted the focus to the transactions. His attention was centered 
on the process of bargaining and the psychology of the partici­
pants. On the other hand, traditional theory assumed that partici­
pants knew how much they would buy or sell at each possible 
price before any transactions took place. Given individual demand 
and supply curves, transactions for exchange of goods followed 
automatically and mechanically if each individual acted rationally. 
Commons did not repudiate traditional theory, but he believed it 
was limited in its usefulness because it followed the wrong analogy. 
He claimed the orthodox economists of his day were trying to 
compare economic with physical phenomenon.33 They were trying 
to be too mechanical and hence were leaving out the dynamic 
elements in economics. Human beings have wills and are not so 
many atoms acting in a completely predictable manner. 
By slavishly following a static mechanical analysis the ortho­
dox economists wandered away from reality, Commons thought. 
They postulated perfect competition when evidences of monopoly 
were widespread. In his Distribution of Wealth Commons had 
32 Commons, Legal Foundations, p. vii.
 
33 Commons, Institutional Economics, p. 56.
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pointed to the monopoly elements in the economy. His analysis 
demonstrated a theory of how monopolists would determine prices 
and output by maximizing profits. By comparing the costs of 
additional increments of investments with revenues from those 
increments, the monopolist could determine where to set prices 
and output. Since Commons' time this theory has been refined 
and has gained acceptance under other sponsors. Yet even when 
he was proposing it he did not believe this was the way that 
monopolists actually make their decisions. He stated : 
In reality, a business man does not proceed in exactly this
way. He knows nothing of different rates of profits on different 
increments of his investments, but he averages his total profits upon 
the basis of his total investments. 
.  . When profits get so low as to reduce his average returns, 
then he begins to retrench. This is the only way he has of calcu­
lating the returns to marginal investments.34 
After confessing that businessmen did not follow the marginal 
analysis, he did not go on to answer, "Why pretend that they do?" 
Defenders of the marginal analysis have their answers, but Com­
mons gave none. After the poor reception of his Distribution of 
Wealth he abandoned the marginal analysis as unrealistic. 
He did concede that the usual price theory is adequate for 
analyzing such institutions as a stock exchange, a produce ex­
change, a board of trade, or some other organized market.35 Be­
cause these markets are impersonal an individual cannot bargain 
(except in a limited sense) with anyone in them, as in the stock 
market, for example. His economic power, power of persuasion, 
or other characteristics are not pertinent to a transaction in this 
market. The individual merely reacts to the market conditions. 
Free competition in the market determines the prices. 
Although the usual price theory is a fruitful one for analyzing 
transactions in highly competitive markets, Commons believed 
that "orthodox economists" used it in too many kinds of transac­
tions where its usefulness was limited. His participation in labor 
problems caused him to reject this predetermined mechanical 
operation of the transactions as analyzed by "orthodox econo­
mists." To him, the participants in a transaction ordinarily do not 
approach an impersonal market with decisions made in advance. 
The usual theory assumes that supply curves show what 
quantity of a commodity would be offered for sale at each pos­
34 Commons, Distribution of Wealth, p. 148.
 
35 Commons, Institutional Economics, p. 711.
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sible price, and that demand curves show what quantity of a 
product could be sold at every possible price. Implicit in the con­
struction of such curves is the fact that each seller or each buyer 
has determined (consciously or unconsciously) what he will sell 
or buy at each price. On these curves all changes while any trans­
action is taking place are ruled out except the interaction of the two 
variables. The entire process is mechanical and shuts psychology 
out of the picture at too early a stage in the analysis. Traditional 
theory uses psychology to determine original decisions made by 
buyers and sellers so that supply and demand curves may be con­
structed, but it stops short of analyzing what was particularly 
interesting to Commons. The whole psychology of negotiation 
with the use of persuasion, coercion, hesitations, and the inter­
play of many motives, he maintained, have as much to do with 
determination of prices and values as anything the more traditional 
economists use in their analysis. 
In labor transactions involving collective bargaining nothing 
is predetermined. In the contest between the wills of the partici­
pants the final decision depends on many variables, the effects of 
which may not be foreseen. Although relative economic condi­
tions might indicate the ability of each side to hold out to compel 
agreement by the other side, the purely psychological elements, 
such as the strength of each side's willingness to suffer sacrifices, 
cannot be measured. In a "war of nerves," the breaking point can­
not be determined in advance. Powers of persuasion and skills of 
negotiators will affect transactions in ways that cannot be pre­
determined. Besides these mentioned, many other unforeseen 
variables also will act on the situation. 
Reality in analyzing a collective bargaining transaction re­
quires recognition of the fact that no single item, such as wages, 
is the only one usually considered. The scope of bargaining in­
cludes, besides wages, working conditions, hours of work, security 
conditions for the unions. With an extensive list of factors, with 
different weights as to importance, the number of acceptable 
combinations may be considerable. To analyze in what form the 
combination of these factors finally will be acceptable, the mechani­
cal procedure of marginal analysis is limited in its usefulness. 
The marginal approach also fails to provide a picture of the 
institutional framework within which the transactions take place. 
In this framework, customs (both those formalized into law and 
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Both the unions and employers are reluctant to bargain away 
rights that have been established by custom. Many of the methods 
of recruiting workers, paying them, and supervising them have 
become so habitual that change may be resisted. By following 
practices until they become habitual, both workers and employers 
build up a body of concepts concerning what is "fair" and what 
is "unfair."36 Ideas of "fair pay" and a "just day's work," "fair 
pay differentials," and a host of other preconceived ideas enter 
into the bargaining picture. To assume these under supply and 
demand curves is assuming far too much of the problem of how 
wages are determined. 
Customs that have become formalized into laws are also a 
part of the institutional framework within which the transaction 
takes place. The rights, duties, and privileges created by laws 
narrow the scope of bargaining to legally accepted limits. Pay 
below the minimum legal wage, work under unnecessarily unsani­
tary or unhealthy conditions, involuntary servitude, and numerous 
other conditions cannot be matters for bargaining. Also, laws 
stabilize conditions so that agreements are possible and enforce­
able. They protect employer's property and prevent workers from 
encroaching upon his rights. On the other hand, mechanics' lien 
laws protects workers' rights to pay they have earned. Laws both 
make transactions possible and limit the scope of their operations. 
John R. Commons' focus on the transaction is particularly 
significant wherever bargaining is the dominant element. Collective 
bargaining is, of course, the important example. But he applied 
his approach to determination of values wherever competition was 
not perfect. 
The role of the transaction 
Commons considered the relationships of people and groups 
of people the key to economic activity. Hence, the transaction that 
brings people together was his unit of investigation. He said: 
In fact, transactions have become the meeting place of eco­
nomics, physics, psychology, ethics, jurisprudence and politics. A 
single transaction is a unit of observation which involves explicitly 
all of them, for it  is several human wills, choosing alternatives, 
overcoming resistance, proportioning natural and human resources, 
led on by promises or warnings of utility, sympathy, duty or their 
opposities, enlarged, restrained or exposed by officials of govern­
ment or of business concerns or labor unions, who interpret and 
36 Commons, Institutional Economics, p. 706. 224  JOHN R. COMMONS 
enforce the citizen's rights, duties, and liberties, such that individual 
behavior is fitted or misfitted to the collective behavior of nations, 
politics, business, labor and the family and other collective move­
ments, in a world of limited resources and mechanical forces.37 
The transaction is the dynamic element in the functioning 
of this country's economy. It is the means by which people, indi­
vidually and collectively, determine proportioning of resources, 
extent of output, and distribution of rights, duties, and benefits. 
In fact, Commons used the concept of the transaction for the same 
purpose other economists use the concept of the price system as 
a regulator of the economy. Yet he refused to follow very far 
into their theoretical structure of the price system. Their ap­
proaches were directed toward logical determinant solutions for 
value and distribution problems, while he probed human wills in 
action whether in concert or in conflict. Rather than finding precise 
objective valuations, he found judgments based on a multiplicity 
of factors. 
Transactions are also the means by which economic problems 
are resolved. Transactions can take place in three ways. One 
method is by bargaining between the parties interested in the trans­
action. In the eyes of the law the bargainers are held to be equals, 
although in other respects they may in no manner be equal. Such 
bargaining may determine prices, wages, and other considera­
tions in a contract. 
A second method is by having a legal superior determine the 
conditions for a legal inferior, a situation Commons called a 
managerial transaction. The employer may issue an order the 
employee is obliged to execute. Any transaction taking place within 
a firm, or between branches of a firm, would come under this 
category. 
The third type Commons used he called the rationing trans­
action. This rationing transaction is between a collective superior 
and individuals who are inferiors. Commons gave as illustrations 
the examples of the logrolling activities, taxation, and tariffs in 
Congress and the legislatures; the decisions of an arbitrator; and 
the decrees of a dictator. Such transactions involve the rationing 
of wealth or purchasing power to subordinates without their 
participation in bargaining. In the process of arriving at a decision, 
the superior may be subjected to pressures of the inferiors in 
arguments and pleadings. Yet the ultimate decision remains in 
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the hands of the superior. This particular type of transaction may 
include the laying down of "working rules" by a superior. 
Commons described the three types of transactions in the 
following words : 
These three units of activity exhaust all the activities of the 
science of economics. Bargaining transactions transfer ownership 
of wealth by voluntary agreements between legal equals. Managerial 
transactions create wealth by commands of legal superiors. Ra­
tioning transactions apportion the burdens and benefits of wealth 
by dictation of legal superiors. Since they are units of social ac­
tivity among equals, or between superiors and inferiors, they are 
ethical in character as well as legal and economic .  .  . These three 
types of transactions are brought together in a larger unit of 
economic investigation, which, in British and American practice, is 
named a Going Concern.  It  is  these going concerns, with the 
working rules that keep them going, all the way from the family, 
the  corporation,  the  trade  union, up to  the  state  itself,  that 
we name Institutions.38 
In Commons' analysis the bargaining transactions play the 
greatest role. He focused his attention on the two best buyers and 
the two best sellers in any market. By "best" he meant the sellers 
who are willing to sell at the lowest prices and the buyers who 
are willing to buy at the highest prices. As do other economists, 
he assumed that each side usually attempts to get as much as it 
can for as little as possible in each transaction. The buyer and 
the seller whose prices are closest bargain until they either reach 
an agreement or break off negotiations. In negotiations the next 
best seller and the next best buyer set the limits above which or 
below which the final price cannot go. The buyer will not agree 
to any price higher than that asked by his alternative seller. In like 
manner, the seller will not sell at a price less than that offered by 
his alternative buyer. 
Commons used the following illustrations : 
Actual (best)  Potential (next best) 
$100 B (buyer)  $90 B' (buyer) 
$110 S (seller)  $120 S' (seller) 
The actual buyer, B, of say a horse or cow, comes upon 
the market hoping to buy at, say $100, the actual seller, S, hoping 
to sell at $110. The potential buyer hopes to buy at $90, the potential 
seller hopes to sell at $120. The other potential, or possible buyers 
and sellers will not ordinarily become actual buyers and sellers until 
those who are nearest together have first gotten off the market. 
They are possible exchangers. Hence the two best opportunities for 
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the actual seller, S, are the two offers of $100 and $90. Evidently
the actual seller cannot be forced to sell for less than $90. On the 
other hand, the best two opportunities for the actual buyer are the 
offers to sell at $110 and $120. Evidently the actual buyer cannot
be forced to pay more than $120. Consequently the actual price 
agreed upon by B and S will lie somewhere between $90 and $120. 
Between these two points may be said to be the field of persuasion 
and coercion, and at these points the opposite party has a costless 
alternative. Beyond these two points only persuasion can induce 
the exchange to be made.39 
In perfect competition the gap between the limits of bargain­
ing is negligible. Hence, neither buyer or seller may bargain, be­
cause each has many equally attractive alternatives. For Commons 
the analysis based on the concept of perfect competition is but a 
special case which he was happy to leave to the "orthodox" econo­
mists. Although he admitted cases exist where such an analysis is 
useful, he turned his attention to those in which he had maintained 
an interest from the first, where competition is less than perfect. 
While the case of perfect competition ignores the process of 
bargaining and negotiation, Commons' institutional economics is 
centered on them. By introducing bargaining and negotiation, 
Commons' analysis is deprived of the precise conclusions the 
marginal approach provides even in some cases of imperfect com­
petition. Commons visualized valuation as a matter of making 
judgments rather than following steps to a logical conclusion. His 
method of weighing nonadditive variables could lead only to 
approximations. 
The parties to a transaction endeavor to induce each other 
to accept their offers. 
In Commons' example, seller S tries to induce buyer B to buy 
for as close to $120 as possible, while the buyer attempts to per­
suade the seller to accept as close to $90 as possible. Just what the 
final agreed price will be depends on their powers of duress, coer­
cion, and persuasion. 
Duress depends on compulsion by physical force either di­
rectly or by threat. Except when the state is exercising its sover­
eign powers, contracts made under duress are not enforceable 
by law. 
Coercion is the using of economic power to withhold some­
thing someone else wants. Thus, someone who has a monopoly 
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over some essential commodity would have considerable power to 
coerce other individuals. Of coercion, Commons explained : 
It depends on the relative wants and resources of the opposite
parties. But, since resources are but the means of satisfying the 
corresponding wants, and since the satisfying of wants exhausts re­
sources in the course of time, the power of each to determine the 
ratios of exchange depends upon their relative power to wait for 
the other to give in. The one with larger resources or less wants
can wait longer than the other. He has the larger power of abun­
dance which gives him larger power of waiting and can eventually 
impose a higher value on his own product in terms of exchange 
for a larger quantity of services of the other.40 
Persuasion is the use of moral power. In the absence of 
duress and coercion, each side is free to accept or reject the other's 
offer. Two bargainers may be unequal in their persuasive abilities. 
One may be a better salesman than the other. He may be intelligent 
and informed, while the other may be stupid or ignorant. Such in­
formation or ignorance may be general or just apply to the bar­
gaining transaction under consideration. Fraud or misrepresenta­
tion may be another source of inequality between the bargainers 
which may influence the outcome. 
In the background of every transaction stands the sovereign 
power of the state as exercised through the judicial system.41 If 
physical coercion or duress were not suppressed by the state, 
transactions would be little more than robbery. Private property 
could not exist if the state did not create the rights and duties 
connected with this institution and then guarantee them with the 
use of physical force, if necessary. Ownership of property is the 
possession of certain rights connected with the property. Cor­
responding to these rights are the duties of other individuals to 
respect those rights. For example, the right to exclusive use of 
the crops of some land must be backed by the existence of the 
duty of others to refrain from appropriating those crops. 
Although the state does not prevent all economic coercion, it 
does set upper and lower limits. For example, when an individual 
or organization has a monopoly of a commodity necessary to 
society, the state sets an upper limit on the price that may be 
charged. Public utility companies must gain permission from the 
state before raising their rates. At the same time courts prevent 
state governments from reducing the rates of public utility com­
40 Commons, Institutional Economics, p. 337.
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panies to the point where confiscation of property results. Between 
these points, rates or prices are considered "reasonable" by courts. 
The state limits its interference with the exercise of persuasion 
to the prevention of fraud, misrepresentation, or unfair use of 
pressure. A minor, or someone not mentally competent, is pro­
tected from having someone else take advantage of his weakness. 
Furthermore, the state suppresses fraudulent advertising and re­
quires sellers to list ingredients in the products they sell. 
Where the state does not limit powers of persuasion and eco­
nomic coercion, private associations in many cases are organized to 
equalize the power of the bargainers. Professional organizations 
develop sets of "professional ethics" which, to a considerable ex­
tent, are attempts to prevent unfair methods of persuasion by 
advertising or unfair pressure on the client. Business men have 
their business ethics, and trade union men have their union ethics. 
To equalize economic bargaining power, workers form unions. 
Because individual workers must have jobs to support themselves 
and their families, they are individually in inferior bargaining posi­
tions. Usually opportunities for jobs for them are much more 
limited than the opportunities for an employer to find employees. 
Not having the worker's urgency, the employer can be more selec­
tive. His waiting power is greater. Only during boom times when 
the demand for labor is abnormally high is the relative bargaining 
power of employers and workers in comparative balance. Conse­
quently, membership in strong unions becomes the means by which 
the economic power of the worker is brought up to a strength in 
collective bargaining comparable to that of employers. 
Unions also provide means by which workers collectively 
attempt to control competition for job opportunities. According to 
Commons, control of competition has two directions. One is to 
equalize the bargaining powers of the buyer and the seller, that is, 
employer and employee. The other is to equalize the power of the 
competitors on one, or sometimes both, sides of the transaction. 
Trade unions owe their existence to the desire to control competi­
tion among workers as much as they do to equalize the bargaining 
power with that of the employers. Unions attempt to control work­
ers so that employers may not take advantage of differences be­
tween workers. In this attempt, unions do not allow workers to 
make special agreements with the employers, because if they did, 
collective bargaining would be impossible. Furthermore, the unions 
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The employers' association is for the employer the counter­
part of the union. It, too, has the function of increasing bargaining 
power by maintaining the solidarity of its members. Yet the busi­
ness men have other organizations, both formal and informal, to 
control competition. Trade associations, cartels (where the law 
permits), and the informal arrangement of tacitly following a price 
leader are all means to maintain equality among competitors. 
In many cases the state has encouraged organizations whose 
purposes are to equalize the bargaining power of groups which 
otherwise would be inferior. Unions among working men, co­
operative  marketing  organizations among farmers,  and  co­
operatives among consumers have been encouraged. Yet the state 
has suppressed organizations whose primary purpose is to control 
competition. The antitrust laws aim at preventing combinations that 
would be in unreasonable restraint of trade. Such combinations 
would lead to greater inequalities in bargaining power. Thus, Com­
mons observed that equality of bargaining power has been an 
important objective of the state. It encourages organizations that 
equalize, but discourages those that would increase the disparity 
in bargaining power. 
Commons' ideal of equality of bargaining power can be 
applied with greater consistency than the ideal of perfect competi­
tion held by other economists of his day. At least the ideal of 
perfect, or even active, competition has not been applied con­
sistently. While the antimonopoly laws attempted to increase the 
amount of competition, other laws permitted unions and farm 
co-operatives to control competition. Antitrust laws have even 
been interpreted so as to condemn aggressively destructive com­
petition. Yet equality of bargaining power was an objective in 
each case. 
Commons, as a labor economist, had his eye on the collective 
bargaining transaction. Disparities in bargaining power greatly 
impressed him. It is little wonder that an analysis of the inequal­
ities of the bargainers and the methods to equalize them would 
play an important role both in his theories and his policy recom­
mendations. Such considerations would not have the same empha­
sis for other economists who held to the ideal of perfect competi­
tion. But wherever it is recognized that either of the bargainers is 
limited as to alternatives, bargaining power becomes important. 
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The transaction as the dynamic element in society 
The transaction is more than an exchange of ownership of 
property. It is the activity undertaken by individual groups organ­
ized as going concerns to resolve their conflicts in interests. Com­
mons believed that conflicting interests are due to the existence 
of scarcity in the world. In some primitive societies where neces­
sities of life are abundant everywhere, conflicts may be at a 
minimum. However, in most regions of the world, nature is not 
so bountiful. Man must combine in order to augment the natural 
products of nature. In doing so, he engages in collective action, 
and he is faced with two problems. One is that conflicts in interest 
will continue, because scarcity also will continue. Secondly, to the 
extent that his organization succeeds in reducing scarcity, mutual 
dependence is created. Consequently, man through his collective 
action must bring order out of the conflicts and stabilize his rela­
tions. Hence, "working rules" of the group (called a going con­
cern by Commons) are created so that individuals and groups 
will have their rights which determine what they may expect from 
others. These working rules also will assign duties to others so 
that the assigned rights may be effective. 
It is the transaction that provides the mechanism by which 
conflicts are resolved. Commons explained : 
In every economic transaction there is a Conflict of Interests 
because each participant is trying to get as much and give as little 
as possible. Yet nobody can live or prosper except by Dependence 
on what others do in managerial, bargaining, and ration transac­
tions. Hence, they must come to a working agreement, and since 
such agreements are not always possible voluntarily, there always 
has been some form of collective compulsion to decide disputes. If 
these decisions are accepted as precedents and are conformed to 
as a matter of course in succeeding transactions, then the deciding 
authority need not intervene and does not usually intervene unless 
the conflict again reaches the crisis of a dispute between plaintiff 
and defendent. This process we name the Common-Law Method of 
Making Law by Deciding Disputes. To the entire process we give 
the name, Working Rules of Going Concerns, the purpose of which 
is to bring Order out of Conflict.42 
The transactions that determine the pattern for others, Com­
mons called "strategic." The rest he classified as "routine." These 
routine transactions are automatic and so are not given the atten­
tion given those that are strategic. The strategic ones become the 
basis for establishing customs, resolving conflicts of interests, and 
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establishing working rules. By focusing on the strategic transac­
tions, men can exert a leverage determining the pattern  for all 
the routine transactions which follow as a result. 
Thus, each transaction affects more people than the direct 
participants. Always in the background are the groups varying all 
the way from the family up to the state itself. Commons  calls 
these groups that make working rules "going concerns." These 
going concerns enforce the rights and duties created in each trans­
action. In the case of the state, the courts enforce the rights and 
duties of the individuals through the exercise of force if necessary. 
It is the sovereign power of the state to exercise such force which 
makes private property possible. Other groups may use  economic 
power to coerce or moral power to persuade persons to comply 
with their working rules. 
Although the collective action of the group does place re­
straints on those it assigns duties, it expands the freedom of action 
of the individuals who are given rights. In Commons' words : 
Collective Action is more than control of individual action 
it is, by the very act of control, as indicated by the auxiliary verbs, 
a liberation of individual  action from coercion, duress, discrimina­
tion, or unfair competition, by means of restraints placed on other 
individuals. 
And Collective Action is more than restraint and liberation of 
individual actionit is expansion of the will of the individual far 
beyond what he can do by his own puny acts.43 
Commons' concept of collective action reaches to the very 
fundamentals of social organization. He said : 
If it be considered that, after all,  it is the individual who is 
important, then the individual with whom we are dealing is the
Individualized Mind. Individuals begin as babies. They learn the 
custom of language, of cooperation with other  individuals, of 
working toward common ends, of negotiations to eliminate con­
flicts of interest, or subordination to the working rules of the many 
concerns of which they are members. They meet  each other, not 
as physiological bodies moved by glands, nor as  "globules of desire" 
moved by pain and pleasure, similar to the forces of physical  and 
animal nature, but as prepared more or less by habit, induced by the 
pressure of custom, to engage in those highly artificial transactions 
created by the collective human will. They are not found in physics, or 
biology, or by subjective psychology, or in the German Gestalt psy­
chology, but are found where conflict, interdependence, and order 
among human beings are preliminary to getting a living. Instead of 
individuals the participants are citizens of a going concern. Instead 
of mechanical uniformities of desire of the hedonistic economists, 
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they are highly variable personalities. Instead of isolated individuals 
they are always participants in transactions, members of a concern 
in which they come and go, citizens of an institution that lived be­
fore them and will live after them." 
For the most part, human beings live and act as members of 
groups. The habits and customs of these groups are imposed on 
them. Yet customs are constantly changing, even if gradually. 
Groups repeat their activities of the past, but not precisely. Gradu­
ally changes take place which give rise to disputes over new con­
flicts in interests. When these disputes are settled by the group, 
a leader, or a judge the customs are given the precision of a "work­
ing rule." Such is the method of the development of "common law" 
in jurisprudence or development of union or company rules. 
Hence, the transaction is the method by which collective action 
creates institutions. These institutions are not creations of nature, 
but rather they are made by men in their attempts to solve their 
problems. Consequently, there is nothing sacred in men's institu­
tions. In fact, there is nothing definitely permanent. The processes 
by which men establish practices, customs, working rules, or laws 
(with their accompanying going concerns and institutions) go on 
indefinitely. Commons would not try to develop, therefore, a 
system of deductive economics based on unchanging human be­
havior. He would leave the elaborately logical systems to others. 
Economic evolution 
John R. Commons displayed his use of the transaction as a 
moving force in his article on the shoemakers. He traced the 
development of bargaining organizations used in the shoe industry 
in America from 1648 until 1895.45 Although technological changes 
and extension of markets play important roles in the history of the 
shoemakers, Commons demonstrated that these factors changed 
bargaining conditions and thus brought about changes in organiza­
tions. He laid out a series of stages showing the effect of exten­
sions in the markets on bargaining and economic organizations. 
In the first stage the craftsman had a direct relationship with the 
customer. With the extension of the market, made possible by 
transportation developments, middlemen hired the workers and 
then sold their products to the customers. As the various stages 
developed, the number of levels of middlemen increased to what 
they are today. 
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Throughout each stage of development, workers faced one 
form of competitive menace or another. In some of the early 
stages, "bad ware" makers or "advertisers" were the menaces. 
Later on, scabs, prison labor, sweatshop, or immigrant labor were 
the menaces. Whatever the menace was, protective organizations 
were organized to fight them. These organizations began with 
craft guilds, and reached a climax with industrial unions and 
employers' associations. In each of the various stages the control of 
unfair competition was the motivating force behind all organiza­
tions. Workers strived to maintain their bargaining power in their 
transactions. To do this they even combined with their employers 
on occasions to protect themselves from what they believed were 
competitive menaces. 
In his article on the shoemakers Commons used eight stages 
up to 1895. Later in his Institutional Economics he used an addi­
tional method of dividing the development of capitalism.46 In 
each of three periods, he explained, there was a different form of 
capitalism. He called that before the industrial revolution Mer­
chant Capitalism; that during the nineteenth century, Employer 
Capitalism ; that in the twentieth century, Banker Capitalism. Com­
mons admitted that no set dates could be used for these periods. 
Furthermore, not all industries enter the same stage at the same 
time. His criteria in defining a stage depended on who was dom­
inant in the economythe merchant, the industrial employer, or 
the banker. 
When the merchant controlled it, he hired producers on con­
tract. He had control over the markets while the competition 
among the producers gave him effective bargaining power. Gradu­
ally, with the introduction of the factory system, the producers 
reached toward their markets to become less dependent on the 
merchants. Finally, when the extension of markets had reached the 
stage where integration and consolidation of firms became the dom­
inant economic activity, the banker stepped into the major role. 
Commons characterized these three stages as those of scarcity, 
abundance, and stabilization. In the pre-industrial revolution period 
of scarcity, the community exercised a considerable amount of 
control over economic activity. Like cities under siege, communities 
facing serious scarcities protected themselves by this control. Local 
governments with their guilds of craftsmen and merchants made 
supervision of economic activities their business. With the growth 
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of nationalism, central governments following the principles of 
merchantilism replaced local regulation of industry with nation­
wide control. 
With the coming of the industrial revolution, the new pro­
ductivity of industry replaced scarcity with abundance. Conse­
quently, the nations could permit a maximum of individual liberty 
and a minimum of governmental control. Individuals could bargain 
effectively because of the abundance of alternative opportunities 
open to them. Under such conditions, while the economic units 
still were small, competition was an effective protection against 
exploitation. 
Yet the period of "abundance" had its evilcompetition was 
destructive, unfair, or cut-throat. Such competition, according to 
Commons, led to periods of oversupply followed by periods of 
undersupply. "These oversupplies led to destructive competition, 
price wars in manufactures and rate wars in transportation, the 
elimination of weak competitors, the consolidation or absorption 
of competitors into large combinations."47 
A conflict between the goals of efficiency and scarcity created 
the conditions under which combinations appeared to be desirable 
forms of relief. Efficiency permitted businessmen to increase the 
quantity of goods they could sell in order to increase their wealth. 
Yet value depended on scarcity as well as quantity and useful­
ness. Consequently, businessmen sought to increase their own 
sales, but at the same time, limit the total amount offered. Aggres­
sive competition designed to drive out competitors resulted. The 
way out of these "price wars" was combination. 
In their efforts to free themselves from destructive competi­
tion, the businessmen turned to the bankers for money to accom­
plish their consolidations. Then financiers, as the creators of the 
great economic combinations, superseded the production experts as 
the key men in the economy. Hence, Commons named this period 
the one of Banker Capitalism. 
The period was also one of stabilization. The consolidations 
aimed at preventing overexpansion, which was thought to be the 
source of instability in the economy. To prevent the frantic com­
petition which bred overexpansion, businessmen also developed a 
new morality. Their policy became "live and let live" by each firm 
following a price leader who set prices enabling all firms in an 
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industry to gain their fair share of the profits. Perhaps no firm 
could get all the business it wanted, but stability was preferable to 
"price wars." Morality censured "price chiseling," price cutting, 
and the initiating of price wars. Part of this development stemmed 
from the reactions of businessmen to the instability of the previous 
period, and part was derived from the operations of the anti­
monopoly laws. 
In the beginning, the antitrust law enforcement attempted to 
prevent combinations in restraint of trade, but as time went on  it 
simmered down to a means of suppressing discrimination. These 
laws became a part of the code to preserve fairness in competition 
and to minimize destructive competition. They directed the con­
trol of industries toward the price leader principle rather than 
outright combination. To enjoy relative freedom from harrass­
ment under these laws, large firms found it to their interest to 
tolerate the existence of many smaller competitors. Yet the mere 
possibility that the giant could use its economic power to crush 
them, would keep the smaller firms in line. When great and small 
firms in an industry became convinced of the fairness of the 
leader and that price leadership principle was in their mutual 
interest, direct combination became unnecessary. 
Although businessmen and bankers strive for stability, they 
cannot achieve it alone. Commons believed that an unregulated 
capitalistic economy is unstable unless price fluctuations can be 
dampened. Once prices begin to move either up or down, expecta­
tions of further movements drive prices in the same direction. 
Businessmen expecting price rises will hasten purchases, but they 
will hurry sales or delay purchases when they anticipate price 
declines. Furthermore, because cost changes tend to lag behind 
price movements, profits are high while prices are rising, but are 
low, or are replaced by losses, when prices are falling. The stimu­
lus of profit or loss anticipation drives the economy either to a 
boom which must give way to a depression or directly to a de­
pression. 
The banking system itself, according to Commons, plays an 
important part in the instability. During upward movements of 
the business cycle, businessmen seek loans from banks. Because 
these loans increase the money supply, additional purchasing power 
is thus created to accentuate the upswing in economic activity. 
During the downswing, the reduction in loans to businessmen 
causes a reduction in the money supply so that the forces working 
for deflation are aggravated. 236  JOHN R. COMMONS 
Commons believed that monetary controls exercised through 
the Federal Reserve System could prevent price fluctuations to 
a considerable extent. If prices tended to go upward, he would 
have the Federal Reserve Banks restrict credit to prevent an 
uncontrolled boom. When prices tended to sag, he would ease 
credit to stimulate business. However, he had more confidence in 
preventing a depression by suppressing a boom than in efforts 
to cure the depression itself. Collective action by bankers acting 
through the Federal Reserve Banks is an important function in the 
era of stabilization under Banker Capitalism. 
Yet Commons was not quite satisfied to limit stabilization to 
monetary controls. He wanted to stabilize employment for the 
workers. Such a goal developed from his proposed rights to em­
ployment which he featured in his Distribution of Wealth. For 
years, Commons campaigned in an effort to sell his state and the 
nation on the idea of unemployment compensation with its device 
designed to stabilize employment. 
John R. Commons had considerable faith in the profit motive 
when properly organized. According to him, institutions should be 
fashioned in such a way that individuals are given incentives to 
behave in the manner that would be beneficial to society. Monetary 
controls and his unemployment compensation scheme were ex­
amples of such institutions. Bankers may be tempted to loan 
money if reserves are provided through open market transactions 
or if they can borrow at lower rates themselves from the Federal 
Reserve Banks. They would be acting in their own self-interests 
because they would be given incentives to earn profits. In a similar 
manner, the Federal Reserve System, by reducing reserves, could 
induce the bankers to loan less money. No direct compulsion would 
be necessary. Neither would any government orders for an em­
ployer to refrain from employment practices causing unemploy­
ment be necessary. Commons maintained that the incentives under 
the unemployment compensation plan would be effective if mone­
tary controls kept the economy from violent fluctuations. 
Institutions can be organized so that individuals react to the 
stimulus of profits. Because margins of profits, which represent 
the difference between the total revenues and total costs,  are 
normally very slender, businessmen are sensitive toward  any
prospective changes. Unless it  is passed on to the consumer or 
to someone else, a small percentage change in total costs can 
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gin. Although the possibility does exist that a cost may be shifted, 
the businessman views each possible additional cost in relation 
to the size of his profit margin. He focuses his attention on each 
possible cost as its prospects arise. Some may be shifted, but to 
do so may take time and incur resistance. The avoidance of the 
cost is the preferable course, especially if his competitors are not 
also to be burdened with it. 
Consequently, Commons believed that changes in the interest 
rate or avoidance of unemployment compensation payments have 
a considerable value as incentives for businessmen to act. Such 
small changes with weighty impacts he called limiting factors. By 
selecting and acting through such limiting factors, man can influ­
ence a whole host of complementary factors to achieve a desired 
result." Pressure of a man's foot on the limiting factor, the ac­
celator, in his car will cause the other complementary factors in 
the engine to make it run at a desired speed. In the same way, a 
particular change in the interest rate can have far-reaching effects 
on the economy. 
By making use of incentives which would have the leverage 
of limiting factors, Commons created his many schemes for eco­
nomic reforms. From the very first, his work displayed a concern 
for what he believed to be the growing amount of monopoly in 
our economy. To reverse the trend, he believed, was neither pos­
sible nor desirable. The only feasible course he could see open 
was the protection of individuals from the arbitrary power of the 
monopolists.' Besides protection of the consumer by control of 
48 See Barnard, pp. 202-211. 
49 In all probability, Commons would have been enthusiastic over Galbraith's concept
of the Countervailing Power. Certainly there was nothing in this concept that would have
been inconsistent with what Commons believed. Yet Galbraith's analysis is much neater
than Commons' rather vague "reasonable capitalism." Both men are optimistic in their
pointing out that exploitation has not been great in spite of ever-increasing concentration
of economic power. For the protection against such exploitation, both stress the role of
bargaining. In both analyses there is a recognition that equalized bargaining power will 
not provide protection for the various groups if there is economic instability. For Galbraith 
the countervailing power breaks down under inflationary pressures and becomes a mechan­
ism for spreading further inflation. Commons, being pre-Keynesian, lacked an adequate 
explanation of how purchasing power is generated in the economy; at least he would have
been ready to apply tight monetary controls to prevent an inflation. 
Commons certainly wanted to develop countervailing power, but his "reasonable capi­
talism" is not quite the same thing. Except for consumers' co-operatives or government 
regulation of prices, Commons' analysis tended to neglect protection for the consumer.
He clearly saw the producers organized to protect their interests by collective bargaining,
but unlike Galbraith, he did not clearly see the role of the powerful retailers. Such retail­
ers, who make their money on volume sales at prices attractive to consumers, use their
strong bargaining power to reduce the manufacturer's prices. Their use of countervailing
power thus provides protection for the consumers. This and other parts of Galbraith's 
analysis is missing in Commons'. Yet it is likely that Commons would have been willing to
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public utility companies, many of Commons' reforms centered 
on social security provisions. He was a  leader in the accident 
compensation, health insurance, and unemployment compensation 
movements as well as supporting allied forms of protection for 
the workers. 
In all of his reforms, John R. Commons was not a true radi­
cal. Unlike the utopians, socialists, communists, and other radical 
reformers, he had no consistent blueprint of any new economic 
order that could be installed at some future time. Rather he visu­
alized our economic order slowly evolving to new forms. Because 
he was not sure where this evolution would lead, he was willing 
to push it in directions favoring security consistent with liberty. 
He had observed other economic societies attempt to solve the 
problems of security and stability by means which killed freedom 
for its members. Not only did he reject totalitarian methods, but 
he also distrusted all sudden changes unless they had roots in 
past experience. Preferable to such sudden changes has been the 
Anglo-American common law development of accepting customs 
that were reasonable while rejecting those that were unreasonable. 
Progress for Commons consisted of selecting the best prac­
tices that had been proved practical and then making them stand­
ard. For example, in factory safety, the Wisconsin Industrial Com­
mission (which he designed and served on for its first two years) 
would study the means that the most enlightened employers used 
to protect their workers. Gradually these methods would be re­
quired of all employers. 
In his other reforms, as we have seen, he also would start 
with the most enlightened employers, gain their support, and then 
use them to sell the others. They and representatives of labor 
would be asked to work out details of the reform. Usually those 
who were to be reformed presented less opposition if they had 
an opportunity to participate in the planning. Yet they never could 
dictate the terms because conflicting interests also would be repre­
sented. Neither side would be completely satisfied, but they could 
have confidence in the reasonableness of the reform. Much of the 
history of American social security laws demonstrates the sound­
ness of Commons' strategy. 
If one were to describe the kind of economy Commons would 
view with favor, it might be characterized as a welfare state with 
rather complete social security coverage.50 Yet individuals and 
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firms would have the maximum amount of freedom consistent with 
their charging "reasonable prices," and maintaining "reasonable 
labor relations." Although the meaning of "reasonable" is  still 
vague in spite of Commons' efforts, its definition must imply fore-
bearing from exercising the full weight of one's economic power. 
The economic giants, in Commons' scheme, would refrain from 
practices which would "exploit" the consuming and working 
public. Instead of maximum profits, the great firms would prefer 
satisfactory public relations. Instead of conflict, they would prefer 
harmony. 
Commons also would equalize bargaining power by fostering 
collective bargaining for the workers. Besides labor unions, he 
would encourage organizations of farmers and consumers as 
methods of equalizing bargaining. These numerous going con­
cerns he saw as bulwarks against seizure of totalitarian power. 
Conflicting though these different interests might be, Commons 
had faith that their differences could be resolved. Although he 
had dropped his earlier ideas of representation of interests by a 
scheme of government by proportional representation, he believed 
that conflicts could be resolved by the use of advisory boards 
working for governmental commissions. The Wisconsin Industrial 
Commission demonstrated this technique at its best. 
Commons would have the state play the role of the wise and 
kindly father. It would jealously guard the welfare of its citizens 
by maintaining a healthy economic climate. By monetary means it 
would keep the economy on an even keel. Through all types of 
trouble it would protect the workers by providing them with 
security of incomes by means of a comprehensive social security 
program. Yet like the wise father, the state would limit its inter­
ference with the activities of its citizens. It would refrain from 
imposing such direct controls as would seriously reduce the area 
of the citizen's freedom. Thus, Commons was neither an advocate 
of state control nor a defender of laissez-faire. He was neither 
a radical nor a conservative. He kept one eye on the future and 
one on the past. He did his best to hurry along the economic 
evolution to levels of "stability and fairness to all." THE INSTITUTIONAL 
SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
C UPPOSEDLY there is, or at least was, an institutional school of
S economics. Economists still exist who call themselves institu­
tionalists. Although they disagree on who qualifies for member­
ship, they insist there is such a school. They admit that it has lost 
some of its vigor, but they express confidence that their brand 
of economics has a future. Every few years they manage to induce 
the American Economic Association to include a discussion of 
their school on the agenda for an annual meeting. Occasionally 
one of them writes an article or a book on the subject. Yet to 
the outside observer, the attempts to restore the school to its former 
vitality appear unpromising. 
The term "institutional" gained currency shortly after Walton 
H. Hamilton introduced it at the 1918 meeting of the American 
Economic Association.' He displayed wisdom by cautiously avoid­
ing defining what would prove to be an elusive concept. Instead 
he provided five criteria for judging economic theory.2 Traditional 
1 Hamilton, American Economic Review, Vol. IX, pp. 309-324. Allan Gruchy quotes 
A. B. Wolfe that Max S. Hardman first used the word institutional to describe Veblen's 
Works, Gruchy, Modern Economic Thought, p. 2.
2 Characteristics of Institutional Economics: (a) Economic theory should unify eco­
nomic science; (b) Economic theory should be relevant to the modern problem of con­
trol;  (c) The proper subject-matter of economic theory is institutions;  (d) Economic 
theory is concerned with matters of process; (e) Economic theory must be based upon 
acceptable theory of human behavior. 
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theory, he claimed, failed to meet these tests, but the institutional 
theory did. 
Hamilton did not create institutional economics; he merely 
gave it a name. He explained that such Americans as Henry 
Carter Adams, Charles Horton Cooley, Thorstein Veblen, and 
Wesley Mitchell already had made significant contributions to 
this brand of economics. Hamilton might have named others, but 
their inclusion would have depended on the definition he failed 
to give. 
Over the years, institutionalists and their opponents have 
struggled over a proper definition. J. M. Clark called the school 
that "elusive movement known as 'Institutionalism' which means 
so many different things to so many different people that doubt 
has arisen whether it has any definable meaning at all."3 John R. 
Commons confessed difficulty in defining the term, though he 
managed to write a book on the subject.4 At the American Eco­
nomic Association annual meeting in 1930, two papers, one by 
Evelyn Burns5 and the other by M. A. Copeland,6 failed to give 
any definition. Yet the subject of their panel was "Institutionalism : 
What It Is and What It Hopes to Be." Mrs. Burns blamed some 
of the difficulties of the institutional school on the vagueness of 
the concept. At the next meeting in 1931, J. M. Clark also declined 
to make any definition while Paul Homan (who had been chair­
man of the meeting the year before) cast doubt on the possibility 
of arriving at any definition. He stated : 
.  .  . My correspondence and my reading have  reached every known 
economist of supposed institutional  proclivities, and they divide 
roughly into two classes, those who refuse to define institutional 
economics, and those whose definitions disagree .. .7 
.  .  .  I may as well bluntly state my opinion that an institutional 
economics,  differentiated from other economics by discoverable 
criteria,  is  largely an intellectual  fiction,  substantially void of 
contents 
.  .  .  If institutional economics be broadly defined, it is practically co­
extensive with economics. If narrowly defined in connection with 
a Veblenian origin, it consists mainly in a few thin essays, critical, 
3 J. M. Clark, p. 426. 
4 Commons, American Economic Review, Vol. XXI, pp. 648-657. "We may define an
institution as collective action in control, liberation and expansion of individual action." 
This defines the word institution, but not institutionalism. 
5 Burns, American Economic Review, Vol. XXII, pp. 80-87. See also "Economic
TheoryInstitutionalism: What It Is and What It Hopes to Become," American Eco­
nomic Review, Vol. XXI, pp. 134-141. 
6 Copeland, American Economic Review, Vol. XXI, pp. 67-79. See also "Economic
TheoryInstitutionalism: What It Is .  .  ." 
7 Homan, p. 12.
 
8 Ibid., p. 15.
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hortatory, and hopeful. If not defined at all, it is a miscellaneous
body of works associated with a group of economists reputed to 
be institutionalists.9 
The lack of agreement on the definition of institutional eco­
nomics (which has persisted to this day) also has obscured the 
origins of the school. Several contemporary institutionalists, Allan 
Gruchy,1° Clarence E. Ayres," and John Gambs12 trace their eco­
nomic school back to Thorstein Veblen. Joseph Dorfman concurs 
but adds the influence of Charles Horton Cooley, the sociologist 
who pioneered studies of institutions.13 Although considerable 
opinion probably could be mustered to the view of the Veblenian 
origin, there is by no means unanimity. Hamilton, it might be 
noted, included Henry Carter Adams of a generation earlier than 
Veblen.14 Another member of Adams' generation, Richard T. Ely, 
insisted that institutionalism began long before Veblen appeared 
on the scene.15 Upon listening to the roundtable discussion on the 
subject in 1931, he declared that he had heard the same arguments 
in 1885. At that time he and others who were institutionalists 
(except in name) founded the American Economic Association.16 
Many of his colleagues were, at the time, young economists who 
had been trained in Germany. Upon coming home, they had found 
the field of economics dominated by an old guard steeped in the 
classical tradition. These younger men, in revolting against the 
conservatives, began the school of institutional economics. 
Undoubtedly there is some truth in Ely's assertions. The 
revolt which began in the eighties did fuse with that sparked by 
Veblen after the turn of the century. But it was a milder one 
centering on methodology and some limited reforms. Furthermore, 
it lacked the influence of Veblen. He added a new intensity to the 
revolt, and some new grounds for dissent. 
Although Veblen was not the only important institutionalist, 
his influence came close to dominating the movement. Institu­
tionalism was the voice of dissent, and his voice was the strongest. 
Those who formed the new school often had little in common 
9 Ibid., p.  16. See also "Institutional Economics," American Economic Review, Vol. 
XXII, pp. 105-116. 
10 Gruchy, p. 31.
11 Ayres, American Economic Review Supplement, Vol. XX, p. 47. 
12 Gambs, p. 1.
13 Dorfman, Proceedings American Economic Association Meeting, Vol. XLI, p. 80.
14 Although Veblen was only six years younger than Adams, his influence came
much later. Only after he published his first book, The Theory of the Leisure Class, did
he gain any reputation. By then he was 42. While Veblen's productive career at that
time was in the future, Adams had already distinguished himself. 
15 Ely, American Economic Review, Vol. XXII, pp. 114-116. 
16 Ely, American Economic Review, Vol. XXVI, pp. 141-150. 244  JOHN R. COMMONS
 
except their repudiation of orthodox economics. Occasionally 
economists with views at wide variance with Veblen joined the 
group. In time, it became easier to identify institutionalists by 
what they were against than by what they were for. Consequently, 
the difficulties over definition arose. 
There was much to attack in the orthodox economics at the 
turn of the century. It presented a smug picture of an economy 
efficiently controlled by competitive forces. Members of society 
were assured by the theorists that competition guaranteed them 
incomes equal to the value of their respective contributions of 
services or property. Facts such as the cumulative growth of trusts 
for the purpose of suppressing competition were either ignored 
or minimized. Furthermore, the prevailing economics neglected 
the obvious fact that the economy was not stable. Because the 
economists assumed that the economy automatically could run 
efficiently and justly, there was no need for any government 
intervention.  Governments could  safely  follow the  policy  of 
laissez-faire. 
Just as the orthodox economist's view of the economy invited 
criticism, so did his methodology. In spite of the arguments that 
had been raging since the eighties, many economists followed what 
has been called the deductive approach. Those using it assumed 
that all of economics could be deduced from a few general assump­
tions which are self-evident to most intelligent people. Conse­
quently, such assumption did not require empirical verification. 
What was worse, it often ignored facts at variance with its con­
clusions. Because such information was not readily available, 
economists failed to use statistical evidence. They even ignored 
historical information by assuming that their reasoning was valid 
in almost every period of time and in almost every country. Be­
cause their assumptions involved what they believed was unchang­
ing human nature, they left out all cultural variations in their 
reasoning. Furthermore, their conception of human nature did not 
necessarily correspond to that held by the psychologists of their 
time. But perhaps the most noticeable methodological fault was 
the failure to analyze economic changes over time. They patterned 
their models after the static analysis of physics and consequently 
had been unable to incorporate dynamic elements. In an age when 
the most obvious fact about our economy was that it was under­
going rapid changes, the failure to account for them invited 
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The institutionalists agreed substantially on their criticisms of 
the orthodox economists' picture of the economy and the meth­
odology used in arriving at it. Some emphasized certain portions 
of their common criticisms, others different ones. The gathering 
and evaluating of statistics became the job of some empirically 
minded economists. Some concentrated their studies on the busi­
ness cycle and causes of instability in the economy. Many, in their 
revolt against the formal theory of orthodox economics, specialized 
in the study of special problems and institutions. A synthesizing 
theory they hoped might grow later from such studies. 
Their studies often led to opportunities for participation in 
the creation of institutions. Consequently, many institutionalists 
worked with governments. Those interested in long-run problems 
studied the evolution of economic institutions and their prognosis 
for capitalism's future. 
Although the various problems on which institutionalists 
worked created a picture of diversity, the nature of their concept 
of proper methodology bridged most of their differences. Yet 
there was one very fundamental dividing line between two groups 
of institutionalists : those who would substitute a planned economy 
for private enterprise, and those who would not. Those following 
Veblen tended to be in the first group while the followers of 
Commons tended to be in the second. 
Veblen and Commons have much in common, even though 
their conclusions are different." They both were impressed with 
the rapid economic changes they and their generation witnessed. 
Both believed that the tasks of economics includes the explana­
tion for development. They watched the biological sciences accept 
the Darwinian explanation of evolution and, in doing so, found 
what they thought was a fruitful methodology for economics. 
Both Commons and Veblen believed that men live by habits 
and customs. Not caring to think except under necessity, men 
prefer the security of established routines that develop into insti­
tutions. These institutions change but only when subjected to 
the influences of strong forces. 
The two men differ in their explanations of the cause of 
change. With Commons it is the conflict of interests among indi­
viduals and among groups.18 This conflict originates because there 
17 David Hamilton, pp. 43-50.
 
18 Commons, Institutional Economics, p. 244.
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is a scarcity of economic goods in the world. Yet conflicts must 
be resolved for men to organize production efficiently. Working 
together, men both increase the goods available and create an 
interdependence upon one another. Commons focused his theory 
on how men have resolved their differences in the past. He as­
sumed that there is a good chance they would continue to be 
reasonable in the future. Although free enterprise would be some­
what limited by some reforms providing protection for consumers, 
investors, workers, and farmers, it need not be abandoned. 
While Commons' evolution stressed institutional adaptation to 
changing conditions, Veblen's emphasized the reverse. He demon­
strated how old habits and institutions  inhibit adaptation to 
changes.19 Old instincts, remnants from the days of savagery or 
barbarism, cause men to cling to practices and thoughts that would 
be ridiculous, if objectively viewed. But man is not rational. He 
is a creature of superstitious and anthromorphic propensities. 
Yet some men do think more rationally than others, because 
their jobs condition their minds. These are the industrial workers 
and technicians who work with machines. By watching cause and 
effect sequences they begin to shed notions that ascribe Divine 
intervention, luck, magic, or other supernatural explanations as 
causes. They are practical men who take pride in good and pro­
ductive workmanship.2° 
Unfortunately, the more rational industrial workers (or engi­
neers) are not in control of economic institutions. Instead, a 
leisure class controls both government and industry. This class, 
whose members avoid productive labor as being beneath them, 
has been shielded from the processes that produce rationality. 
Hence, they tend to be conservative (except in consumption) and 
attempt to inhibit any changes in the status quo. 
Being throwbacks to the predatory class that dominated bar­
barian cultures, the members of the leisure class are more inter­
ested in their own pecuniary gain than in production. They engage 
in fraud, chicanery, and other predatory practices that undermine 
the stability of the economy. During boom times their fierce com­
petition, their speculations, and their credit manipulations cause 
them to overtax the economy. Inevitably the credit structure col­
lapses under their excesses. Exogenous forces may restore pros­
perity temporarily but recovery cannot be permanent. 
19 Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class.
 
20 Veblen, The Instinct of Workmanship.
 The Institutional School of Economics  247 
The pecuniary interests seek relief by combining into huge 
monopolies for the purpose of limiting production. This measure 
of stabilization is helpful in maintaining profits only temporarily. 
Finally, it leads to a stalemate of declining production and employ­
ment. Veblen was not sure of the outcome. He thought the govern­
ment might purchase enough armaments and other goods which 
might be produced with the excess capacity. By reverting to war­
like imperialism, a nation might find relief from chronic economic 
stagnation.21 
The sensible alternative, he thought, was unlikely to happen 
in the calculable future. If the technicians and engineers, who 
actually run the industrial enterprises, would revolt from their 
financial masters, the businessmen, they would free the economy 
of the fetters that limit production. By cutting out waste, elimi­
nating selling costs, by canceling financial claims of the vested 
interests, and by putting the idle to work, the engineers could 
increase production many times. Unfortunately they "are a harm­
less and docile sort, well fed on the whole, and somewhat placidly 
content" with their lot.22 Like most of the population, they are 
caught in a web of institutions which inhibit them from making 
drastic changes. 
Thus, while Commons saw an evolution in which men con­
stantly adapted their institutions to changing conditions, Veblen 
saw one in which such adaptation was incomplete and tardy. Al­
though neither was certain of the future, Commons tended to be­
lieve in the possibility of progress, while Veblen could foresee only 
purposeless change. Commons' evolution provided him with incen­
tive to be a reformer, while that of Veblen created only a critic. 
It is but a short step from Veblen's reasoning to the accept­
ance of some form of a controlled economy, and some of his fol­
lowers made that step. But their radical thinking did not signifi­
cantly divide them from the other institutional economists. All 
institutional economists were rebels revolting against orthodox 
economics. For some, the revolt stopped at methodological con­
siderations, for others at reforms for the purpose of providing 
security and stability in the economy, and for a few it did not 
stop short of advocating a complete change in the economic sys­
tem. The extent of the revolt was not as important as the fact that 
they all had the same adversary, the orthodox economists. 
21 Veblen, The Theory of Business Enterprise, p. 256.

22 Veblen, The Engineers and the Price System, p. 135.
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Although the institutional school of economics did not suc­
ceed in replacing traditional economics, it did achieve a consider­
able measure of success. A number of institutionalists made sig­
nificant contributions to economic knowledge and pursued highly 
successful careers. Their spiritual leader, Veblen, achieved the 
distinction of being America's most outstanding economist, at least 
in reputation. Yet it was not his positive contributions that gained 
him his eminence, but rather his provocative criticism. He wrote 
with a strange style, a blend of elements that attracted left 
wingers,  malcontents,  nonconformists,  intellectual  snobs,  and 
numerous other people who enjoyed his pungent phrase-making. 
The intention here is not to disparage his analytic ability, but to 
point out that his manner of writing probably was as influential 
as anything he said. His irony, which approached dead-pan humor, 
continues to fascinate his readers. Three of his books, The Theory 
of The Leisure Class, The Higher Learning in America, and 
The Theory of Business Enterprises today enjoy such wide cir­
culation that they have been made available in paperback editions.23 
Veblen set men to thinking, even when he did not convince 
them. His books began to appear at a time which favored their 
reception. Shortly after The Theory of the Leisure Class and The 
Theory of Business Enterprise were published, the magazines of 
the country erupted in a wave of criticism of business and politics. 
Although not connected with Veblen, the magazine writers who 
gained the name muckrakers seemed to add documentation to his 
assertions. On the political front, the progressive movement radi­
ating out from Wisconsin also attacked the status quo. Here the 
link with institutional economics was through Commons and not 
Veblen, but the movement added fire to the revolt against tradi­
tional economics. 
While Veblen served as a publicity agent for the revolt and 
Commons directed it into channels of reform, a third prominent 
leader of the institutionalists assumed a quieter role.24 Wesley 
Mitchell limited his role to that of a scholar. Unlike his teacher, 
Veblen, he did not write speculative accounts of the evolution of 
capitalism. Neither did he step out of the role as an economist and 
assume the one of reformer or public administrator as Commons 
did. Instead, he patiently studied the operations of the economy 
while remembering the institutionalists'  criticisms of orthodox 
methodology. 
23 Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class, The Higher Learning in America, The
Theory of Business Enterprise.
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Mitchell confined his studies largely to what he could verify. 
He wanted to test each hypothesis empirically before he would 
accept it. Consequently, he began with a subject that would lend 
itself to measurement, that of money. After publishing several 
articles on the subject, he completed his study with his A History of 
the Greenbacks.25 In the process of writing it, he discovered that 
the available index numbers were not adequate. To remedy the 
situation he turned to developing some statistical techniques of 
his own. His interest in money and in statistics lead to a study 
of the business cycle. Originally this subject, which was to absorb 
so much of his interest, was to be covered in an introduction to 
a work on "The Money Economy." Instead,  it grew into his 
classic book, Business Cycles, which he published in 1913.26 
Shortly after World War I he became the director of the 
National Bureau of Economic Research. With the facilities of this 
organization, he was able to extend his study of business fluctua­
tions even farther. He and his co-workers used their ever-growing 
arsenal of empirical techniques to gather facts on the numerous 
time series, composition, and changes in the national income, and 
anything they could find related to the operation of the business 
cycle. The National Bureau, in continuing this work, today stands 
as a monument to its founder, Wesley Clair Mitchell. 
Veblen, Commons, and Mitchell each had a number of promi­
nent students and followers. In the past, their common revolt 
against orthodox economics, and their determination to be identi­
fied as a school, have given these followers a measure of unity. 
The question now is, will there continue to be an institutional 
school of economics? Or will it pass from the scene when its dis­
tinguished but elderly adherents are gone? I believe that the insti­
tutional school is dying. 
The one issue that held institutionalists together no longer 
has the force it once had. Revolts against the thinking of the 
main body of economists may break out in the future, but they 
are weak at present. Much of the faulty methodology of the older 
economists has been corrected. The manifold forms of today's 
empirical research stand out in marked contrast with the deductive 
techniques of fifty years ago. 
25 Wesley Clair Mitchell, A History of the Greenbacks.
 
26 Wesley Clair Mitchell, Business Cycles.
 250  JOHN R. COMMONS 
Although much of the acceptance of the need for more empiri­
cal investigations has been on an intellectual basis, part of it has 
stemmed from the comparative ease in raising money for such 
projects. A considerable amount of Commons' success came from 
his ability to promote such projects. He found it easier to raise 
money for this type of work than for that of a more theoretical 
nature. The trend which had its beginning with the institutionalists 
has continued to this day. 
Institutionalists were not the only ones who could be tempted 
by research grants. Using such tools as statistical methods and 
econometrics, the newer economists have come to do the lion's 
share of empirical research. So the institutionalists won their 
methodological battle, but in doing so lost one of their points of 
dissension. 
The battle against the rigid doctrine of laissez-faire also has 
been won. The reforms Commons and others advocated in the 
teeth of this doctrine have given individuals security against the 
harsh operations of the economic system. Then, when the more 
orthodox economist, Keynes, introduced techniques for stabilizing 
the economy, much of the force of the institutionalists' revolt 
was gone. When the Keynesian techniques met with apparent 
success, proposals for a controlled economy also were effectively 
shelved. Apparently this country could retain all the benefits of 
free enterprise while at the same time claim the benefits of eco­
nomic planning. 
Institutionalists also have had much of their special subject 
matter stolen from them. At one time they had the subject of 
monopoly almost to themselves. Except as an aberation from the 
norm of perfect competition, the subject remained an undigested 
lump in the traditional theory. In time, different writers began 
to deal successfully with the subject. Finally, Edward H. Cham­
berlin and Joan Robinson fitted it into price theory.27 
Morris A. Copeland declared that a large part of the eclipse 
of institutionalists in late years stems from the fact that other 
economists have developed more realistic dynamic models.28 Insti­
tutionalists had complained for years that their orthodox com­
petitors thought along static lines. In contrast, Veblen, Mitchell, 
and others of their school made use of what they called a cumula­
tive sequence. Although today's models would not meet all of 
27 Friday, "Veblen Versus Chamberlin."
 
28 Copeland, American Economic Review, Vol. XLI.
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the criticisms, they do a neater job of analyzing the same prob­
lems that occupied the institutionalists. 
Modern economists are showing an increasing interest in 
the field of economic development. In doing so, they are taking 
over the subject that has held the greatest interest of any for 
institutional economists. Veblen complained that the economics 
of his day was pre-Darwin in its orientation. Although "the phe­
nomena of growth and change are the most obtrusive and most 
consequential facts observable in economic life,"29 they clung to 
their static analysis. In contrast, Veblen, Commons, and other 
institutionalists made the evolution of the economy the central 
feature of their studies. Although some only gave lip service to 
this evolutionary approach, almost all institutionalists have agreed 
on its importance. Some such as Allan Gruchy declare "that 
Institutionalism is primarily a positive, creative movement which 
aims at broadening the nature and scope of economic science by 
pushing beyond basic theory to create a theory of our developing 
economic system."3° 
In recent years interest in undeveloped countries has provided 
incentives to explore the reasons why some economies have grown 
while others have not. The apparent stagnation of our economy 
during the thirties and its rapid postwar growth also have focused 
attention on economic development. Similarly, the strides with 
which the Soviet economy apparently has been catching up with 
ours have provided a compelling incentive to study the growth of 
our own. 
Some of the studies in economic development have been 
limited to the creation of models constructed in such a way to 
demonstrate which combination of variables lead to economic 
expansion. Others have gone beyond to a study of each determi­
nant that might be used in any mode1.31 When economists begin 
to search for all the conditions that must be considered as pre­
requisites to economic growth, they find it necessary to cross the 
boundaries of their discipline. They follow in the steps of the 
institutionalists by studying all the psychological, cultural, and 
social factors revelant. In fact, if Gruchy's32 or Ayres'" definition 
were accepted, many of those studying economic development 
29 Veblen, in Wesley C. Mitchell, ed., What Veblen Taught.
 
30 Gruchy, American Economic Review, Vol. XLVII, p. 13.
 
31 Abramovitz, pp. 132-182.
 
32 Gruchy.
 
33 Ayres, American Economic Review, Vol. XLI, pp. 47.55.
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are institutional economists. Yet the fact that their work is similar 
to the institutionalists' does not make them members of that school. 
Many of them would be surprised to be so classified. It is doubt­
ful that the institutionalist had much of an influence on most of 
those studying economic development. 
Perhaps the greatest jurisdictional encroachment has been 
in the study of institutions. While the study of the subject has 
languished in the hands of economists, it has undergone a con­
siderable development in the hands of sociologists. Although 
Charles Horton Cooley provided inspiration  for  institutional 
economists, his influence among sociologists has been even greater. 
Beginning with him a substantial literature has accumulated on 
the subject of institutions. By now the study of institutions is one 
of the primary tasks of sociology. According to J. 0. Hertz ler, 
"one of the most important tasks of further conceptualization, 
classification and generalization in the field of theoretical sociology 
relates to social institutions."34 Although sociologists, until recently, 
have dealt with economic institutions only incidentally, they are 
now entering this field. For example, Talcott Parsons along with 
Neil Smelser have attempted a new synthesis of sociology and 
economics in their Economy and Society.35 
From the economists' side there have been a few skirmishes 
along the border of sociology. In the fields of labor economics, 
entrepreneural theory, organizational theory, marketing theory, 
economic history and development, such encroachments hardly 
can be avoided. Yet no general synthesis of economics and soci­
ology, such as was envisioned by the institutionalists, has been 
attempted by economists. 
What has happened on both sides of the border between 
economics and sociology might be taken by some as a neo­
institutionalism. Certainly modern analysis is moving along the 
very lines which institutionalists had staked out for themselves 
long ago. Yet it is difficult to establish sufficient links to validate 
any claim to any continuous movement. At least to this observer, 
it appears that this is another case where outsiders have moved 
in to take over the institutionalists' subject matter. 
The decline of institutionalism has been the result of more 
than the appropriation of its methodology and subject matter by 
the main stream of economics and sociology. The greatest cause 
34 Hertz ler, pp. 1, 2.
 
35 Parsons and Smelser.
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of the decline of the school has stemmed from the centrifugal 
nature of its practical bias. Because institutionalists tended to be 
overly suspicious of theory, they tended to encourage their stu­
dents to concentrate on practical problems. Hence, institutionalists 
became labor economists, public finance and taxation experts, 
agricultural economists, monetary theorists, transportation and 
public utility economists, and numerous other specialists. Although 
such economists might hold chairs at reputable universities, they 
did not pass on institutionalism to their students.36 Instead they 
merely taught them subjects from their own fields. What theory 
the students learned often would be taught by noninstitutional 
faculty members. Even when an institutionalist did teach theory, 
his influence often was diluted by that of his other colleagues. 
Furthermore, the lack of textbooks, except on an elementary level, 
precluded teaching institutional theory except to a handful of 
graduate students. Even these few were not a total gain for the 
school. To find positions they often were forced to follow one 
of the special fields of economics and consequently did not pass 
on their special training. 
In some cases institutional economists found a greater knowl­
edge of orthodox economics necessary for their own studies. Men 
such as Alvin Hansen, a student of Commons, and Paul H. 
Douglas, a student of Mitchell, made significant contributions to 
the main stream of economics. Although such men might have 
held certain sympathies with institutionalism, their work tended 
to carry them out of the school. In this way it lost some of its 
ablest economists. 
Another large number of students trained by institutional 
economists were drained into the government service. This was 
particularly true of Commons' students. The University of Wis­
consin became a pioneer in the training of persons for public 
administration. Ostensibly, Commons and his colleagues were 
training economists, but in reality they were staffing government 
agencies. 
Governments needed the type of persons trained by institu­
tional economists. When governments began to enter the fields 
of economic regulation, they needed people who could dig up in­
formation; they did not need theorists. Often the success of ad­
ministrative commissions depended on how well staff members 
36 C. E. Ayres of the University of Texas and Allan Gruchy of the University of 
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could marshall facts to support their cases before both the courts 
and the public. In this kind of research, the Commons-trained 
students excelled. Consequently, many found positions in govern­
ment and many became prominent administrators. 
Today governments continue to require such persons, but do 
not insist they be trained as economists. A new field of training, 
that for public administration, has been developed to fulfill the 
same need. In this training, much of the study of economics has 
been replaced by that more closely related with governmental 
administration. 
Economists continue to have roles in government, but in pro­
fessional instead of administrative capacities. Because the type of 
economic problems has grown in complexity, the casual training 
in economics such as that possessed by those trained by institution­
alists is no longer adequate in many cases. Government economists 
must be able to follow developments in their field. Because they 
are trained as scholars, they do not attempt to cope with the 
numerous administrative details that plague administrators. In­
stead the economists contribute professional advice on economic 
problems  to  administrators and legislators who make policy 
decisions. 
This failure to develop unified institutional theory, because 
of members of the school becoming either specialists or govern­
ment economists, is important. The writing of monographs on 
specific economic problems, or the elevation of men to high ad­
ministrative positions, may create a distinguished membership, 
but it contributes very little to the long-run vitality of a school. 
Only Veblen and Commons made any significant contributions 
to the unification of the theory. Unfortunately, Veblen's con­
tribution was a negative one, while Commons' did not appear until 
1934, when the school was definitely on the decline. His insights 
were important and interesting, but they needed further work 
before they could contribute to unity in institutional theory. 
Subsequent developments in both sociology and economics 
indicate that the institutionalists might have worked their vein of 
theory more profitably. The price of their failure was the loss 
of their subject matter to their competitors. While they continued 
to attack traditional economics, the justification for their revolt 
gradually vanished. The orthodox economists both corrected many 
of their methodological faults and extended their studies into the 
areas the institutionalists had accused them of neglecting. As The Institutional School of Economics  255 
Kenneth Boulding claimed before the American Economic Associ­
ation meeting in December of 1956, institutional economists were 
essentially dissenters. They had an important role in America's 
ideological development. But take away their reasons for dis­
senting, and their reason for existing is gone. 
It is believed by some that the school is approaching its end. 
It may linger for some time, but it is doomed. This does not mean 
that individual institutionalists will not continue to wield an in­
fluence. People will continue to read Veblen and enjoy his works. 
There might even be a rediscovery of Commons. Books written 
by other institutional economists such as Ayres and Gambs will 
continue to be classics in their fields. Undoubtedly the subject mat­
ter of the school will be developed by other economists and sociolo­
gists. Some modern institutionalists may contribute to these further 
developments. But the number is not likely to be so many, or their 
approach so different, that they could be identified as a continuation 
of the institutional school of economics. The institutionalists broke 
off from the main stream of economics only to find themselves 
later swallowed up by that very stream. 
Even though the institutional school of economics comes to 
an end, Commons' contributions should not be neglected. His 
contributions to the history and study of the labor movement have 
a secure place in economic literature, but his ideas on economics 
have not had the attention they deserve. In an age in which there 
is so much interest in the processes of economic development, 
Commons' insights should be re-examined. 
Yet even more important than any of his contributions to 
economic thought, is his practical demonstration of how reformers 
can push along the evolution of society. What he did in the cam­
paigns to establish public utility regulation, workmen's compensa­
tion,  factory safety regulations, and unemployment insurance 
demonstrated his method of reform. Implicit in his reforms was 
the belief that men will be reasonable if presented with proper 
alternatives. Institutions can be created with incentives built in to 
ensure behavior consistent with the general interest. Economic 
and social evolution thus can be directed toward desirable ends 
instead of those dictated by blind chance or revolution. His plan 
of extending small voluntary projects into state programs and 
finally into nationwide ones contributed greatly to the develop­
ment of the U. S. social security system. His influence in bringing 
about great changes in this country's economy entitles him to a 
permanent place of importance in history. BIBLIOGRAPHY
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